The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Switzerland

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Preamble

The initiative to this research project was put forward within the framework of the migration partnership between Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter BiH) and Switzerland. At a bilateral migration dialogue in 2011, the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees of Bosnia and Herzegovina (MHRR) submitted to the inter-ministerial Migration Working Group (WGM) of the Swiss Government a project proposal entitled “Mapping of BiH Diaspora in Switzerland”. The project proposed the creation of “evidence-based policies and programmes, i.e. measures that would improve contribution of Diaspora to the development of BiH in accordance with the analysis recommendations”.

The WGM welcomed the initiative and suggested a process-oriented “step-by-step” approach, including a thorough study in Switzerland of BiH’s Diaspora integration characteristics, networks and potentials for cooperation as a point of departure. Relations to the country of origin and integration towards the hosting country are closely interlinked features of a Diaspora population. Therefore, the research project looks at these two angles.

The two leading agencies for the implementation of the Swiss Migration Partnership strategy in the Western Balkans, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Federal Ministry of Migration (FoM), agreed to co-fund the research project. Both institutions viewed it a welcome opportunity to combine the two different yet closely related perspectives: migration and development and migration and integration. The Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies (SFM) at the University of Neuchâtel has been mandated to lead this two-fold research project.

The study at hand conducted in Switzerland serves as a first step in responding to the initiative put forward by MHRR who strive to improve the contribution of the Diaspora to the overall development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also it portrays a general image of the BiH population and explores their needs and potential for their successful integration in Switzerland. As part of the research project, a separate study about the linkage between Diaspora and development has been conducted and published in BiH.
The presence of migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in Switzerland dates back to the 1960s. These were considered Yugoslavian workers at the time and up until the early 1990s. However, the majority of migrants from BiH stem from subsequent waves, first of economic migration in the 1980s and then political exile following the war that devastated the country between 1992 and 1995. Despite the size of the BiH population in Switzerland, there has been relatively little discussion about them, in contrast to some of the other communities from the Balkans. Although the war in BiH captivated Swiss public opinion, very little is known about the Bosnians now living in Switzerland. It is, in fact, a heterogeneous population, regarding their different migration journeys as well in socio-economic and cultural terms. Given that so little research and studies have been published in Switzerland on the subject of BiH immigrants, the management of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Federal Office for Migration (FOM) commissioned the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies (SFM) at the University of Neuchâtel to compile an overview of this population, outlining their migration history, their economic and demographic situation, their socio-cultural integration in Switzerland and the transnational relations they maintain between Switzerland and BiH. This study seeks to portray a general image of the BiH population, explore their needs and the potential for their successful integration in Switzerland, and the socio-economic development of BiH. As with previous publications issued by the SFM concentrating on the Kosovar, Sri Lankan and Portuguese populations, this study is intended for a wide readership, from professionals in numerous sectors (administrative, social, educational, medical, police, etc.) to private individuals interested in learning more about the lives of BiH nationals living in Switzerland.

**Methodology**

This study has drawn on three main sources of information: the existing literature, statistical data, and semi-structured interviews with individuals and groups. The information thus obtained in Switzerland was subsequently reviewed in relation to the findings of a study carried out in BiH by Adnan Efendić of the University of Sarajevo (School of Economics and Business), between November 2012 and January 2014.

Our study is primarily based on a corpus of research articles comprising scientific publications and official reports. We then consulted various statistical sources, particularly the results of the most recent federal population census, the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS) and other theme-based statistics from the Federal Statistical Office (FSO). One of the difficulties encountered was the absence of precise statistics, due to the fact that, until 1992, Swiss residents from BiH were not categorised separately in the official statistics on all citizens from the former Yugoslavia. What’s more, even after 1992, a considerable number of people from BiH were counted in the statistics as being Croatian or, to a lesser extent, Serbian; these had opted to swap their Yugoslavian citizenship for a Croatian or Serbian passport (and not Bosnian) on account of their stronger affiliation with an ethnic rather than a national identity (see 2.2).
Finally, we conducted around 20 interviews with experts from various professional fields (research, healthcare, education, social welfare, public authorities) and with migrants from the BiH community living in Switzerland. These interviews proved a valuable source regarding various aspects of life for BiH migrants in Switzerland, given the dearth of information in qualitative and quantitative terms.

**Structure and contents of this publication**

The contributions are structured into three chapters, each comprising a number of sub-chapters, which are designed to be read independently of each other.

- Chapter 2 outlines the history of BiH. The objective was to provide a basis for better understanding its historical heritage as well as its social and cultural complexity, from the time of the Byzantine Empire up to the political developments of the 1990s. This brief history also covers the different migration phases of the BiH population to Switzerland.

- Chapter 3 looks in further detail at the socio-demographic characteristics of the BiH population in Switzerland. Here, the objective was to present and interpret the socio-demographic characteristics of the BiH population in Switzerland. Here, the objective was to present and interpret the socio-demographic characteristics of the BiH population in Switzerland. This chapter also covers the different migration phases of the BiH population to Switzerland.

- Chapter 4 addresses the issue of socio-cultural, economic and legal integration of BiH nationals in Switzerland from both a qualitative and quantitative perspective. It also seeks to propose some avenues for reflection on the change in migrants’ transnational relations between Switzerland and BiH.

As each sub-chapter forms an independent unit, certain areas of overlap have been intentionally included, with cross-references to other sub-chapters. Each chapter starts with a summary of the main findings. The individual chapters end with a bibliography which the reader may find useful for more information on the subjects covered. A complete list of bibliographic references quoted in the text can be found at the end of the publication. Furthermore, the various themes covered are illustrated by way of charts, images and quotations from the interviews with experts or migrants. Finally, the Annex includes a list of the individuals consulted and a compilation of relevant organisations and points of contact. This list is not necessarily exhaustive and, given the transient nature of associations and other cultural or sports organisations, we cannot guarantee the validity of this information.

**Acknowledgments**

The authors wish to express their gratitude first and foremost to those, within and outside the BiH community, who agreed to share their experiences, knowledge and expertise, without whose involvement this study would not have been possible. A list of these people is given in the Annex; we would like to thank each and every one of them.

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Special thanks go to Prof. Rustem Simitović, Honorary Consul of BiH in Zurich and former Chairman of the organisation “Matica”, who was always very accommodating in connecting us with key players, whether from BiH or experts in Switzerland. His opinions on the BiH population were of great assistance to us. Thanks also to the other members of the advisory group: Taner Alčehić, Osman Besić, Tarik Kapić and Mario Perić. In addition, the views of Jean-Claude Métraux gave us clearer insight into the mindset of the BiH population after the war. His network of contacts offered us a better understanding of the issues faced by the second generation, the children of the original migrants.

Finally, we would very much like to thank the representatives of the organisations that commissioned this study, who followed our work throughout the empirical and editorial phase: in particular, Stéphanie Guha and Ursula Messerli Baftijaj (SDC) and Stéphanie Zbinden (FOM). We also thank the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Department for Diaspora), which submitted the initial project plan to the Swiss institutions. Moreover, we are grateful to Azra Šarenkapa and Joseph Guntern from the SDC Cooperation Office in Sarajevo. All statements and opinions are those of the authors.

Bashkim Iseni, Didier Ruedin, Dina Bader, Denise Efionayi-Mäder (Project Manager)
Terminology

Balkans (the): A peninsula of South-eastern Europe, surrounded by coastlines on three sides: the Adriatic Sea and the Ionian Sea to the west, the Aegean Sea to the south, and the Marmara Sea and the Black Sea to the east. In general usage, the word “Balkans” refers to the territories of the former Yugoslavia.

This study concerns the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) living in Switzerland, i.e. all residents from BiH. While the bulk of the statistics here refer to BiH citizens (i.e. not naturalised), the stories recounted also concern those with dual citizenship or former Yugoslavian migrants from BiH now naturalised as Swiss citizens.

For ease of reading, we use the terms “Bosnian” or “Bosnian population” for the entire BiH population in Switzerland, i.e. the original immigrants from BiH (first generation) as well as their descendants (second generation). These are referred to variously as “migrants” or “Bosnian immigrants”. Note that the term “Bosnian” should not be confused with “Bośniak” (see below).

Bośniak: Unlike the term “Bosnian” (Bosanac), which applies to all inhabitants of BiH, the term “Bośniak” refers only to the Muslims of BiH (Bošnjak). See the definition of “Muslim” below and further details in Chapter 2.1 (Box 2).

Community: The term “community” is used in this paper synonymously with migrant group or population and does not have any particular ethnological or sociological connotation. Neither does it entail any negative element such as in the meaning of communitarianism, a term with particular connotations in current political and public debate. Instead, and to paraphrase a renowned sociological encyclopaedia, we use the term “community” to refer to a group of people having something in common with each other.

Croats: BiH citizens with the Croatian language and culture; also referred to as Bosnian Croats in this paper.

Diaspora: A term derived from the Greek for “dispersion”. We use this term according to the approach taken by the Global Forum on Migration and Development: A diaspora is composed of individuals originating from one country, living outside this country irrespective of their citizenship or nationality, who, individually or collectively, are or could be willing to contribute to the development of this country. Descendants of these individuals are also included in this definition (see also a more detailed definition in chapter 4.7).

Džemat: Bosnian Islamic place of congregation.

Endogamy/exogamy: Endogamy refers to marriage within the same ethnic, religious or national group. The opposite is exogamy (mixed marriage).

ESPOP/STATPOP: In 2010 the Federal Statistical Office (FSO) replaced its ESPOP Statistics by STATPOP, which forms part of the statistics of the new population census system. The permanent resident population comprises: Swiss citizens having their primary place of residence in Switzerland; foreign nationals holding a permanent or temporary residence permit of at least 12 months (B or C permits or FDFA permits (international public servants, diplomats and their families); foreign nationals holding a short-term residence permit for a total period of at least 12 months (L permit); asylum seekers whose applications are being processed (F or N permit) residing in Switzerland for a total of at least 12 months.

Ethnic group: This term was initially used in the social sciences to denote groups of humans sharing the same identity, united by common elements of civilisation such as history, language, religion, culture or origin. The term has subsequently been adopted by state and national projects that justify their existence on the basis of ethnic arguments.

GDP: Gross Domestic Product.

Gross Domestic Product.

Muslim / muslim: The term “Muslim” (MUSLIMAN) with an uppercase “M” was used 1968 to 1993 in a national sense, referring to Slavic Muslims in SFRY, irrespective of the degree of their adherence to the faith. The term “muslim” (musliman) with a lowercase “m” is used in the religious sense, referring to all followers of Islam regardless of their nationality.

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD): A type of serious anxiety disorder that may occur after a person undergoes extreme emotional trauma.

Serbs: BiH citizens with the Serbian language and culture; also referred to as Bosnian Serbs in this paper.

Sex ratio: Statistical measure of the number of men per 100 women.

Socio-cultural integration: Adoption by migrants of the host country’s culture, i.e. learning the language, and also adoption of the lifestyles and values of the host society and identification with these. This also includes demographic aspects (marriage, fertility rate), social contacts, inclusion in formal or informal social networks, etc.

Socio-economic or structural integration: Includes the indicators of professional integration but also the level of education and possibly also housing conditions.

Transnationalism: Areas in which migrants create real or virtual links between their country of origin and the host country.
In brief

– Between 1945 and 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was one of the six constituent federal units forming the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). BiH is characterised by ethnic diversity that prevailed until 1992, especially by way of mixed marriages.

– The break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s also marked the start of the war in BiH, which lasted from 1992 to 1995.

– During the war and the post-war period, Switzerland intervened in BiH by way of a humanitarian aid programme. It subsequently became an active player in the process of reconstruction and democracy-building. Switzerland developed a privileged relationship with this country, specifically through the establishment of a bilateral cooperation programme and by signing a migration partnership in 2009.

– There have been three waves of immigration from BiH to Switzerland. The first two waves (in 1960 and 1980 respectively) were made up of seasonal workers, unskilled for the most part, coming in response to calls for labour in Switzerland and the lack of opportunities for social mobility in the former Yugoslavia. The majority of these migrants were males from the Serb or Croat community. According to the 1971 Yugoslavian census, only 1.5 % of all emigrants from BiH were working in Switzerland, while most were working in Germany (71 %) or Austria (17 %). In 1991, the Federal Council introduced its three-circle policy, bringing a halt to economic migration from countries in the third circle, which included Yugoslavia and the countries that emerged after its break-up.

– The third wave of immigration to Switzerland comprises BiH nationals fleeing the war. As asylum requests peaked at almost 7000 in 1993, the Federal Council decided to grant provisional collective asylum. Despite the cessation of hostilities with the Dayton Agreement in 1995, national reconciliation in BiH has remained difficult, complicating the return of refugees and their reintegration.

• In light of the conflict and the divisions this has created within the BiH population, quite a number of migrants now identify with the concept of “Yugoslavism”, regarded as a defence against nationalist assimilationism on all sides.
2.1 History of Bosnia and Herzegovina

To understand the diaspora from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in Switzerland, we need to be aware of the country’s past and the conditions under which BiH citizens migrated to Switzerland. A brief historical interlude is thus necessary, in terms of both the socio-political changes in the country of origin as well as the successive waves of BiH migrants to Switzerland.

After the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, there were armed conflicts in BiH where all sides wanted to defend their own political and territorial claims. Given the serious human repercussions of these wars, the past – both distance and recent – remains a very sensitive subject. This extreme politicisation of history constitutes a major obstacle to the country’s long-term stability and, as a consequence, the return of refugees to their region of origin, whether inside or outside of the country’s boundaries.

Legacy of the Ottoman Empires

This former republic of the Yugoslavian federation is historically known as “Bosnia and Herzegovina” as it comprises two regions: Bosnia, a predominantly mountainous region to the north with a continental climate, and the smaller Herzegovina to the south with a more Mediterranean climate. The present territorial borders of BiH and its classification as a contemporary political and territorial unit date back to the period of foundation of Socialist Yugoslavia (1945) under President Tito. However, the current territory of BiH formed an integral part of the Ottoman Empire for a period spanning five centuries, from the 15th to the 19th century.

“Bosnia” was one of the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire (known as eyalets, subsequently vilayets) (Figure 1). The province of “Bosnia” was broken down into administrative divisions (sanjaks), each of which was divided into cantons or districts (kazas). Most Ottoman provinces were governed by local inhabitants who had converted to the dominant religion, Sunni Islam. Control of the local populations under the Ottoman administration was governed by the millet system.

Although BiH was part of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires for a lengthy period of its existence, it was also under Austro-Hungarian administration for three decades (1878–1918). The influence of this rich and varied past, not only Byzantine and Ottoman but also Roman Catholic, still marks the urban and rural landscape of BiH, whether visually, socially or culturally. Architectural remains from the Ottoman period, as well as from the Byzantine and Habsburg Empires, are still dotted across the country’s towns and cities, mainly in the form of mosques and churches, whether Orthodox or Catholic. However, the Ottoman legacy is strongest in the towns, with many old bazaars and public steam baths or hammams still remaining. The food and lifestyle as well as social and cultural traditions and practices stemming from the Ottoman past are still omnipresent among the different faiths, whether Muslim, Orthodox or Catholic.

Figure 1: The Ottoman province of Bosnia Eyalet in 1609:

Vilayet in 1880:

Box 1: The Ottoman millet system

A millet was a legally protected religious community. The Ottoman Empire remained a feudal system for the best part of its existence, occupying various territories by force and repression. According to the historical context, however, it was also characterised by relative tolerance towards Christians and Jews. The latter, expelled from Spain in 1492, settled in several different Ottoman provinces. In fact, to make this vast Empire work, the Sublime Porte (diplomatic term used for the Ottoman Empire, referring to the monumental gate of honour of the Sultan’s government) pragmatically also allowed non-Muslims to hold leading positions in certain sectors of Ottoman society (specifically those occupations considered impure in the Muslim faith, such as finance). Also of note is the fact that some of the Empire’s provinces and cities were governed by Christians. A considerable number of poor, dominated Christian populations chose to convert to Sunni Islam, i.e. to join the Sunni Islam millet, mainly for socio-economic reasons. By converting to the dominant religion, they were exempt from having to pay the tax on non-Muslims (çiziye).
Transition to the national era

Until the nineteenth century, the inhabitants of the area, like most other Europeans, identified themselves by social class and religious affiliation. The concepts of ethnicity or nationality, as modern socio-historical and political categories, were not as distinctive as in the period following the transition from the Ottoman era to a territorial and political order based on the centralised nation state. As with most other modern European states, the nineteenth century was a period of transition for South-east Europe into the ethno-national era. This transition marked the introduction of ethnic or national phenomena into the politics of the Balkans. By ethnic or national, we mean the socio-cultural and political categories that evolved historically and not objectively, “natural” facts. The nineteenth century was a time of great social change for the region, reviving memories of ethnic resentment that can still be perceived today. In the context of the Oriental Crisis of 1840, and faced with the political and territorial decline of the Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers decided at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 to transfer administration of BiH to Austria-Hungary (as an Ottoman protectorate). However, Austria-Hungary decided to annex BiH completely in 1908. This gave the country a Western political regime, marking the start of the modern Habsburg state.

The entity of BiH is also renowned in European history for one particularly fateful event: in June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary was assassinated in Sarajevo. This attack by a local nationalist triggered the outbreak of the First World War. After the war ended in 1918, the “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes” was proclaimed, renamed the “Kingdom of Yugoslavia” in 1929. BiH remained part of this kingdom until the outbreak of the Second World War. It should be noted that this kingdom deliberately abolished the historical boundaries. The conflict between Serbs and Croats on the structure of the Yugoslavian state left very little space for Bosnian Muslim to forge their own identity.

Formation of Tito’s Yugoslavia

In 1941, Yugoslavia was occupied by Nazi Germany. The region that is now BiH, through its geographical configuration, became the spearhead of the partisan guerrillas’ resistance to Nazi occupation. The creation of modern-day BiH, with its present administrative borders, was decided at a session of the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ). This historic meeting was held in November 1943 at the BiH town of Jajce. It was led by Josip Broz Tito and the elite of the partisan resistance. The status of BiH was thus cemented as a Yugoslavian federal entity, composed of and led by its three main ethnic groups, which shared a common language but differed in religion; i.e. Muslims, Serbs (Orthodox) and Croats (Catholic). BiH attained this status from the time of the creation of the Republic of Yugoslavia, just after the Second World War.

BiH was one of the main driving forces behind this Yugoslavian political union, because it represented a multi-ethnic political entity. More specifically, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was made up of eight federal entities: six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, BiH, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia) and two regions, subsequently called autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina). The populations recognised as constituent peoples were the Slovenes, Croats, Muslims3, Montenegrins, Serbs and Macedonians. The various “nationalities” were minorities living in the different republics or provinces of the SFRY, whose “parent nation” was outside of Yugoslavia, such as Albanians, Hungarians, Turks, Italians, Romanians, among others.

Yugoslavia was a country under Communist influence (subsequently Socialist) with recognised sovereignty on the international stage. It rose to the rank of a regional power and enjoyed international prestige as a leader of the non-aligned countries. The country embarked on a process of decentralisation in 1974, opting for self-management. In 1981, just one year after the death of the charismatic leader Tito, the SFRY, facing a serious structural, economic and financial crisis, suffered a period of major political upheaval and international blockades. The tension between the federation and its constituents became palpable, undermining the interethnic peace on which the entire political union was based.

Box 2: Muslims, Bosnians, Bosniaks

Note that, in the context of BiH, the term “Muslim” (Musliman) with an uppercase “M” was used in a national sense between 1968 and 1993, referring to all islamised Serbo-Croatian speaking Slavs irrespective of the degree of their adherence to the faith. The term “muslim” (musliman) with a lowercase “m” is used in the religious sense, referring to all followers of Islam regardless of their nationality. While the Muslims of BiH under Tito were initially classed as “undeclared”, they were officially designated “Muslims” with a capital “M” in 1968, as a separate nation of Yugoslavia. In 1993, the term “Muslim” in the sense of a nation was replaced by “Bosniak” (Bošnjak). This should not be confused with the term “Bosnian” (Bosanac), which refers to all inhabitants of BiH (see also the Terminology).

What happened next is well known: the disintegration of the Yugoslavian federation and outbreak of armed conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia, which rapidly spread to BiH. The war in BiH broke out in 1992 and lasted until 1995.

1 Referring to the sense of nation as a cultural community.
2 The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed at a meeting of ZAVNOBiH (Zemaljsko Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Osloba Đenja Bosne i Hercegovine, State Anti-fascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina).
3 Serbo-Croatian is a pluricentric language with four or five mutually intelligible standard varieties: Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Montenegrin (incipient) and Burgenland Croatian.
4 Prior to 1971 Muslims had to declare themselves either Croat, Serb, or “undeclared” in censuses.

In March 1992, a year after the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia, a referendum for independence was organised in BiH. Although it was boycotted by the vast majority of Serbs, independence was subsequently proclaimed. The Bosnian Serbs had the political and later also armed support from Serbia. A bloody interethnic conflict erupted between Muslims, Serbs and Croats, who held differing political visions. Many civilian victims were killed by the practice of ethnic cleansing. Faced with the extent of human tragedy, following the discovery of camps holding civilian populations of BiH and the Srebrenica massacre 5, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) issued a list of indictments for crimes of war, crimes against humanity and genocide. All of these war criminals have now been arrested, and most of them brought to justice and condemned before an international court.

Apart from the human loss and the scale of destruction, the war in BiH triggered the displacement of a large part of the population both within and outside of the country. The war ended with Western military intervention and the Dayton Agreement, heavily sponsored by the United States. This entailed a NATO-led international Implementation Force (IFOR) of 60,000 soldiers, with a mandate to restore and maintain the peace and security of the region. IFOR’s mission was then progressively scaled down to peacekeeping duties with a Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and finally support measures by the European Union’s multinational stabilisation force (EUFOR).

The State of BiH since 1995

The Dayton Agreement, formally signed in Paris in December 1995, divided BiH into two political-territorial entities: the Bosniak-Croat Federation (subsequently named the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), covering 51% of the country, and the Serb Republic of BiH (Republika Srpska). The Dayton Agreement was a compromise between Bosniak, Croat and Serb leadership and established a new governmental set-up. The Agreement largely recognised new post-war ethnic-territorial situation, while seeking to create a common institutional basis at multiple levels, so as to guarantee the peace and maintain the country’s unity.

The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Republic form the State of BiH, with Sarajevo as its capital (Figure 2). The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided into 10 cantons which are subdivided into municipalities. The Serb Republic has a centralised government in Banja Luka and is directly divided into municipalities. Each of the two entities has its own constitution, government and parliament. At the intersection of these two political entities lies Brčko District, a small administrative unit of particular significance for interethnic peacekeeping. Brčko, in the north of the country, is an administrative division of its own, just like the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Republic.

In general, the process of consolidating the State of BiH and the ensuing fragile interethnic equilibrium were supported over many years by an international presence. The institutional architecture of BiH following the Dayton Agreement is characterised by multiple political levels. The cost of maintaining this institutional and political configuration is high, hindering the smooth functioning of BiH as an efficient and modern state.

Switzerland’s activities during the war were by way of a humanitarian aid programme; since then, it has participated in the recon-

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5 In July 1995, more than 7000 Bosniak men and boys were killed by the Army of Bosnian Serbs (VRS). The massacre was classified as genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2001, a ruling confirmed in 2007 by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
construction and democracy-building process. As with other European countries, Switzerland counts the stability of the Balkan region as one of its foreign-policy objectives, a necessary condition for guaranteeing peace. Similarly, economic development is an important goal of European social and political integration, which should eventually see BiH join the European Union. Given the number of BiH citizens living in Switzerland, in particular, the two countries have developed a privileged relationship.6

On this matter, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg ruled that this system was discriminatory.8 Brussels subsequently made this decision a political requirement for BiH to receive EU candidate status. This requirement calls for a revision of the BiH Constitution and, as a consequence, the Dayton Agreement. This pressure has begun to bear fruit, with the Sarajevo Canton Assembly recognising on 30 January 2013 the equality of representatives of the country’s “constituent peoples” and members of the other groups.9

Box 3: BiH – facts & figures

Official name of the country: Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
Capital city: Sarajevo
Demonym: Bosnian-Herzegovinian, BiH citizens, or Bosnian
Official languages: Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian
Area: 51 100 km²
Population: 3 829 000 (2013 estimate)
Density: 74 inhabitants/km²
Urban population: 48.3 %
Political system: Federal semi-presidential republic
Legislature: House of Representatives and House of Peoples
Currency: BiH convertible mark (BAM)
Human development indicator (world HDI ranking in 2012): 81/186
GDP (2012 estimate): USD 18 billion
Unemployment (2012 estimate): 28 %
Inflation (2012): 2.2 %
Imports of goods and services (2012 estimate): USD 10.2 billion
Exports of goods and services (2012 estimate): USD 5.4 billion
Number of high-speed Internet subscribers (2011): 430 247
Main economic sectors: Metals, timber, foodstuffs, construction

The 1995 Constitution mentions the existence of three constituent peoples of BiH: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.7 BiH citizens who do not identify with any of these three peoples are referred to as “Others” (Ostali) and are not considered legally equivalent to members of one of the three constituent ethnic groups of BiH. For instance, citizens who declare themselves to be “Bosnians” or belonging to other minority groups are ineligible to stand for election to the country’s tripartite presidency or other institutions.

7 In post-Dayton BiH, there are three official languages spoken: Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian.
8 In this matter, two BiH citizens (Sejdić and Finci) of Roma and Jewish origin respectively, and thus classified as “Others”, filed a complaint against BiH with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. In its ruling of December 2009, the Court found that BiH was in violation of Article 14 (Ban on discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
### 2.2 Ethnic diversity

BiH is among other characterised by ethnic diversity. The coexistence of the various ethnic groups is a major challenge in the process of consolidating the post-war society. In fact, destroying this ethnic diversity was one of the major consequences of the nationalist forces during the war of 1992–1995. It must be remembered that this diversity stems from the historic identity of BiH, as a pluralistic society in both cultural and religious terms.

Historically, BiH has long served as a “buffer zone” between Islam, the Orthodox Church and Catholicism, forming also a meeting place for cultural and religious exchange. The existence of several religions alongside each other, at the crossroads of different foreign influences over the years, goes to explain the enduring nature of this diversity; in fact, this may well have been the glue that held society together, speaking the same languages but of different religions. Another particular feature of BiH is its ethnic-religious mix through marriage, which prevailed until 1992. For example, 17% of marriages in BiH in 1991 were mixed, predominantly in urban areas.

The tradition of interethnic mixing and tolerance in BiH was also closely linked to the history of Yugoslavia. BiH was a territory much coveted by its expansion-hungry neighbours, i.e. Serbia and Croatia. The population of BiH, particularly the Muslim component, repeatedly found their identity being co-opted by one of these two states (classified as “Serbs of the Islamic faith” or “Croats of the Islamic faith”). Meanwhile, the Orthodox inhabitants of BiH defined themselves as Serbs, and the Catholics as Croats, leaving somewhere in the middle those who spoke the same language but were Muslim. This most likely explains the tendency among the Muslims of BiH to strategically support the Yugoslav concept, as a supra-ethnic identity. “Yugoslavism” was relatively popular in BiH, regarded as a defence against nationalist assimilationism on all sides.

The recognition of the “Muslim” nation in 1968 was an attempt to contain ethnonationalist tendencies in Yugoslavia.

The 1991 census revealed the following demographic structure regarding the population of BiH: out of a total population of 4,365,000, Muslims/Bosniaks represented 43.7%, Serbs 31.4%, and Croats 17.3%. Of those classified as “Others”, 5.5% called themselves Yugoslavs, and 2.5% were members of minority populations, mainly comprised of Roma, Jews and other minorities.

The general image of BiH, which continues to prevail today among some of its diaspora, is that of interaction, tolerance and mixing between the different populations and religions, living in a region with a rich socio-cultural heritage. "Bosnia only makes sense with a true mix of ethnicities," according to one BiH citizen working with migrant populations in Switzerland. This traditional diversity is still evident in the post-war population. However, it exists now in the form of areas that are ethnically more homogeneous than before, even if minorities still live among them.

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10 For political reasons, the most recent figures mentioned here are those of the 1991 census of Yugoslavia. The census figures were taken from: Roux Michel, “La population de la Yougoslavie en 1991. Inventaire avant le chaos”. In: Méditerranée, vol. 81, 1.2.1995. Dynamiques actuelles de la population dans les pays méditerranéens. pp. 35–46. A census was conducted in October 2013 and initial results indicate a decrease in the population: BiH lost some 600,000 inhabitants since 1991, explained by the consequences of the 1992–95 war and the massive migration of the population: http://bhinfo.fr/premiers-resultats-la-bosnie,3687/ (as at 13 November 2013).
Box 4: Key dates in the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina

1377  Kingdom of Bosnia becomes independent
1463  Start of the Ottoman era
1878  Treaty of Berlin, and BiH under Austro-Hungarian administration
1908  Austria-Hungary formally annexes BiH (October)
1914  Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo (28 June)
1918  Incorporation of BiH into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS Kingdom)
1929  SCS Kingdom becomes the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
1941  BiH is incorporated in the fascist Independent State of Croatia under Ante Pavelić
1943  Creation in BiH of the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ)
1945  Formation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
1968  Official recognition of the “Muslim” nation by Tito’s political regime
1980  Death of Josip Broz Tito
1990  Political pluralism and elections in BiH and throughout Yugoslavia
1991  Outbreak of war in Slovenia and Croatia
1992  Referendum on the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and outbreak of conflict
1992  BiH admitted as a member state of the United Nations
1994  Creation of a joint Bosniak-Croat Federation
1995  Dayton Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Key references


2.3 Three waves of migration to Switzerland

Discussion on BiH migration within Swiss or BiH institutions, or in academic circles, refers to a heterogeneous population that immigrated to Switzerland during several different phases in the past. Most of the experts we consulted as part of this study agree that the bulk of the BiH population in Switzerland arrived at the time of the war. However, the BiH demographic should not be equated with only war refugees or asylum seekers, as it also stems from previous economic migration.
In fact, there have been several waves of immigration from BiH to Switzerland, as is the case with other countries of the former Yugoslavia. While most of the experts and migrants we consulted mentioned just two, i.e. before and after the war, we believe that a distinction should be made between three such waves.

First wave of economic migration
The first wave dates back to the 1960s and was directly linked to the signing in 1965 of an agreement between Switzerland and Yugoslavia to bring in contingents of labour. This was a social security arrangement for seasonal immigration of migrant workers spending several months a year in Switzerland (4 or 9 months) and returning to Yugoslavia for the rest of the year. During this 10-year period, the individuals concerned could take up permanent residence in Switzerland only after the fifth year of working in succession. This also enabled them, if they wished, to have their family join them in Switzerland (see Box 6).

The first wave was thus primarily economic in nature: Switzerland needed the foreign labour, and unemployment was high in Yugoslavia. It should be noted that Yugoslavia faced numerous structural difficulties during this period. Given the poor prospects of an improvement in the job situation, the government recognised and facilitated opportunities to work abroad, a decision that was not without consequences for the Communist ideology of full employment at the time.

However, unemployment was not the only reason drawing Yugoslavians to work abroad: another reason mentioned in the survey was the prospect of earning more money in Western countries, especially Germany. In Switzerland, the first Yugoslavian workers that came from BiH, like those from Kosovo, were largely unskilled. According to the 1971 census, 64% of them had previously worked in agriculture, fishing and forestry. The majority were young men (74% aged under 35). The proportion of female migrants was much lower, at just 19%. However, based on the official figures from the period, the number of BiH immigrants in Switzerland remained low. The Swiss federal census of 1970 showed 24,971 Yugoslavian citizens living in Switzerland (21,201 according to the Yugoslavian census of 1971). During the same period, 478,000 Yugoslavian workers were registered in Germany (411,503 according to Yugoslavian statistics of 1971) out of a total of 671,908 Yugoslavian workers who had emigrated to Europe.

According to the Yugoslavian census of 1971, only 1.5% of all Yugoslavian migrants from BiH were working in Switzerland. The bulk of them left to work in Germany (71%) and Austria (17%). These figures tally with the various stories gathered as part of our study. They confirm that the BiH citizens living in Switzerland in the 1960s were in a minority compared with migrants from other autonomous provinces and republics of Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia).

Several of the BiH experts consulted for this study also reminded us that, in parallel with this migration of unskilled labour, there was also an increasing number of skilled workers from Yugoslavia. Yugoslavian doctors and engineers came to work in Switzerland in response to the demand on the Swiss labour market for these profiles. This information is backed by the substantial and sudden increase in the number of qualified Yugoslavians choosing to emigrate to Western countries: 15,400 Yugoslavians left their country in the first eight months of 1966, while the total number for the whole of 1965 was just 2,700.

Second wave of economic migration
The second wave of immigration from BiH (i.e. from Yugoslavia) to Switzerland dates back to the 1980s. Once again, this was seasonal migration of, for the most part, unskilled workers leaving their country in the midst of economic crisis and high unemployment. This was a time of economic recovery in Switzerland, and certain sectors of the economy, particularly construction, hotels and agriculture, were calling for seasonal workers from abroad.

12 Immigration of Yugoslavian workers by host country, ibid, p. 42.
Swiss statistics do not contain any specific details for BiH citizens as they are all classified as “Yugoslavian”. However, the 1981 Yugoslavian census shows the following statistics on the presence of BiH immigrants in Switzerland: 899 young children (0–7 years), 217 of school-going age (7–14 years), 7216 males aged between 15 and 64, and 3691 females aged between 15 and 64 (of which 3625 were aged between 15 and 49). In total, the number of persons from BiH exceeded 12,000, i.e. 20% of the total number of Yugoslavian immigrants in Switzerland, which came to 60,916 in 1980 according to these sources.

The Swiss statistics show demographic data indicating the rapid and huge increase in the population from Yugoslavia: while the population doubled in size in the years from 1970 to 1980, it almost tripled in the following ten years, reaching 172,777 in 1990.

Table 1: BiH citizens in Switzerland according to the 1991 Yugoslavian census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>7328</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>12,038</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>14,794</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3434</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37,594</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1991 Yugoslavian population census, BiH citizens working temporarily abroad (according to the municipality of origin, destination country and gender), Statistical Bulletin 35 (Statisticki Bilten 235), Sarajevo, June 1994

See Table 1 for statistics on BiH citizens according to the 1991 Yugoslavian census.

According to these Yugoslavian sources, 234,213 BiH citizens (of which 61% were male) emigrated in 1991. These figures indicate a growing tendency among BiH migrants to choose Switzerland as their destination country.

This emigration trend in the 1980s is explained by the exacerbation of the economic situation (high structural unemployment and soaring inflation). As to why they chose Switzerland, this was—as the experts also agree—related to the needs of Switzerland’s booming economy and a slowdown in the migrant workforce from Italy and Spain.

Regarding the ethnic make-up, the bulk of this migration came from Croat ethnic groups (from the municipalities of Odžak, Travnik, Modrića, Tomislavgrad, Gradačac, Bosanski Šamac) and Serb ethnic groups (from the municipalities of Lopare, Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Odžak, Zvornik, Prnjavor). Bosniaks, the demographic majority in BiH, were in third position (mainly from the municipalities of Sanski Most, Prijedor, Bihać, Lopare, Travnik, Ključ). One point worth noting in these official figures is the very low number of immigrants from Sarajevo. The 1991 Yugoslavian census also shows that around 40% of this emigrant population from BiH was female.

Emigration due to the war

The third wave of immigration from BiH to Switzerland concerned the devastating conflict the country experienced. War broke out the day after the country declared independence in March 1992. The civilian populations were particularly badly hit (see 2.1), and around 1.2 million men, women and children fled BiH for other countries between 1992 and 1995. In addition an estimated 1.3 million were internally displaced. Table 2 illustrates the extent of this phenomenon.

The war in BiH rapidly had an impact on Switzerland, with so many victims coming to take refuge. Asylum requests from BiH peaked at almost 7000 in 1993 (Figure 5). Applications fell in 1994 and 1995 but remained at a high level.

The first flow of refugees was mainly of women and children, sent to Switzerland as part of a contingent divided among various Western countries. Many of these refugees confirm that they came to Switzerland “by chance”, following an initial halt in Croatia.
Table 2: Refugees from BiH to Switzerland and several European countries during 1992–1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host country</th>
<th>Number of refugees registered between 1992 and 1995</th>
<th>Change in reception country</th>
<th>Refugees repatriated to BiH</th>
<th>Number of refugees in host countries in 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>24,500</td>
<td>2600</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>10,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>86,500</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>10,100</td>
<td>14,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>246,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>62,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>297,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>137,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>58,700</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>56,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most of them originated from Prijedor (North-West) and Bratunac (East). Applications filed during the years 1993 and 1994 were in relation to family members already in Switzerland as well as family reunifications. A number of survivors from Srebrenica (east of BiH) were then also placed in Switzerland.

The human drama endured by this country in South-east Europe soon captured public opinion, as well as that of Swiss political authorities at a federal, cantonal and local level. The compassion thus generated proved a great comfort to the Bosnian families ravaged by war. The BiH migrants we interviewed expressed their gratitude to Switzerland for the welcome they received at the height of the war in BiH.

The cessation of hostilities and the Dayton Agreement in 1995 led to a sharp drop in the number of asylum applications. Nonetheless, despite the presence of NATO-led troops in the country, BiH experienced a difficult period of reconciliation in the ten years following the Agreement. The main problem for refugees remains the complex issue of reintegration into their towns or villages of origin, a difficult or even impossible task. At the end of the war, the new ethno-political configuration of BiH made it extremely difficult to return to BiH in the short to medium term. The number of new asylum applications from BiH citizens still fluctuated at around 1800 a year between 1996 and 2002, before balancing on a lower level (between 150–500 in 2012).

Box 5: The story of one survivor of the war in BiH

When war broke out in BiH, I was 20 years old. Our village of Kosterjevo was targeted by the Bosnian Serb military and paramilitary forces on 31 May 1992. That day, 117 people from my village were shot in cold blood and women were raped. It was almost a miracle that we survived. My family was dispersed around different regions during the war: my father was taken prisoner and held in concentration camps for 27 long months; my mother and my sister were also taken prisoner. Their lives were spared thanks to the humanity of one Bosnian Serb in a neighbouring village, who pretended to his superiors that he was executing both of them, but then actually released them and saved their lives. We often go back to visit him, to thank him. My brother stepped on a landmine and still to this day has metal shards in his body that they couldn’t remove. In January 1993, I ended up in Srebrenica, and then Tuzla. I was completely cut off from my family for 18 months, with no news from them. We came to Switzerland in July 1994, to join my father, who had come to Switzerland as a refugee. He applied for family reunification for all of us via the Red Cross. I’m now settled in Switzerland and I work as a community healthcare assistant. The war we lived through has left its mark on us forever.
Box 6: Timeline of Swiss migration policy regarding BiH and the former Yugoslavia

1965: Switzerland and Yugoslavia signed a social security agreement marking the starting point of immigration for Yugoslav workers.

1991: The Federal Council introduced the three-circle policy, which halted economic immigration from countries of the third circle, including Yugoslavia and the countries that emerged after its break-up. Due to the war in BiH, the Federal Council decided to grant provisional collective asylum to those displaced by the war. This measure secured the protection needed for those whose lives were in serious and specific danger as a result of the war.

1995: Following the signing of the Dayton Agreement which brought an end to the war in BiH, Switzerland seconded experts and inspectors to assist in implementation of the peace accords.

1996: The Federal Council decided to gradually withdraw its special rules for Swiss residency applicable to BiH citizens. Thus, BiH citizens who were unmarried or those who were married but had no children were requested to leave Swiss territory by 30 April 1997. A pilot project for assistance in returning to BiH was launched.

1998: The three-circle policy (for hiring workers) was abolished in favour of a dual admission system, allowing free circulation of workers within the EU and quotas for the second circle (non-EU countries).

1999: Following a special programme initiated in 1996, Switzerland renewed its aid through a long-term programme on humanitarian aid and development cooperation, specifically in establishing a market economy and democratic structures.

2009: Switzerland and BiH signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a migration partnership with BiH.

2009: A cooperation programme was set up by Switzerland to support BiH in establishing democracy, relaunching the economy, reforming the health system and building basic infrastructure.

2010: In light of the Schengen Agreement, the Federal Council decided to abolish the visa requirement for citizens of BiH.

2013: The cooperation programme between Switzerland (SECO and the SDC) was extended.

Key references
In brief

– It is difficult to make a precise estimate of the number of people from BiH in Switzerland. According to the official statistics for 2010, there are some 35,000 BiH nationals, taking all residence statuses together, although other sources claim almost twice as many, around 60,000, including those who have obtained naturalisation. BiH citizens thus represent around 2% of the foreign population in Switzerland.

– Regarding natural flows, the BiH population in Switzerland experienced a sharp increase in fertility rates between 1993 and 2000 before falling off in one generation to the low rates otherwise observed in Switzerland.

– Regarding migration flows, the number of BiH citizens in Switzerland has fluctuated in line with the various waves of migration. Their number increased sharply when the war broke out, however, peaking in 1994. When the war ended in 1995, the Federal Council decided to terminate the provisional collective asylum status for refugees from BiH; since then, most newcomers to Switzerland belong to the family reunification category or cases of extreme personal hardship.

– As to geographical distribution, more than 65% of the BiH population is concentrated in just seven cantons. St. Gallen is the canton having the highest concentration, with 4802 Bosnian and Herzegovinians, followed by Aargau (4267), Zurich (4039), Vaud (3342), Lucerne (2279), Bern (2065) and Ticino (1938).

– 2011 figures show very little difference between the number of males and females from BiH having their permanent residence in Switzerland, as economic migration and asylum alternated in bringing more men and then women. Likewise, the average age of men and women of Bosnian nationality is very similar, fluctuating around 35 years.

– Like the Swiss, the BiH population is now aging. Apart from a declining fertility rate and thus fewer young people, many of the latter have chosen to obtain naturalisation and thus no longer appear in the statistics for the BiH population.

– While mixed (interethnic) marriages were common in BiH, the war brought about a change in marriage practices, with a higher rate now of endogamy. This trend towards endogamy is also confirmed in Switzerland. Bosnians remain open to the possibility of mixed marriages, although this is more easily accepted if the prospective partner is not from another BiH community. Since 2000, there has been a steady increase in the number of marriages between Bosnian nationals and Swiss.

– Regarding residence permits (see Box 7), most BiH citizens currently hold a B or C permit. Very few have an N, F or L permit with a period of stay of less than 12 months. In contrast, there were far more asylum-related permits in the 1990s at the time of the war in BiH. In fact, the topic of residence permits of BiH citizens, as well as those of other citizens of the former Yugoslavia, is a recurrent and sensitive one, for two reasons. First, following the introduction of the three-circle policy in 1991, certain citizens from countries of the former Yugoslavia, including BiH, were unable to convert their seasonal permit into a more...
permanent residence permit. Secondly, those displaced by the war were given temporary collective asylum, which, when the war ended, was converted for some of them into a humanitarian permit, while others were requested to leave Switzerland.

- Between 1998 and 2006, the number of naturalisations of BiH citizens increased linearly as these gradually met the requirements for obtaining a Swiss passport. From 2006 on, however, the number of naturalisations decreased each year, with no apparent reason to explain this.

### 3.1 Official figures and unofficial estimates

Making a precise estimate of the number of people from BiH in Switzerland is not easy, for a variety of reasons. First, the official data do not include figures on naturalised persons, despite the fact that such individuals may still be classified as members of the BiH diaspora. Secondly, the break-up of Yugoslavia and the emergence of various successor countries complicate the matter for determining the size of the BiH population in Switzerland. Quite frequently, a BiH citizen may hold official documents from two states, e.g. BiH and Croatia. As a result, many people from BiH are actually counted as Croatians. Finally, changes have recently been made in the way the numbers of foreigners are included in Switzerland’s official statistics, to facilitate their compatibility with European statistics. Taken together, these factors may distort the accuracy of any official estimate of the number of BiH citizens in Switzerland.

Data concerning BiH are available only from 1993 on, after the country declared its independence in 1992. Until then, migrants from BiH were counted as foreign citizens of Yugoslavian nationality. While their Bosnian nationality has become official since then, this change does not fully clarify a complex situation. As mentioned above, Bosnian nationals are distinguished by the ethnic group to which they belong: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. The leaders of various Bosnian associations claim that their number in Switzerland is underestimated, as a significant number of individuals from Bosnia are actually included in the statistics as Croatians or Serbs. These people have chosen to convert their Yugoslavian citizenship into Croatian or Serbian rather than Bosnian. Some of them have done so for practical reasons, as Croatian and Serbian nationals can now travel freely within the EU and enter Switzerland. Others maintain that this is part of a trend. It should be noted, however, that citizens of BiH could easily obtain a Serbian or Croatian passport based on their belonging to one of these ethnic groups.

To estimate the number of BiH citizens in Switzerland, we need to follow the new definitions for estimates used by the Federal Statistical Office. The analyses shown in this chapter, following the definition of the permanent resident population, are primarily based on ESPOP (statistics of the annual population status) for the period from 1993 to 2010, and STATPOP (statistics of the population and households) from December 2010 on. According to ESPOP, there were 34,688 permanent residents from BiH living in Switzerland in 2010. This figure refers only to those holding a B or C permit (see Box 7). Taking the STATPOP definition, the Bosnian population living as permanent residents comes to 35,513. This figure also includes migrants with N and F permits as well as those holding an L permit and who have lived in the country for more than 12 months. It is clear, therefore, that the permanent resident BiH population is bigger under the STATPOP definition than with ESPOP.

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15 BiH was admitted as a Member of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 22 May 1992 (the same date as Croatia and Slovenia were admitted). Member States of the United Nations Organisation (UNO), http://www.un.org/en/members/ (as at 20 August 2012).
Box 7: Types of residence permits in Switzerland

Residence permits are granted by the cantonal departments for foreign nationals and/or the Federal Office for Migration.

B permit: resident foreign nationals
“Resident foreign nationals are foreign nationals who reside in Switzerland for a longer period of time for a certain purpose, with or without gainful employment” (permanent employment contract, minimum one year, spouses of Swiss nationals or settled foreign nationals, students, pensioners, etc.). This permit must be renewed yearly for non-Europeans and every five years for EU/EFTA nationals.

C permit: settled foreign nationals
A C permit may be obtained after a period of five or ten years living Switzerland. The residence permit is for an indefinite period; there are no conditions applicable to it, but the permit must be renewed every five years.

F permit: provisionally admitted foreigners
“Provisionally admitted foreign nationals are persons who have been ordered to return from Switzerland to their native countries but in whose cases the enforcement of this order has proved inadmissible (violation of international law), unreasonable (concrete endangerment of the foreign national) or impossible (for technical reasons of enforcement).” This permit allows the holder to work after obtaining authorisation from the canton.

L permit: short-term residents (up to 364 days)
This permit enables the holder to exercise temporary gainful employment, generally for less than one year, or to reside in Switzerland without gainful employment.

N permit: asylum seekers
Asylum seekers are persons who have applied for asylum in Switzerland and whose application is being processed. Pursuant to Art. 43 AsyIA, asylum seekers are authorised, in certain circumstances, to exercise gainful employment from the fourth month after lodging their asylum application.

According to the experts asked and grey literature, some 60 000 persons from BiH live in Switzerland, including the first and second generations as well as naturalisations. This figure is extremely difficult or even impossible to prove. For 2010, the World Bank furnished an estimate of 52 078 persons from BiH in Switzerland. This estimate is similar to that obtained with the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS), taking account of all BiH citizens, including the young and old, as well as naturalisations.  

The progression of the Bosnian population with permanent residence in Switzerland shows a sudden increase in the workforce in 1999. In fact, a large number of Bosnians acquired Bosnian nationality that year, thereby increasing their number in the statistics for permanent residents. Nonetheless, most of these already had a B or C permit, so their overall number did not actually change. This is a statistical artefact as, up until the end of the 1990s, all nationalities of the former Yugoslavia were classified together under “Yugoslavia”.

A combination of naturalisations together with migrants returning to their country of origin has decreased the workforce of the BiH population with permanent residence since 2002. While this portion of the population accounted for almost 3.5% of foreigners in Switzerland in 2000, it now accounts for only 2% (Figure 7). This lower percentage is also due to the increase in the number of immigrants of other nationalities in Switzerland.

The total flow of Bosnian migrants should be viewed in relation to the total number of migrants from the former Yugoslavia. The total number of citizens from countries of the former Yugoslavia represents 4% of the total population living in Switzerland, or around 320 000, which makes up more than 17% of the total foreign population: Serbians 6%, Kosovars 4%, Macedonians 3%, Bosnian citizens 2%, Croats 2%, and Slovenians and Montenegrins accounting for less than 1%
These figures should be viewed with a certain degree of caution, as they are not always an objective reflection of nationality. For example, going by these figures, the total number of Kosovars should be higher than that of Serbians. However, because of Kosovo’s status until recently, as well as the various problems associated with official travel documents, a considerable number of Kosovars are still counted in the statistics as Serbian citizens. They thus preferred to register as Serbians in Switzerland, for practical reasons, and especially so as to be exempt from visas. A similar problem exists for the citizens of BiH who chose to register as Croatian or Serbian nationals.

**3.2 Demographic movements**

To understand the demographic movements of the BiH population in Switzerland, we need to examine both natural and migration flows. Natural flows concern births and deaths among the population, while migration flows result from the movement of those entering the country (immigrants) and those leaving (emigrants). The difference between these two flows gives the net migration of the BiH population in Switzerland.

**Natural flows**

The Bosnian population in Switzerland saw a sharp rise in its fertility rate between 1993 and 2000, before falling back to the low fertility rates observed in both Switzerland and BiH. The total fertility rate (TFR) for female Bosnians was 2.0 children in 2011 per woman, which is still higher than the TFR for Switzerland as a whole (1.5) but closer to the TFR for the total foreign population in Switzerland (1.8) (Figure 8).

In 2000, there were around 45,000 Bosnians in Switzerland; by 2011, the number was just over 35,000. Meanwhile, the number of those of reproductive age (15–49 years) is higher now than 10 years ago. However, despite the increase in the population of childbearing age, the number of births has halved (Figure 8); there has therefore been a distinct decrease in the fertility rate of Bosnians in Switzerland in the space of one generation.

**Source:** http://www.ined.fr/fr/pop_chiffres/pays_developpes/indicat_eun_fecondite/ (as at 14 May 2013)

**Migration flows**

There have been several phases of migration flows of Bosnians to Switzerland in recent decades. As already mentioned, the bulk of this population arrived in three successive waves (see 2.3). The first two waves, from the 1960s until the end of the 1980s, were comprised of men and women coming from BiH to work in Switzerland, including those who came as part of family reunification programmes. The third wave of migration, from 1992 to 1994, consisted mainly of war refugees and asylum seekers. Most of the newcomers since 1995 belong to the family reunification category.

A large contingent came during the war, i.e. the early 1990s, peaking in 1994. Between 1994 and 1998, many of them, mainly asylum seekers, left again, probably for Bosnia. From 1996 on, the Federal Council decided to terminate its provisional collective asylum for BiH refugees and set deadlines for their progressive return.

Those who returned on the basis of the Federal Council’s decision received support under the return assistance programme. The use of forceful measures was envisaged once the given deadlines had expired. In its reply of 1 July 1998 to an urgent parliamentary
question on this subject, the Federal Council disclosed that, of the some 18000 Bosnians admitted to Switzerland on account of the war, 5242 had returned voluntarily under the assistance programme since the end of 1997. Moreover, 6816 people were scheduled to participate in the programme during 1998.18

Since 2002 (and even before that according to Figure 9), there has been a decline in the number of newcomers from BiH (see the black curve in Figure 10). Since then, there have been two main reasons for immigrants coming to Switzerland: family reunifications and cases of extreme personal hardship. Hardship cases include those who had previously been admitted on a provisional basis under the asylum programme and who obtained a residence permit in Switzerland. Since the 2000s, family reunification has become the single most important source of Bosnian immigration to Switzerland.

3.3 Geographical distribution of the BiH population

Migrant populations, particularly those who arrive in a country in a series of successive waves, tend to flock together by way of migration chains for the sake of mutual support but also to preserve ties with their community and country of origin. Migrants also tend to be concentrated in urban centres, which not only are more attractive economically but also allow easier socio-economic integration and therefore easier access to employment. The geographical distribution of the first two waves of BiH migrants was determined by certain factors inherent to all migration but also because Bosnian workers already in Switzerland tended to hire staff from their own regions of origin. However, the distribution of refugees and those given provisional asylum was determined by asylum policy which, since 1990, has distributed asylum seekers according to the cantons’ acceptance quotas.

As shown in Figure 11, more than 65% of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian population in Switzerland is located in just seven cantons,
i.e. (in the order of their number) St. Gallen (4802), Aargau (4267), Zurich (4039), Vaud (3342), Lucerne (2279), Bern (2065) and Ticino (1938). All of these cantons have large towns, such as Zurich or Lausanne. There is also a possibility of family and friends playing a significant role in a migrant’s choice of town. This is the case for St. Gallen, for example, which now has a tradition of Bosnian Serb immigration and a number of active associations (see Figure 12).

The concentration of migrants in urban areas is also important for their community life. The cantons of Valais and Fribourg, for example, have practically no Bosnian associations, due to the low number of Bosnians living there and their dispersion across different localities. Finally, according to one expert, the fact that Bosnians from the same parts of BiH are concentrated in the same Swiss towns is also, to a certain extent, a result of the contingents of refugees admitted during the war. For example, refugees who fled peripheral regions of BiH such as Konjević Polje and Srebrenica (eastern Bosnia) were sent to Yverdon-les-Bains, while those from Prijedor and Kozarac (northern BiH) tend to be concentrated in Lausanne.

### 3.4 Demographic profile

To understand the dynamic of the BiH population, we need to study the various components of its demographics. Age and dependency ratios show us whether the population is young or aging and what proportion of the population is dependent on the working population. Gender relationships and marriage characteristics indicate any imbalances that may exist between males and females as well as the population’s fertility potential.

#### Age and gender

The analysis of the age pyramid for the BiH population is based on its shape, its profile and any irregularities as well as the sex ratio. Figure 13 shows that there is very little difference between the number of males and females from BiH having their permanent residence in Switzerland in 2011. Nonetheless, certain variations can be noted.

In the age group from 15 to 34, there is a 10% excess of males, with a sex ratio of 120, as opposed to 108 for the total foreign population. This surplus of males can probably be

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**Note:** Created with Philocarto: http://philcarto.free.fr
Source: Federal Statistical Office (FSO), STATPOP 2011

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**Figure 11: Size of the Bosnian population in the cantons, 2011**

**Figure 12: Percentage of the Bosnian population within the permanent resident foreign population, 2011**

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19 The sex ratio is a demographic indicator that measures the number of men to each 100 women in a population. The sex ratio generally fluctuates around 105 men for every 100 women and tends to remain balanced before falling below 100 at the higher ages on account of women’s longer life expectancy.
explained by the over-representation of young men among the recipients of humanitarian permits for hardship cases. Meanwhile, in the age group from 35 to 49 years, a sex ratio of 90 indicates a lower proportion of men. This is likely due to the war in the 1990s, when Switzerland admitted many refugees from eastern Bosnia (particularly the region of Srebrenica), where many women had lost their husbands and sons. Most of those who immigrated before the war, mainly for economic reasons, were male, which explains the slight dominance of males in the age group from 50 to 64. The proportion of women increases in the higher age groups, corresponding to their longer life expectancy, with a steady decline in the sex ratio from age 60 on.

The average age of men and women from Bosnia is relatively balanced. There is nonetheless half a year between them (35.5 years for women, 34.9 years for men), undoubtedly due to the fact that women have a longer life expectancy. The shape of the age pyramid overall shows a strong presence of Bosnians between the ages of 25 and 60, i.e. of working age. This concentration is quite noticeable when compared with the shape of the age pyramid for the Swiss population, where the labour force shrinks progressively for each age group over 30. Among the Bosnian population, this decrease does not appear until after the age of retirement. Moreover, the shape of the Bosnians’ pyramid shows a falling fertility rate, with the number of children under 15 in steady decline.

Figure 13: Age pyramid of the Bosnian population with permanent residence in Switzerland, 2011

Is the population aging?
To understand a population, it is necessary to analyse the dependency ratios\(^20\) between the different population categories to determine whether the population is young or aging. The BiH population has certain discrepancies but also some points in common with Swiss residents.\(^21\)

The first difference we can see between citizens of BiH and the Swiss concerns the change in the dependency ratio. In 2011, 68% of economically inactive Swiss were dependent on the remaining 32% making up the labour force (as opposed to 63% in 1995). While the dependency ratio for the Bosnian population in Switzerland was only 39% (as opposed to 68% in 1995), this has been declining for 16 years (Table 3). The second difference concerns young people under 20 years old. More specifically, the number of young Bosnians in Switzerland has been falling sharply since 1995, with the dependency ratio of the under-20s down from 64% to 33% in 2011. This means that there are fewer children per adult (normally working). There are two rea-

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\(^{20}\) The dependency ratio measures the proportion of the population of non-working age (children up to the age of 19 and adults of 65 years and older) to those of working age (20–64 year-olds). The dependency ratio is equal to the total number of people under 19 added to the total number of people who are 65 and over, divided by the total number of people who are aged between 20 and 64, multiplied by 100.

\(^{21}\) Table 3 calculates a separate dependency ratio for the young and for the elderly. A dependency ratio above 50 means that more than half of the population depends on the rest, while a dependency ratio below 50 means that less than half of the population depends on the rest.
sons for this sudden reduction in the dependency ratio for the young. First, a certain number of those under 20 joined the labour force when they turned 20. Secondly, the number of naturalisations rose sharply between 2000 and 2006. Consequently, many of the young people were no longer counted as Bosnians in the figures once they obtained naturalisation. There are therefore fewer young people of Bosnian nationality and a larger labour force to support them. In Switzerland, the dependency ratio of the under-20s has also fallen, though less sharply (35% in 2011).

What these two populations have in common is the fact that they are both aging. This is evident in that the dependency ratio of the young is falling while that of the elderly is rising (since 2000 for BiH nationals). In fact, Switzerland is known to have an aging population on account of its higher life expectancy but also as a result of the drastic fall in the fertility rate in recent decades. This phenomenon can also be seen among the Bosnian population in Switzerland, with the proportion of elderly people increasing almost two-fold since 2000. Compared with the total foreign population, the proportion of elderly has increased from only 7% in 2000 to 10% today.

At present, these facts translate into a lower total dependency ratio for BiH nationals, for two reasons. First, many young people have been naturalised or have moved into the 20–64 age bracket. Secondly, there has been an increase in the total dependency ratio for Switzerland as the dependency ratio of the elderly rises faster than that of the under-20s.

3.5 Marital status

As shown in Figure 14, almost 60% of the Bosnian population with permanent residence are married, compared with around 33% unmarried. This strong over-representation of married couples among Bosnians contrasts with the situation for the Swiss population, which comprises an equal proportion of unmarried (43%) and married (43%). The high number of married people among the Bosnian population may be explained by the age structure and probably also by the fact that, for many migrants, marriage is a means of stabilising their status in Switzerland; this contrasts with the Swiss population, who may instead opt for cohabitation and therefore are still classified as unmarried. The number of divorced people is lower among Bosnians (6%) than the Swiss population (8%). Nonetheless, the rate of divorce among both groups is similar, with 11 out of 1000 married Bosnians divorcing in 2010, compared with 12 for the Swiss population. While Bosnian women display a lower tendency to divorce (10/1000), their male counterparts divorce at the same rate as Swiss men and women (12/1000).

Given the high proportion of married people among the Bosnian population, it is worthwhile taking a closer look at these marriages. As mentioned in the previous chapter (see 2.2 above), BiH was a country of ethnic mixing and exchange, particularly in the towns but also in certain peripheral regions. In the former Yugoslavia, mixed marriages between people of different religious and ethnic groups, known as exogamy, were quite commonplace. This changed substantially with the war, however, and mixed marriages have become a sensitive issue in the context of the

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Table 3: Progression of the dependency ratios of the total Swiss and Bosnian populations in Switzerland, 1995–2011

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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td><strong>Dependency ratio of the young (&lt; 20 years)</strong></td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td><strong>Dependency ratio of the elderly (&gt; 65 years)</strong></td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
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Figure 14: Marital status of the permanent resident population by nationality, in 2012

![Figure 14: Marital status of the permanent resident population by nationality, in 2012](image)
interethnic conflict in BiH since the war broke out. In fact, mixed couples in BiH came under increased pressure as interethnic divisions came to the fore, particularly in small towns and villages. They faced the dilemma of deciding whether to resist exclusion on ethnic grounds, separate, or leave the country to escape the stigmatising gaze of their community and/or family. Also, as revealed in 2006 in a report by the Swiss Refugee Council, “in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnically mixed couples and their children may still find themselves in difficult situations. In regions that experienced much ethnic cleansing and combats (e.g. Pale), ethnically mixed families more frequently face discrimination” (Walser 2006: 15). Certain mixed couples decided to leave the country, and most Western nations were sensitive to their plight, particularly Canada.

The general consensus among those we spoke to was that the decision to marry outside of or within one’s community (i.e. exogamy or endogamy respectively) in BiH is largely determined by the socio-cultural profile of the couple’s parents. There is a far greater tendency towards exogamy among the children of mixed parents or those from urban regions. Nonetheless, the general trend in BiH is less oriented towards mixed marriages, and more marriages now occur within the same ethnic community. The same trend can be seen within the Bosnian population in Switzerland, even if they have more freedom of marital choice than those living in BiH (less family and community pressure). According to the experts we asked, the tendency towards endogamy among Bosnians living in Switzerland is stronger among those in refugee families from areas that suffered the most during the war, notably Srebrenica. However, one observer also noted that endogamy is more common among the newcomers (2009–2011), who are younger and tend to be more religious. One expert explained that “traditional folk evenings often serve as a meeting place for young Bosnians, thus perpetuating their identity of origin.” Apparently, the trend towards endogamy is also fostered by online transnational meetings between young Bosnians in BiH and in Switzerland, particularly on social networks such as MSN and Facebook. Of course, annual holidays in the country of origin also play a role in this respect. Finally, some young Bosnians in BiH also see marriage to an immigrant compatriot in Switzerland as a means of leaving their country with greater hope of social mobility.

One expert stated that Bosnian families in Switzerland have no particular requirements concerning an exogamous marriage, even if “it is harder to gain acceptance for a marriage with a Muslim/Serb or Croat than with an Italian or Swiss national”. The marriage situation of Bosnians can be compared with that of Kosovars, who, for their own socio-historical reasons, have been less inclined to accept interethnic marriages. This attitude is primarily explained by their minority political situation, their Albanian culture (i.e. not Slav), and the fact that, in socio-cultural terms, they were less integrated in the former Yugoslavia. These factors clearly favoured intra-Albanian marriages in Kosovo, unofficially regarded as a means of resistance against the political regime in Belgrade. Only the elite Communist Albanian-Kosovars married outside of the
Albanian community of Yugoslavia. Moreover, nationalists often targeted this elite as the ones responsible for jeopardising the national rights of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia. Such rhetoric still exists to a certain extent today within some of the Bosnian population, who see exogamous marriage (with Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats) as a threat to their own ethno-religious situation. Nonetheless, for the socio-historical reasons explained above, the Bosnian population remains relatively tolerant in this respect. For example, a second-generation Bosnian woman born into a mixed marriage told us that, throughout her entire childhood, her father, who was Muslim, took her to a Catholic church every Sunday because she had chosen to follow her mother’s faith.

The statistics show a steady increase in recent years in the number of marriages between Bosnians and Swiss citizens (Figure 15). These data may be interpreted in one of two ways: either these are exogamous marriages with indigenous Swiss citizens or de facto endogamous marriage with Bosnians who have obtained Swiss naturalisation. The latter would appear to be the most frequent case. Alongside a growing trend towards Bosnian-Swiss marriages, it must also be said that young Bosnians have a higher propensity for naturalisation (see 3.7 below). One fact that corroborates this presumption is that the straight-line increase in marriages with Swiss citizens resembles that of naturalisations during the same period, i.e. 2002 to 2006 or even 2007. This means that, in reality, the trend towards cultural endogamy remains strong among this population in Switzerland.

Figure 16: Trends in the Bosnian resident population in Switzerland by residence permit, 1995–2011


3.6 Residence permits

In 1995 and 1996, almost a quarter of Bosnians living in Switzerland were in the asylum programme, i.e. N or F permit. Subsequent years saw an increase in the proportion of people holding a long-term residence permit (C), while the number of residence permits overall remained stable (Figure 16). The steep rise in the number of holders of C permits in 1999 was probably due to the fact that many citizens of the former Yugoslavia who were from BiH then obtained Bosnian nationality. Those who had come to work in the 1980s already held a long-term residence permit. Therefore, this was not an increase in the number of immigrants from BiH but merely a change of passport, from Yugoslavian to that of BiH. There was in fact very little change in the number of permanent residents in Switzerland.

The Bosnian population in Switzerland has largely stabilised (Figure 17): the 2011 figures show a limited number of newcomers, with quite a high proportion of those born in Switzerland (23% as opposed to 20% for all foreigners). At the same time, the number of BiH citizens holding an N, F or L permit with a period of stay of less than 12 months was very low in 2011. Finally, the majority of Bosnians now hold a B or C residence permit.
The question of residence permits of Bosnian citizens, as well as those of other citizens of the former Yugoslavia, is a recurrent and sensitive issue, for two reasons. First, following the introduction of the three-circle policy in 1991, certain citizens from the former Yugoslavia, including Bosnians, were unable to convert their seasonal permit into a long-term residence permit. After the war, Switzerland pursued a policy of curtailing migration from BiH. According to a former community leader, such a precarious status after a long period of waiting for stabilisation undermined the integration process of first-generation migrants, who remained in the country for many years without a long-term residence permit. Secondly, BiH citizens had been granted temporary collective asylum (F permit under the previous legislation). After the war, some of these returned to their country of origin, while others were able to obtain a B residence permit (hardship cases). Meanwhile, some stayed for many years with an F permit (provisional admission) and were thus at a disadvantage with regard to integration until 2007–2008, e.g. limited access to the labour market and a lack of integration measures.

Finally, it should be noted that most of BiH nationals obtain today Swiss residency by family reunification and marriage.

### 3.7 Naturalisations

The Bosnian population in Switzerland has decreased substantially in number, mainly due to the high propensity since 1998 among Bosnians (and citizens of the other countries of the former Yugoslavia) to acquire Swiss citizenship. The increase in the number of Bosnian migrants obtaining naturalisation rose linearly between 1998 and 2006, as they progressively met the requirements for obtaining a Swiss passport (Figure 18).

However, the number of naturalisations of Bosnian citizens has decreased since 2006, a trend observed for all naturalisations. This is not readily explained, as naturalisations would have been expected to continue increasing. After all, most Bosnians living in Switzerland meet the time requirements if they have been born in Switzerland or are living there long enough (Figure 18). A study by Wanner and Steiner (2012) reached the same conclusion regarding all candidates who met the conditions for naturalisation but did not file a request.

22 FSO, STATPOP 2011, [http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/01/07/blank/key/03.html](http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/01/07/blank/key/03.html) (as at 29 October 2012).

![Figure 17: Duration of stay of the total Bosnian population in Switzerland, 2011](image17)

![Figure 18: Progression in the number of naturalisations of the Bosnian population by gender, 1993–2010](image18)
According to our interviews, there are three main reasons for Bosnians to apply for Swiss citizenship. First, given the socio-cultural integration of both generations, acquiring Swiss citizenship would naturally be the next step for many. Secondly, having a Swiss passport provides a sense of security for those whose status has been uncertain over the years. Also, it has enabled them to travel in Europe and further afield, as BiH citizens required a visa to enter EU countries up until mid-December 2010. Thirdly, according to one expert, it would appear that having Swiss citizenship fills a void felt by Bosnians after the break-up of Yugoslavia. Swiss citizenship represents a new start for these populations ravaged by war in their country of origin. This aspect is more likely to concern women, who identify more strongly with Switzerland and tend to be less interested in returning to live in BiH than men. Indeed, more women than men acquire Swiss citizenship, a phenomenon also observed among other immigrant groups.

Key references


In brief

– The Bosnian population in Switzerland is divided into two groups, practically identical in terms of size: on the one hand, those communicating primarily in a Swiss national language and, on the other hand, those using a language from the Balkan region in their daily lives. The first generation of migrants is more likely to use a language from their country of origin, while the second generation, already integrated, can generally express themselves better in one of the host country’s languages. Moreover, each ethnic group from BiH teaches their children their own culture and language of origin (Bosnian, Serbian or Croatian) in separate structures.

– The level of education among Bosnians varies. Around half of the Bosnians in Switzerland have had no further training after completing their compulsory education, often as a result of their exile or emigration as young seasonal workers. A little more than a third have had some form of vocational training after their compulsory education. The remaining decile obtained their maturité (Swiss matriculation certificate) or a third-level qualification. There has been a significant and progressive increase since 2002 in the number of Bosnian citizens who have graduated with a Bachelor’s degree.

– The first generation of migrants maintain an exclusive relationship with their country of origin, while the second generation feel a greater sense of belonging in Switzerland. Most migrants financially support their family members still living in BiH. However, in light of the political and economic instability in BiH, very few migrants of working age are planning to return in the short or medium term, except possibly when they retire.

4 Socio-cultural integration and economic participation

– Many BiH nationals face a variety of health problems. Refugees tend to suffer from mental disturbances, brought on by traumatic experiences during the war and a difficult migration path. Migrants from the first wave suffer from chronic ailments and somatic disorders, often as a result of their physically demanding work. Moreover, very few Bosnian women have preventative health checks.

– Given the numerous differences between the three ethnic groups from BiH, it is more appropriate to refer to the Bosnian diasporas, in the plural, in Switzerland. The vast majority of associations are organised along intra-ethnic lines. However, some Bosnian national organisations not restricted to a certain ethnic or religious group are attempting to bridge the gaps. Religion continues to play an increasing role in the lives of Bosnian nationals. Religious institutions have progressively become the main formal and informal relations between the Bosnian diasporas and their origins.

– The first generation of migrants maintain an exclusive relationship with their country of origin, while the second generation feel a greater sense of belonging in Switzerland. Most migrants financially support their family members still living in BiH. However, in light of the political and economic instability in BiH, very few migrants of working age are planning to return in the short or medium term, except possibly when they retire.
4.1 Aspects of integration

In order to gauge the level of integration of BiH immigrants in Switzerland, and their role in the development of their country of origin, we must first introduce certain concepts used in our analysis of this population. This will then allow us to analyse the socio-cultural integration processes and identify specific aspects related to migration.

The concept of integration has different meanings and uses, depending on the context and timing. In the past, it has variously been used as a synonym for acculturation, incorporation, adaptation, accommodation, assimilation, or as the opposite of marginalisation, exclusion, cultural isolationism and ghettoisation. It is therefore important to address the different possible meanings of this term and also the associated issues. Until the 1960s and 1970s, the term “assimilation” was largely used to describe the multifaceted process of immersion and social and cultural interactions of migrants in a host country “to generate a feeling of identifying with a society and its values, thereby maintaining social cohesion”.

Integration is today defined in the foreign nationals legislation as the social and individual process of insertion and acceptance based on reciprocity, thereby requiring the participation of the migrants themselves as well as the host society and its members (Art. 4).

However, it must be stressed that a sense of belonging to a national community is the fruit of a long and complex process and cannot be generated mechanically by the cultural, ethnic or religious origins of the individuals making up this community. This ongoing process of internalising common values and standards allows, at a national level, citizens belonging to different geographical entities, social classes, cultures or religions to be included in society. Integration also involves an individual’s relationship with the state, which grants the individual certain rights (residence, citizenship, civil or political rights) and imposes duties. However, this process of integration primarily entails a mutual exchange between migrants and the host society. It generally comprises several stages (accommodation, adaptation and even conflicts), though not necessarily in any particular order.

In this chapter, we look at different aspects of the socio-cultural integration of Bosnians in Switzerland, i.e. knowledge of the languages of the host country and the country of origin, education, work, health, social and religious matters, as well as Bosnians’ relationship with their country of origin and the host country. This analysis is based on the information obtained through interviews and focus groups as well as the scientific literature and the statistics available.

4.2 Language skills

More than half of the citizens of BiH have as their main language one of the languages of their country of origin, i.e. Bosnian, Serbian or Croatian. “Main language” here refers to the language they most fluently use on a daily basis. This situation is similar to that of other populations from this region who emigrated to Switzerland. More specifically, however, there are clearly two groups, practically identical in terms of size: on the one hand, those communicating primarily in a Swiss national language and, on the other hand, those using a language from the Balkans in their daily lives (Figure 19). It should be noted that this distinction includes slight variations according to the country of origin (the gap between the languages varies by only between 2 and 10


25 The first question on the 2010 census asked: What is your main language, i.e. the language in which you think and which you know the best? This question also allowed for other languages to be given.
percentage points). However, this is not sufficiently marked to generalise the use of one language (a Swiss or Balkan language) among all members of an immigrant population. Note that these data, broken down by nationality and not by ethnic group, do not take account of the language skills of those who have obtained naturalisation in Switzerland (see 3.7 above).

Unfortunately, no statistics are available concerning the degree of language proficiency of BiH migrants. However, according to the experts, the first generation tends to use the language of the country of origin more frequently, while the second is more at ease in a language of the host country. Consequently, first-generation immigrants from BiH are more reliant on their children or other people in their community for communicating with the host society. This situation particularly applies to those with a precarious legal status.

For many individuals from the first generation, learning the language of the host country was never a priority, for several reasons, particularly their migration journey. For one thing, unskilled migrants tended not to make an effort to learn a language of the host country, as they did not plan to stay in Switzerland. What’s more, their work did not require any particular language proficiency. Secondly, many refugees did not have language lessons from the start on account of the migration context and their legal status in Switzerland, despite the fact that many of them had university degrees or other qualifications. As a result, they were unable to immerse themselves into the language of the host country at a sufficiently early stage. One expert noted that the problem of poor language skills also concerned children from BiH who came to Switzerland as teenagers.

While socio-linguistic integration seems to have been difficult for the first generation, those of the second generation, who were born or raised in Switzerland, speak and fluently use the language of their place of residence at home and at work in their day-to-day lives. A variety of factors go to explain this. The main reason is the integration of children from BiH from an early age. According to one psychiatrist from BiH, “Children from BiH have been successfully integrated.
Box 8: Language skills: experience of one community expert

A second-generation migrant working as a psychologist, in daily contact with BiH nationals and particularly refugees, underlined the difficulties encountered by the first-generation migrants in terms of language comprehension: “Patients of mine who are first-generation migrants frequently contact me regarding communication problems in the language of the host country (particularly written correspondence). They come to a consultation and ask me to read and explain various letters, including remainders for unpaid bills... things that have nothing to do with my professional consultations. They bring a different problem each time they come.”

They have been rapidly included in the school system and received intensive lessons in French”. Fluency in at least one of the languages of the host country is also explained by the immersion of children, as early as possible, in the culture of the host country and a willingness to identify with it. This feeling of identifying with Switzerland is reinforced by the tendency to “block out” the child’s sense of belonging to BiH. The country of origin thus loses its attraction with the second generation. This statement was corroborated by the organisation “Matica” (see Box 11), which had to translate its website as an increasing number of young people did not understand the Bosnian languages.

4.3 Teaching of the languages of the country of origin

The language of the country of origin is less well known among the second generation of Bosnians in Switzerland and is generally limited to basic conversational skills. Code-switching, i.e. the inclusion of certain words or phrases from another language into a conversation may be quite common among young people with limited knowledge of a Bosnian language, who may use a word in a Swiss language. This is partly explained by the absence of appropriate structures for teaching the Bosnian languages in Switzerland. The existence of such institutions, which do not receive any state support from BiH, is purely on the migrants’ own initiative. What’s more, according to one of the leaders of a džemati in Switzerland (Bosniak Islamic place of congregation), the organisation of teaching the Bosnian languages in Switzerland suffers on account of the ethnic division of BiH: “The organisation of language teaching by the BiH government is undermined by BiH politicians who want to stymie any efforts in favour of a joint school of BiH populations. This could help to reunite a Bosnian national community in Switzerland.” As a result, the teaching of BiH languages in Switzerland, for the children of immigrant families, is separated by ethnic group, in accordance with the three groups making up this country (see 2.1 above).

As regards the Bosniak population, courses in the Bosnian language and culture are given in most džemats of BiH in Switzerland. The lessons are self-financed, mainly by contributions from the students’ parents. There are currently 27 džemats operating in Switzerland, most of which are in the German-speaking part of the country. The majority of these offer weekly lessons in the Bosnian language, alongside other activities such as teaching of the Islam, social support or traditional folk activities.

The children of the Bosnian Serb population attend Serbian language schools (largely financed by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Serbia) in St. Gallen, Zurich, Winterthur, Solothurn, Bern, Lausanne and Geneva. The number of children attending these schools is probably less than 10% of all the children from families of Serb origin in Switzerland, of which there are around 2000.26 Meanwhile, three “autonomous schools” for teaching the Serbian language were founded in the early 2000s, in the cantons of Lucerne, Vaud and Zug. According to one community expert, these are distinguished by their independence from the Serbian Ministry and are self-financed by the parents. Unlike in the officially funded schools, the language is taught in these schools with a view to integration in the host country and not solely for the purpose of maintaining links with the country of origin. The school in Vaud is the only one of these still in operation today. It has some 70 students of different ages, based in different localities. Around half of its students are Serbs from BiH.

Regarding the children of the Bosnian Croat population, it should be noted that it is practically impossible to give an accurate estimate of this population within the Croat communities of Switzerland.27 Most of the Croats from BiH attend complementary classes in the Croatian language. Until 1990, courses in the Croatian language and culture were organised by Croatian cultural associations and Catholic churches. Since 1993, however, they have been funded by the Republic of Croatia’s Ministry of Science, Education and Sports. There are 20 teachers teaching Croatian to a total of 1750 students, in 94 localities around Switzerland.28 The cantons with the highest numbers of Croat populations are Zurich and Aargau, followed by St. Gallen, Bern, Ticino, Lucerne, Solothurn, Basel, Schaffhausen and Valais. However, according to the leader of a Croat association, the number of Croat students attending courses in the Croatian language and culture is falling rapidly, on account of their widespread cultural immersion in the host country. According to one Serb religious leader, this loss of interest in learning the language of origin is also quite common among the Serb population in Switzerland.

26 2007 figure: http://www.vrupidijaza.pava.org.aspx?id=4833 (as at 18 May 2013); the figure of 2000 students following Serbian language classes was also given by the community experts.
27 Based on the opinion of Marija Ćulap Imhof, who works at “Drustvene obavijesti”, the media organisation of the Croat cultural association in Switzerland, two-thirds of Croats in Switzerland are from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bilten Udruge “Ra Giga VMC”, Year III (Spring 2013), no. 8, p. 2.
28 http://www.mvep.hr/hr/hmiu/iseljenistvo/svicarska/ (as at 22 May 2013).
box: bosnian language school in emmenbrücke

Some associations organised by Bosniaks claim to be pan-Bosnian, such as the “Heimatliche Sprachen und Kultur HSK” in Emmenbrücke (Lucerne). This school strives to “improve Bosnian language skills, represent the culture, literature and art of BiH, and strengthen relations between BiH children through education and games”. Unlike the schools of the đemats, this school brings together children from the different ethnic groups and religions and teaches them the Bosnian languages in both the Roman and Cyrillic alphabets. This school still exists, but others, such as in Basel or Solothurn, have closed down. The teaching of Bosnian languages within the framework of such structures is increasingly threatened by a loss of interest of students and their parents in such courses. This has largely to do with the cost of such courses for the parents. According to the managers of the school in Emmenbrücke, they are increasingly in urgent need of the local authorities’ support, in terms of both finance and logistics.

4.4 Education: generational gap

As regards education and training, Figure 20 shows that Bosnians are mainly concentrated in manual work, even more so than all other non-European nationals. Slightly more than half of BiH nationals have left formal education upon completion of compulsory schooling. Another third have pursued vocational training, and less than 10% have completed their education with a maturité diploma or a third-level qualification.

However, these figures show only part of the story regarding the educational level of Bosnian migrants in Switzerland, for two reasons. First, the data do not distinguish between the level of training of different migratory waves. The consensus among those we interviewed was that economic migrants from the first migration wave generally had a lower level of education than those who came after the war. Their schooling was interrupted as a result of them coming to Switzerland as young seasonal workers. One expert pointed out that the children of refugees have a “good basic education” and are often advanced in mathematics. Compared with Kosovar nationals, he claims that Bosnian children often have a better level of education. The socio-professional profile of the parents and the family environment in which children grow up often play a key role in this respect. These findings must be seen in context, given the divergence in the profiles of first-generational Bosnians who fled the conflict in BiH, ranging from poorly educated people from isolated villages east of the Drina to university graduates living in large urban centres. Finally, the majority of qualified refugees from BiH faced a downgrading of their professional qualifications after migration, with their degrees or diplomas not being recognised in Switzerland (see 4.5).

Secondly, these figures do not distinguish between the levels of education in the different generations. And yet, many children of Bosnian migrants are now pursuing post-compulsory and even third-level education. With regard to third-level education, the statistics show low numbers of Bosnian students. However, these figures conceal the actual presence of many naturalised students in higher education. Nonetheless, there has been a significant and progressive increase since 2002, with almost 60 Bosnian students obtaining a Bachelor’s degree in 2010. There has been no such increase in the number of Master’s degrees, which has remained stable at 20 since 2008. Likewise, the number of

29 Interview with a member of the directing board of Language and culture of origin (LCO) of Emmenbrücke, 4 October 2012.
30 Glossary of educational levels: “Compulsory education” includes primary school and Level I secondary school, “Vocational training”, Level II secondary (post-compulsion), comprises a pre-apprenticeship, an apprenticeship of 2 to 4 years, full-time vocational college, commercial diploma, apprenticeship workshops and similar training; “Third-level education” includes universities and technical colleges, specialised and professional higher education with a federal diploma, studies in a technical or graduate school, etc. The figures quoted in this paragraph are taken from the Structural Survey.
32 Regarding the level of education of Kosovars in Switzerland, see Burri-Sharani, B., et al., 2010; it should be noted that the Albanian-speaking population, the majority in Kosovo, faced an educational embargo in the 1990s on account of the military-police domination in Kosovo by the regime of Slobodan Milošević. Regarding the situation of schools in Kosovo during the 1990s, see: Ibrahim Rugova, La question du Kosovo, interviews with Marie-Françoise Allain and Xavier Galmiche, Paris, Fayard, 1994.

figure 20: comparison of educational levels by nationality, 2010

Notes: Situation in 2010; adults aged between 18 and 64. Less than seven years of compulsory education; compulsory education (including supplementary year); initial vocational training; high-school or professional maturité; third-level degree or diploma from a university or technical college (EM). Source: Structural Survey.

0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %

Compulsory education or less
Vocational training
Maturité
Third-level education

0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %

Swiss
Non-
Europeans
BiH

66
67
Bosnians completing a doctoral thesis has remained at between 5 and 10 a year since 2002. The general trend of an increasing number of students – with the exception of doctoral studies – is similar to that observed among Swiss students.

Comparing the situation of Swiss nationals with that of Bosnians, within the same level of education, there is a much greater gender gap among the Swiss. The distribution is relatively even among Bosnians (with a gap of less than 10 percentage points; see also 4.5). At the time of the survey, the gender gap among Swiss students varied considerably according to the highest level of education reached. The over-representation of females among those who completed only their compulsory education (68%) gradually decreases as the level of education increases, with males in the majority in third-level education (59%). This contrast can also be seen among non-EU nationals (around 20 percentage points). Furthermore, Figure 21 shows that, in third-level education, the proportion of Bosnian female students is much higher (approx. 60% in 2010) than the overall proportion of female students in Switzerland, taking account of all nationalities (approx. 50%). This high and increasing level of Bosnian women in universities and third-level colleges (HES) may be interpreted as a positive sign of emancipation inherited from Yugoslavian Socialism but also, for those from a more traditional milieu, as a sign of their successful integration.

In terms of university courses (Figure 22), Bosnian students tend to opt more for the humanities and social sciences (approx. 40% in 2010), followed by business and economics (approx. 25%). Note that this trend has reversed since 1992 (when they were approx. 10% and 35% respectively). Nonetheless, both of these fields have increased in popularity among Bosnian students since then. The turnaround in favour of the humanities and social sciences may be interpreted as a consequence of the difficult situation in BiH since 1992 but also, primarily, the human suffering caused by the ravages of war. In more concrete terms, the emotional trauma endured or passed on by parents to the next generation may have played a role in this choice. In 2010, law and natural sciences each accounted for around 10% of Bosnian students. The field of natural sciences has become less attractive, compared with 1995 when it accounted for up to 30% of students from BiH. Finally, medicine and technical sciences were the least popular options in 2010.

A further two aspects concerning the education of BiH nationals cropped up again and again in the interviews with experts and migrants. First of all, the parents’ cultural relationship with education has tended to affect their children’s decisions in this respect. As it happens, BiH parents often regard a university degree as the epitome of socio-professional success, reflecting their lack of understanding of the opportunities also offered by non-university professional qualifications or in the technical colleges in Switzerland. Secondly, parents from BiH have tended not to fully understand the Swiss educational system in time, due to their difficulty in accessing information and the language barrier. According to one expert, the first wave of BiH children was effectively “sacrificed”, as the parents took some years to understand their central role in their children’s schooling; the Swiss
system requires active participation on their part. Then, they understood all too late that, unlike the Yugoslavian system (or more specifically, Bosnian), the children’s socio-professional paths are decided at a very early age in Switzerland, i.e. in year 5 or 6 of compulsory education (at 11–12 years old). This has had serious consequences for children arriving in Switzerland at a critical age in their education. Moreover, the stories we have heard confirm that children have received more support from their parents when they themselves had a university education, as they also most likely had parental guidance at home.

4.5 Employment: unskilled and semi-skilled work

In 2010, 65% of Bosnians in Switzerland formed part of the labour force, a similar rate to that of non-European nationals but higher than that of Swiss nationals (61.5%) (see Figure 23). More than one-third of Swiss (36%) are not in gainful employment, undoubtedly because of the higher number of pensioners and students among the Swiss population. In the Bosnian population, 27.8% are not in the labour force, some of which are recipients of disability pensions. As mentioned in the following sub-chapter on health (see 4.6), many of the economic migrants from the first and second waves of immigration suffer from chronic illnesses, particularly because of the tough physical activities in their work and also, in some cases, because of traumas suffered during the war. Studies confirm that the citizens of countries from the former Yugoslavia are clearly over-represented among the recipients of disability pensions (Guggisberg 2010).

As to the working population, 6.6% of Bosnians are unemployed, compared with 2.2% of Swiss and 11% of non-Europeans. In 2010, the rate of unemployment among the Bosnian population in Switzerland (8.1%) was much higher than that of Swiss citizens (3.4%). While the first proportion should be viewed with caution for reasons of methodology, the gap between the nationalities in terms of insertion in the labour market is significant. This difference is also visible in the breakdown of recipients of social welfare. In 2011, there were 2968 BiH nationals in receipt of social welfare payments. They represent 2.8% of all foreigners receiving social welfare and between 6 and 10% of the Bosnian population in Switzerland. In comparison, the rate of Swiss citizens receiving social welfare has remained stable at 2.1%, which may be explained by a number of factors. First, a lower level of education increases the risk of having to rely on social welfare, and a large number of the Bosnians in Switzerland are unskilled (see 4.4). Secondly, this low level of education, together with the downgrading of qualifications after migration, means that a significant number of foreigners in Switzerland are working in low-skilled and insecure jobs (see below). Finally, given the high number of couples with children in this population, many people have to supplement a low income with social welfare to meet the needs of their family (see 3.5). Nonetheless, the rate of social welfare recipients among BiH immigrants has been decreasing since 2006.

While the situation differs by nationality, there is also a gender gap with regard to employment. Figure 24 shows that, in general, the proportion of the population not in the labour force is higher for women, irrespective of the nationality. This over-representation of...
women is explained by the fact that women make up a higher number of homemakers and also of pensioners, given their longer life expectancy (see 3.4). However, the gender gap is much narrower among the Bosnian population, with a difference of only four percentage points in the labour force. This relative balance in the professional situation between men and women – reflecting our comments with regard to the level of education (see 4.4) – is not found among either the Swiss (with a gap of 12 percentage points) or non-European migrants (21 percentage points).

We use the median annual income to compare the pay situation of the Swiss and Bosnian populations, as this represents the value that is exactly in the middle of the pay scale; in other words, half of the individuals in the population observed earn less than that amount and the other half earn more. We can thus see that half of the Bosnian men (aged between 18 and 65) in full-time employment earn less than CHF 66,600, while only a quarter of their Swiss counterparts are in this situation. The median annual income for Swiss males is CHF 87,100. Similarly, half of Bosnian women (18–65 years) earn less than CHF 52,300, while only a quarter of Swiss women earn less than that amount (their median annual income being CHF 68,900). In general, we can see that the annual income of women, of all nationalities, is lower than that of the men of the same nationality; for the same number of working hours, they earn around 80% of the

Figure 24: Professional situation by nationality and gender, in 2011

Note: Extrapolation based on fewer than 90 observations (BiH). Source: ESPA
Swiss Non-Europeans to the Swiss population. While the statistics show a general trend among citizens of the Western Balkan countries to work in these countries, also observed among Kosovars, Serbs and Macedonians. The strong presence of labour from BiH, or countries of the former Yugoslavia in general, thus constitutes an undeniable contribution to these sectors in Switzerland. Meanwhile, in the sectors of healthcare, science, management and the legal professions, Bosnians are under-represented with respect to the Swiss population. While the statistics do not differentiate between the first and second generations of migrants, the stories we have heard confirm that many second-generation Bosnians work in unskilled cleaning jobs because they needed to work to become financially independent and sort out their residence situation, so as to get out of the provisional asylum system and obtain a B permit. [...] But they never really managed to integrate, despite trying to learn French. They faced so many personal, family-related and professional challenges in Switzerland. It was easier for me.”

One second-generation migrant in Switzerland told us: “Before coming to Switzerland because of the war, both of my parents held qualified jobs: my father was an engineer and my mother was a chemist. They started working in Switzerland in unskilled cleaning jobs because they needed to work to become financially independent and sort out their residency situation, so as to get out of the provisional asylum system and obtain a B permit. [...] But they never really managed to integrate, despite trying to learn French. They faced so many personal, family-related and professional challenges in Switzerland. It was easier for me.”

As shown in Figure 25, most Bosnians work in the hospitality sector, industry and construction, accounting for almost a third of those in employment. These figures also confirm the trend among citizens of the Western Balkan countries to work in these countries, also observed among Kosovars, Serbs and Macedonians. The strong presence of labour from BiH, or countries of the former Yugoslavia in general, thus constitutes an undeniable contribution to these sectors in Switzerland. Meanwhile, in the sectors of healthcare, science, management and the legal professions, Bosnians are under-represented with respect to the Swiss population. While the statistics do not differentiate between the first and second generations of migrants, the stories we have heard confirm that many second-generation Bosnians work in manual trades such as building or electricity. In fact, many of these have also set up their own business in these sectors. Women are often employed in retail sales, hairdressing or as administrative staff – jobs that, they believe, are more easily accessible to BiH migrants. Their mothers, first-generation migrants, often work in cleaning or housekeeping jobs, where they can work part time and business networks have developed within their community.

While some Bosnians have set up their own business in cleaning and building services and hired fellow Bosnians, one expert pointed out that, in general, immigrants from BiH are less likely than Kosovars to start up their own business. This difference is partly explained by the fact that Kosovars have generally been independent in the past and were less likely to have been hired in Yugoslavian state companies, while Bosnians were more attached to the Yugoslavian socialist production model, which had once given them stability and full employment.

Therefore, most Bosnians in Switzerland are employed in low-skilled jobs and, according to the sources we asked, are reluctant to change their chosen profession. Indeed, based on our findings, it would appear that the Bosnian population has made little use of the possibilities on offer in Switzerland to acquire new professional skills (continuing education). Moreover, they have made little effort to obtain a good level of proficiency of the languages of the host country, as a result of their migration history in the context of war. Some of the first-generation migrants who had highly qualified professions in their country of origin (legal experts, engineers, doctors) were unable to pursue their profession in Switzerland. This professional downgrading resulted from their conditions of emigration, combined with the consequences of the war, in particular, but also on account of certain obstacles faced in the host country (poor language skills, lack of professional network, lack of information on having qualifications recognised in Switzerland). As shown by the breakdown of educational levels among Bosnian migrants (see 4.4), emigration from BiH to Western countries also included an element of skilled people. According to the World Bank, the “brain drain” from BiH was 24.5% and, in 2007, the International Organization for Migration claimed that 12.7% of doctors had emigrated from BiH. This loss of graduates and white-collar workers was largely due to the war and its repercussions.

Figure 25: Type of profession by nationality, in 2010

Source: FSO, Structural survey
4.6 Health: post-traumatic stress disorder

According to several Swiss and BiH experts, a significant proportion of this immigrant population faces serious health problems. The main mental illnesses encountered are depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)\(^{33}\), while the main somatic disorders concern chronic pain.

These health problems mainly affect the adults who came to Switzerland as part of the wave of refugees. These are people who were directly or indirectly faced with the conflict in BiH. Quite a number of Bosnians spent part of the war in concentration camps or witnessed scenes of extreme violence. Many Bosnians living in Switzerland lost a member of their immediate or extended family during the conflict. For many years, these traumatic experiences were punctuated by phases of collective mourning and depression, having negative repercussions on their integration process in Switzerland.

A study has shown that, apart from the traumatic events witnessed during the war, other possible causes for health problems among Bosnians include their migration journey, with the associated structural problems – such as their legal status, working and living conditions, financial constraints, the lack of support networks in daily life, or emotional stress – as well as the fear of being sent back, an uncertain future, social isolation, xenophobia, a sense of powerlessness and loneliness. Moreover, refugees emigrated in different circumstances (under stressful conditions and frequently on the move) than those who left BiH for economic, social or educational reasons. Clinical research comparing the BiH populations who emigrated before and after the war found that Bosnians who came as refugees tend to be plagued by many health problems. More specifically, 78% of the 36 Bosnians surveyed identified the trauma they experienced as the cause of their illness, in addition to a series of psychological or biomedical factors.\(^{34}\)

According to a Bosnian in Switzerland formerly involved in an association, the problem of PTSD mainly affects those in his community whose symptoms were initially ignored, only for them to reappear several years later. One expert told us that most of those who witnessed the ravages of war never received appropriate treatment for the traumatic events they experienced. The mental scars can be very deep, however, particularly for women who were victims of rape during the war.\(^{35}\) A negative connotation associated with psychological and psychiatric consultations may explain the scepticism surrounding seeking help. There is a general feeling within the community that these specialist services are really only there for those with mental disabilities. Bosnians are not alone in having this attitude, however, as the reluctance to seek psychological help is just as widespread among other immigrants and indeed the Swiss in socially disadvantaged groups. The second health-monitoring report points out that migrants are more frequently treated for depression or migraine than the Swiss population.\(^{36}\) This observation applies for migrants from Turkey, Portugal, Somalia and Tamil-speaking migrants.

According to one expert, this mental suffering that had such a dramatic effect on BiH refugees in Switzerland has also left its mark to a certain extent on their children. For many years the children grew up in an atmosphere of “family depression”, undermining their self-confidence. In search of role models, these children were faced with exiled parents, overwhelmed by their traumatic experiences following a failed attempt at socio-professional transition in Switzerland. According to another expert, however, the children of the

\(^{33}\) PTSD is an anxiety disorder that may develop after a person is exposed to one or more traumatic events. The SDC and the cantons of Bern, Fribourg, Geneva and Jura have joined forces to improve the mental health system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. http://www.ddc.admin.ch/en/Home/Projects/Selected_projects/Modern_psychiatric_treatment_for_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina (as at 17 June 2013).


\(^{35}\) In this respect, see the website of the Swiss-based Trial association: http://www.trial-ch.org/en/home.html.

second generation from BiH are more aware of this problem than their parents and are more likely to consult a psychologist. Moreover, the general opinion within the community regarding psychiatry is gradually improving as its role increasingly gains social acceptance.

There is a lack of significant statistical data on the general health of the BiH population in Switzerland. However, a study conducted in 2011 in the canton of Vaud on the population of the former Yugoslavia corroborates most of the opinions found regarding the attitude to prevention and a healthy lifestyle (particularly regarding eating habits, smoking and physical exercise). According to this study, the populations from the Balkans are far more likely to be overweight (64% as opposed to 36% for the Swiss population). In fact, 30% of the citizens of the former Yugoslavia and living in the canton of Vaud live a sedentary lifestyle, as confirmed by the most recent monitoring of the general health of migrants. Regarding food choices and physical activity, migrants’ habits tend to be less healthy than those of the Swiss. According to those surveyed, BiH nationals eat their traditional food, which is rich and high in fat, do less physical exercise and smoke more.

There are also differences between the nationalities with regard to women’s health, particularly in the testing for cervical cancer or in breast cancer screening. One expert claimed that the women from BiH in Switzerland are quite indifferent about prevention, adding that the refugee population do not have sufficient access to information about health and prevention because they have a different attitude than women from urban areas in their home country. This is confirmed by the results of the latest monitoring of migrants’ health in Switzerland, which highlight the lack of understanding in health matters among the asylum population. These populations also have much difficulty not only in explaining things to their doctors but also in understanding what they say. In conclusion, this study shows that the higher the level of education and language skills of migrants, the better their general state of health.

Nonetheless, one expert noted that Bosnians, and particularly Bosniak refugees, were given “alternative medical support by specialists sensitive to the situation of BiH refugees, victims of war in their country of origin”. Such structures came in the form of associations like “Mosaic” or “Appartenance”, based in Lausanne and Geneva. Similar structures for migrants in Bern and Zurich have been used for several years now (and indeed still are used) by Bosnian citizens. Such institutions offer a social framework for migrants to express and share their experiences and stories with other migrants who have been forced into exile. According to a healthcare worker, the substantial resources made available for language interpreting also helped to improve communication between migrants who were victims of the war in BiH and the socio-medical structures in Switzerland.

A doctor pointed out that the chronic illnesses endured by some in the Bosnian population are also a consequence of the depression suffered by this population. Many first-generation migrants from BiH suffer from chronic somatic illnesses. This situation is similar to the state of health of other migrant populations, particularly because of the harsh physical conditions they had been enduring in their jobs for many years. As shown in the study on Kosovars in Switzerland,37 the symptoms of problems with the back, joints and connective tissues in men tend to appear with age, though very often long before they can retire. Moreover, the risk of an accident is particularly high in many of the manual jobs done by BiH nationals. Finally, poor dental hygiene among the population is also a problem. According to one expert, limited access as a result of their residence status (in the case of asylum seekers) has played a role in their choice of minimum, low-cost dental care.

4.7 Religion and social life of the diasporas

In general political language, “diaspora” refers to all of the individuals belonging to a given ethnic or national group who have emigrated to live in another country. It is thus used to mean a migrant population sharing the same origin or nationality. In its narrower meaning, the term refers to the sharing between its members of certain customs and values, and often a desire to return one day to their country of origin. Taking this narrower sense, it is clear with regard to the Bosnian population that there is not one Bosnian diaspora but at least three separate diasporas — Bosniak, Croat and Serb — in Switzerland. What’s more, it is difficult to reach a consensus among experts’ opinions on the BIH population in Switzerland, given the differences between those who came at the time of the former Yugoslavia (economic migrants) or during the war (refugees) as well as between the generations. Migrants from BIH also differ greatly according to their urban/rural origin, regional identity, socio-economic level and even their family history. For all of these reasons, it is more appropriate to refer to the Bosnian diasporas in the plural. This approach also applies for their social life, organised on an ethnoreligious basis.

a) Bosnian national organisations

Generally speaking, the BIH diasporas are not well structured at a national level; there are many BIH associations and organisations in existence, but most of these are restricted to a specific ethnic group. Certain associations not affiliated with any particular ethnic group, claiming to be pan-Bosnian national organisations (called the “4th Bosnia” by one expert), have attempted to get off the ground. However, most organisations are still structured on the basis of their ethnic-religious affiliation as Bosniak, Croat or Serb. BIH nationals not belonging to one of these groups are those who are classified as “Others” or from mixed families. Their social life is quite separate or restricted to a circle of Bosnian friends sharing this vision of a unified Bosnian identity. It must be said, however, that they have not managed to set up appropriate structures promoting their visions and values, in favour of a common trans-ethnic national identity. This vision of the “4th Bosnia” identity in Switzerland (and also in BIH) is most strongly reflected in cultural events, especially concerts. Despite its real potential, the movement remains informal and confined to certain individuals dispersed around certain regions of Switzerland. Establishing this vision in the form of lasting institutions and associations is a challenge for BIH nationals in Switzerland and elsewhere. The difficulty in rallying together around a shared feeling of belonging to one and the same country of origin can be explained by the direct consequences of the war, with the diverging interests of the political elite in BIH leading to increased ethnic fragmentation. In summary, the organisation of the BIH diaspora post-Dayton follows the ethnic divisions found in the country of origin (see 2.1).

It should be noted that there are not many Bosnian “national” organisations at present, even if some of them were once quite popular. The tendency for the BIH associative landscape in Switzerland to degrade quickly is remarkable, especially concerning “national” organisations. These structures were created

Box 11: Matica BiH

Created in Zurich in 1993, at the height of the war, Matica BiH is an association that came to the fore around the end of the period of conflict. This charitable structure regards itself as being neutral from a religious and political point of view. With its name meaning “Source of BiH”, the association seeks to gather information but also carry out surveys and studies to utilise the potential of Bosnia’s heritage. Matica has been involved in providing humanitarian aid as well as assistance to refugees from BIH. It has also campaigned in favour of granting scholarships to students in BiH. Matica has been operating for several years, during the crisis and the period of reconstruction of BIH. Professor Rustem Simitović of ETHZ was its coordinator for several years and made his private, professional and political networks of contacts available for the association’s projects. In recent years, Matica BiH has organised various events to bring together different stakeholders from BIH and the Bosnian diasporas in Switzerland with a view to fostering investment in the country.

by BiH nationals in Switzerland who shared a vision of a united Bosnian society, with hopes of creating a unified, functional state. These organisations bring together migrants from the first generation as well as their children with a view to preserving the plural heritage of the Bosnian and former Yugoslavian identity. According to one community leader interviewed, the people who frequent these associations are often also involved in their own ethnic-religious community. These structures, not defined by their ethnic affiliation, are meeting places for all language and religious groups to come together. They represent an opportunity to cultivate and maintain the values of pre-war BiH, i.e. a vision of citizenship, proximity, tolerance and intercommunity mixing.

b) Religious community organisations

The about-turn in favour of endogamy, as mentioned above (see 3.5), is accompanied by the return of religion to daily life in BiH. The growing importance of religion further crystallises the ethno-cultural affiliation of the different components of Bosnian society. Likewise, it brings a halt to the tradition of mixed marriages and cultural exchange. One expert recalled that, during the Yugoslavian period, people in BiH had quite a relaxed approach to religion: “It was more culture than cult,” he said. Since then, religion and politics have become more closely linked, first during and then after the war, for Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats alike. Even though most people, whatever their religion, are still not particularly devout, the closer ties have inevitably had repercussions on the nature of the relationships between people of the different ethnic groups.

Figure 26: Distribution of džemats and Bosniak associations in Switzerland

Religious institutions have become the main informal links between the Bosnian diasporas and their country of origin. The džemats as well as Catholic and Orthodox churches bring together their respective migrants in Switzerland as they “offer a basis for values and (religious) identities that the other associations or the BiH state cannot provide”. Nonetheless, some experts point out that this rise in religious fervour should be viewed in context. They believe that a return to religious institutions does not necessarily reflect stronger beliefs but rather a desire to socialise with those of the same ethnic group.

Box 12: Kultur Shock

The association Kultur Shock was created in Bern in 2006 by Mario Perić, a Bosnian immigrant involved in various Yugoslavian cultural events for several years since his arrival in Switzerland in 1984. Kultur Shock is a cultural venue hosting, in particular, singers from BiH but also from the rest of the Balkan region and the diasporas. For Mario Perić, born to a mixed Bosnian couple, this initiative was the fruit of a need to overcome the ethnic barriers dividing the communities in Switzerland. The association claims to be neutral and comprises around 300 members from BiH and the rest of the Balkans as well as Switzerland. The association is supported by Swiss foundations to promote the culture of BiH and the Balkans in Switzerland and regularly organises concerts on its premises. The groups are carefully screened so as to avoid any that promote a particular ethnic or religious identity. The founder sees the association’s steady growth as a sign of its success, bringing together migrants from BiH who previously only ever socialised with those from their own ethnic group.

Religious associations

Cultural associations

Key:  ● Religious associations ○ Cultural associations

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90 Reminder: the džemats are Bosniak Islamic places of congregation (see also 4.3).
According to one expert, the BiH diaspora’s Serb and Croat churches were better organised than the džemats before the war. The latter became more structured during and after the war. Since then, the importance of these institutions in the social life of Bosniaks has grown progressively. This reflects a return to a more religious and ethnic representation of the community of origin, with implications on the organisation of daily life in the host country. The džemats now play a key role in the lives of the Bosniak diaspora in Switzerland. They benefit from the infrastructures and funding of their community. Their influence, while undeniable, is not limited to the strictly religious dimension, i.e. prayers and religious celebrations (such as the Eid festival, engagements, circumcisions, funeral rites). In fact, their activities are quite varied, covering language classes (see 4.3), sports (football clubs), cultural activities (traditional folk groups) and humanitarian aid (campaigns in favour of BiH).

While their work is concentrated on their own ethnic group, these institutions also play a significant role in the lives of Bosnian diaspora life in Switzerland and in the relations — humanitarian, cultural and developmental — between Switzerland and BiH.

Regarding Bosnian Serbs, most of whom are Orthodox, religion and religious institutions also play an important role, given their attachment to their ethnic identity. One Serb religious leader confirmed their presence in the religious life of Orthodox Serbs in Switzerland. The Serbian Church acts as a bridge between the culture and the country of origin. Their number in Switzerland bears witness to their importance to the diaspora. To assume this role as a bridge with the country and culture of origin, the Serbian Orthodox Church gradually distanced itself from the Russian Orthodox Church in Switzerland. In its early days in Switzerland, the Serbs held religious ceremonies in Russian churches.

Regarding the Croat community, religious leaders also play an important role in the organisation of diaspora life in Switzerland. The Croatian Catholic Church is very active, not only in religious matters (Catechism, Communions) but also in organising cultural events (traditional holidays and folk groups) and in teaching language classes. Catholicism is a distinctive part of the Croatian national identity both in Croatia and BiH, forming the basis for its role as a bridge between the diaspora and the country of origin. During the war (1990–1995) and the humanitarian crisis in Croatia, the Croatian Church in Switzerland was very much involved in coming to their aid. This Church is attended more by Croats from BiH than those from Croatia. However, as mentioned above, it is very difficult to make a clear distinction between Bosnian Croats and Croatsians, as both populations see themselves as belonging to the same ethnic community. According to one leader, the Croat population’s relationship with its Church in recent years has become increasingly spo-
radic, e.g. when migrants first arrive in Switzerland, as they are more vulnerable and in search of direction, or for First Communions and Confirmations. After that, families tend to have less and less contact with the Church. Croatian Catholic priests in Switzerland are sent from Mostar (a town in BiH). The Croatian Catholic Church in Switzerland forms part of this diocese (the equivalent in Germany belongs to the diocese of Split, in Croatia). Finally, we should point out that the Croatian Church aids poor families in Croatia and in BiH.

To conclude, it should be noted that these religious institutions, whether Islamic, Orthodox or Catholic, are not structured around the countries of the region but bring together the followers of the same ethnic group. Thus, for example, there is no Orthodox church in Switzerland specifically for the Serbs of Serbia. On the contrary, they welcome members of the Serb community in general, whether from Serbia, BiH or elsewhere. The same applies regarding the Catholic Church for the Croat community and regarding the džemats, for the Bosniak communities of BiH and the region of Sandžak. This is a territorial and cultural area predominantly inhabited by Bosniaks (Muslim) located partly in Serbia and party in Montenegro (bordering BiH territory).

4.8 Transnationalism of BiH citizens

BiH has a very high number of emigrants in relation to the country’s population. According to the demographic data from the last census of 1991 (see 2.2), the proportion of emigrants was 38.9% of the total population, or 1.5 million people. According to the central bank of BiH, revenues from remittances total between 1 and 1.5 billion euros a year, or even up to 1.8 billion if the pensions paid from abroad to retired Bosnians are included. These figures match the estimates published by the World Bank: for 2010, remittances sent by emigrants came to 2.2 billion US dollars, or around 13% of GDP.41 These funds are sent via specialist money transfer agencies, by bank transfer, or are brought in person by friends or acquaintances who visit the country on a regular basis. The BiH population in Switzerland continues to send money, with around USD 73.4 million sent from Switzerland in 2012.42 It should be noted that the reconstruction of the country after the war was also funded by migrants’ remittances. This transfer of funds has positive economic effects, contributing to maintaining domestic demand.

41 The estimates of the World Bank are based on various sources including national censuses, labour market statistics and national population registers. For further information on this topic see the World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011 (second edition), available in various languages on www.worldbank.org.

Box 13: Annual get-togethers of the “Behar” club and the natives of Ključ

As it does every year, the “Behar” club organised in February 2013 a gala evening in a hall in Lausen (Basel-Landschaft) with a show of BiH traditional folk music. Around 1000 people from different ethnic groups came from all over Switzerland as well as from neighbouring Baden-Württemberg in Germany. Funded by a group of Bosnian businessmen, the event also received sponsorship from companies invited to present their business activity. This annual festival is organised on a charitable basis to aid the Bosnian municipality of Cazin. For 2013, the event raised a net sum of over CHF 20,000 for the beneficiary town’s social fund. In keeping with tradition, the mayor of Cazin was there to greet and to thank the participants and organisers. He also presented them with a certificate of participation in the social fund.

The Bosnian transnational spirit in Switzerland is also evident in the annual meetings of BiH immigrants. For example, BiH nationals from the region of Ključ meet up once a year with the local authorities. These annual events are almost always held in the country of origin but sometimes also in Switzerland; this was the case in 2012, when several hundred Bosnians came together at a single venue in the town of Emmenbrücke to celebrate Bosnian independence in a spirit of friendship.

According to a community leader close to the Bosnian diasporas in Switzerland, what is needed is not so much the presence of BiH nationals in transnational activities but rather their actual involvement in the management and completion of projects in favour of the development of BiH. In fact, unlike during the period of reconstruction following the war, as BiH nationals began to take up permanent residence in Switzerland, they progressively turned more of their attention to their day-to-day activities in the host country (see 3.7). This situation is similar to that of other immigrant populations, particularly the Albanian-speaking community, who initially maintained a strong link with their country of origin before gradually taking a greater interest in their host country. The transnational activities of BiH citizens are more on an individual than collective basis. At the individual level, most of these migrants in Switzerland remain closely attached to BiH by way of their family and their region, town or village of origin or their respective ethnic community (see 4.7.b). Their lack of community-based involvement is particularly due to the difficult political and socio-economic situation that still exists in BiH. The population remains attached to its origins, whether by way of holidays in BiH or their participation in cultural events (music and folklore). These emotional ties with their regions of origin are an important element to be taken into account with regard to public policies. Today, still, Bosnian citizens occasionally get together to support charitable causes, such as the “Behar” associations and people from the region of Ključ (north-west of BiH).

In the collective imagination in BiH, whether among the general population or its institutions, those who have emigrated from BiH are still considered part of the Bosnian national community. They are not considered foreigners; at least that is the image that emerged from our studies in BiH. The feeling expressed by some of our interviewees that they were treated like “fugitives” or even rejected in their own country could stem from a misunderstanding in the expectations and attitudes. Many people we spoke to in the country of origin claimed to be open and grateful to members of the diaspora. However, this does not mean that they accept every initiative put forward by migrants. Migrants may not always be familiar with the true situation and tend to want to impose certain procedures acquired abroad. It is important, therefore, to be aware of the different expectations on both sides and to promote dialogue, seek solutions and ultimately bridge this gap. The scope of transnational initiatives of Bosnians in Switzerland is determined by the existence and the development of networks, particularly at the local level, between the diaspora and the country of origin. Interpersonal (i.e. direct) relationships between local representatives and members of the diaspora appear to play an important role in transnational links, which, incidentally, are formed differently by the different generations of migrants.

First-generation migrants have maintained close ties with their country of origin (see 2.3). The stories we gathered confirm that these actively participated in their country’s reconstruction after the devastation of the war. The first generation thus continues to represent a valuable, indeed an indispensable, financial resource for families in BiH. Members of the second generation also send money to their families, sometimes indirectly, as recounted by one young Bosnian Swiss: “I support my mother financially in Switzerland, but I know that she uses this money to help out her brother and sister in BiH.”

The first generation often remains within family and community circles and has very little interaction with the host society, except in a working capacity. Their migration context has influenced the intensity of the ties between


44 “Transnational activities” refers to spaces in which migrants develop real or imaginary relations between their host country and the country of origin.

their country of origin and the host country. The collective humanitarian commitment that prevailed during the conflict has gradually eroded, as the country’s political-economic situation stagnated. In this context, it is unlikely that many BiH migrants of working age will return in the short to medium term, although this cannot be ruled out in the longer term. Such a return remains complicated for several reasons. One is the profound metamorphosis of the country’s socio-cultural make-up, with the war placing certain ethnic groups in the minority. As a result, it is quite common to see migrants building new houses in their village or town of origin, without necessarily having any long-term plans. While some may choose to stay there or intend to return to enjoy their retirement, the latent interethnic conflict may also lie behind such building decisions. The changes in population distribution after the war did not end the symbolic struggles that still exist between the different populations on the ground. It is quite common, therefore, to build a house simply to mark the presence of one’s ethnic group in a certain place. This indicates the need for inter-community dialogue, with the wounds of war still running deep.

The socio-professional and cultural integration of the second generation in Switzerland is increasingly successful and diversified. In terms of identity, some young people tend to conceal their BiH identity to others. They agree they identify less with their country than with their specific ethnic group or village of origin. In our interviews, one young woman born to a mixed Bosnian couple (Bosniak and Croat) said: “I envy my boyfriend, who is Spanish and proud of his flag, which you see all over the place, even on a sandwich packet. I tend to hide the fact that I’m from BiH and place more emphasis on my Croatian roots.”

This poor image of the Bosnian national identity has a direct impact on the lack of interest in learning the languages of origin and in getting involved in the development of socio-professional projects or investments in the country of origin. Apart from this, the second generation still take an interest in the country or at least in their region of origin, even if this interest is not directly translated into concrete acts. The second generation’s “successful” integration in Switzerland and their emotional ties to their culture of origin form an important resource that could be harnessed in favour of development projects in BiH. The young could contribute by way of knowledge transfer or the creation of transnational socio-professional networks. Apart from their family ties, the second generation has had very little involvement to date in social, socio-cultural or professional activities with their country of origin. Even though they have an emotional connection to their parents’ region of origin, they have lost or never had the opportunity to develop personal networks, which are necessary if they are to make an effort in favour of BiH. They should therefore form networks with local stakeholders in the country or region of origin.

To encourage these young people to act as agents of development, it is important to support networking events or other occasions serving to create contacts and also to attach greater value to the contribution they make in terms of knowledge transfer or the development of innovative activities. Studies have shown that migrants are not always aware of the resources and skills they could contribute, especially when they are not highly skilled or qualified specialists, as is the case for most BiH nationals in Switzerland. For example, given the lack of qualified tourism personnel in BiH, migrants with a good apprenticeship in hospitality could act as instructors, hiring local trainees on site, or as intermediaries between hotel schools in Switzerland and in BiH. In this respect, the public policies for development and migration could help by creating the framework conditions for making contact in a climate of (relative) confidence and provide...
incentives to facilitate the involvement of migrant communities. Based on the stories we heard in Switzerland and the survey results in BiH, it is particularly important to take account of the local dimension, while not ignoring national circumstances. Such measures would aim to improve the second generation’s self-image and to attach greater value to the learning of their language of origin.

Key references


In studying the population from BiH, today numbering some 60,000 people in Switzerland, we are confronted by a multitude of differences: between those migrants who came before and after the war, and between the separate main ethnic communities making up BiH. Each of these groups has had their own migration journey and a different experience of integrating into the host country, making it difficult to draw general conclusions on BiH migrants, even if they all come from the same country. In this final chapter, we will nonetheless attempt to summarise the main features of migration from BiH.

A multifaceted community...

Economic migrants from the first and second waves (in the 1960s and 1980s respectively) came to Switzerland to work, following a series of agreements between the host country, with a high demand for labour, and the former Yugoslavia, a country in the throes of structural economic crisis with bleak job prospects for its citizens. Many unskilled workers answered Switzerland’s call, as did quite a few skilled workers, hired to fill the shortage on the Swiss labour market.

The workforce from BiH and other countries of the former Yugoslavia clearly made an important contribution to the Swiss economy, whether in construction, services or the hospitality sector. The labour force in Switzerland also had a significant impact on the economy of the less developed regions of BiH. On account of their status as seasonal labour, unskilled workers from BiH were allowed to remain in Switzerland for only several months a year before returning home. Only after five consecutive years of working in Switzerland could they envisage obtaining a more permanent status and finally bring their family members to Switzerland and begin the process of socio-cultural integration in the host country.

Seasonal workers from BiH and other parts and republics of Yugoslavia were directly affected by the enactment of the “three-circle” model in 1991, which excluded them from continuing to work in Switzerland. What’s more, this policy was introduced in a context of instability, with wars breaking out in Slovenia, Croatia and then also BiH, leading to a massive displacement of civilian populations. Refugees fleeing the war in BiH between 1992 and 1995 faced difficult conditions. The war also had direct repercussions on Switzerland with an exponential rise in the number of asylum requests from BiH. In 1991, 41,000 applications for asylum were filed in Switzerland, a situation that gave rise to heated political debate. However, with Swiss public opinion shaken by the images of war and the human drama unfolding in BiH, the Federal Council authorised temporary collective asylum (F permits) for refugees from BiH. Some of these came to Switzerland based on an organised distribution of refugee quotas among Western countries, while others headed to Switzerland to reunite with their family or fellow Bosnians already living there.

The war experienced by BiH citizens in Switzerland has left its mark on their mental health and in some cases also their physical well-being. Some experts believe that the onset of depression or post-traumatic stress disorder appeared in some migrants only years after coming to Switzerland. Most of them ignored initial symptoms, and many cases slipped...
through the net. Practically all of those who came as refugees to Switzerland were touched by the consequences of the war, whether directly or indirectly, e.g. they or their family witnessed scenes of extreme violence, such as abrupt removal from their homes, detention in a concentration camp, or the disappearance or assassination of family members. The repercussions of such traumatic events during the war are also felt in the occurrence of chronic somatic pain among many BiH citizens. It goes without saying that such events also had an impact on the integration process of the first and second generations.

The population from BiH is grateful to Switzerland for welcoming refugees and for its involvement in the reconstruction of BiH. Most refugees returned to BiH at the end of the conflict, within the framework of the Swiss Confederation’s programmes for their return and reintegration in BiH. Others obtained the status of refugee or were granted temporary admission. Some remained in Switzerland with an insecure status, which limited their access to the labour market, for many years in some cases. This placed certain BiH migrants in an increasingly vulnerable situation.

... with different journeys
As with other migrant groups, the reasons for and circumstances of migration have a considerable influence on the context of arriving in the host country. The situation is more complex than that, however, and cannot be summarised under these factors alone. For many of those who came as the first generation, learning a language of the host country was not a priority. The first wave of BiH migrants in Switzerland, most of whom worked in the primary sector, did not make an effort to learn to speak, let alone write, a Swiss language. Their work did not require any language proficiency and, as seasonal workers, the plan was to return home. Their focus remained on their village or region of origin and they stayed within their own immigrant community. Meanwhile, those who came to Switzerland as war refugees were more focused on meeting their immediate and medium-term needs, i.e. rebuilding their lives and stabilising their socio-economic and legal situation, sometimes to the detriment of learning a language of the host country and continuing their education.

Migrants’ hopes for a better life are often fulfilled by their children; this can be observed in many migrant groups, and the BiH population is no exception in this respect. In fact, it is in the second generation that social mobility (or re-establishing the parents’ pre-migration status) rapidly becomes a reality: learning the language, socio-professional integration, a good education and even a university degree in some cases, and acquisition of Swiss citizenship. Unlike the integration problems faced by their parents, the children born to immigrant families from BiH feel at home in the host country. According to our experts, this is partly explained by the Swiss school system and the early and efficient integration of children from BiH immigrant or refugee families.

It should be noted that the younger generations sometimes have bitter memories of their country of origin. Many of them have difficulty speaking the language of their parents. While naturalisation is often seen by the second generation as recognition of their socio-cultural integration in Switzerland, their parents see Swiss citizenship as assurance of a long-term right to remain in the host country and also the reawakening of a sense of national pride, something that was lost with the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

Both the first and second generation of BiH migrants are attached to their country or region of origin. However, the sense of identity felt by BiH migrants is fragmented as a result of the conflict in their country. Some still dream of a reunified country, while others find it hard to accept a national identity and rather stick to one based on their ethnic origin. As one of our experts put it, BiH nationals have a “survivor identity”. The stories gathered in the course of this study revealed the rifts in the population: there is not one BiH diaspora in Switzerland, but three diasporas, Bosniak, Croat and Serb (see 4.7). Each of these differs from the other two, whether in terms of religion (Muslim, Catholic or Orthodox), language (Bosnian, Croatian or Serbian) or their places of congregation (džemats, Catholic or Orthodox churches). This intra-ethnic organisation has been accentuated in recent years by a trend towards endogamy. While mixed marriages were common in pre-war BiH, the fratricidal conflict and breakdown of inter-community relations crushed the spirit of
openness: now, in fact, exogamy is more socially acceptable if the chosen partner belongs to neither of the other two ethnic communities of BiH.

Nonetheless, there are those who try to break down the barriers and rally their compatriots around a common cause, whether through the reconstruction of BiH and the restoration of its heritage (associations such as Matica BiH or Behar) or through music from the Balkans (Kultur Shock). Such pan-Bosnian structures strive — with some difficulty at times — to promote the sense of Bosnian citizenship that has remained and indeed grown progressively in Switzerland in recent years, i.e. the “4th Bosnia”. This movement positions itself between the three ethno-religious groups and their associated structures. The difficulty facing this “4th Bosnia” is in establishing dynamic associations that will reflect this unifying spirit over an extended period. Some of these trans-ethnic community efforts have produced model initiatives, particularly in the cultural and humanitarian sphere.

**What is the potential for development?**

Based on the relations originally formed by economic migration, BiH — like the other states of the western Balkans — has from the outset been a priority country for Switzerland’s foreign policy following the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. A pilot programme was launched in 1996 to assist BiH citizens who fled the conflict to return to their country, leading to a coordinated strategy between migration policy, humanitarian aid and eventually development cooperation. The migration partnership signed between Switzerland and BiH in 2009 resulted from this search for greater coherency between politics and the various stakeholders (integration, migration, development cooperation, etc.), initially as a bilateral partnership and subsequently multilateral. Following on from this is a growing aspiration to encourage, in Switzerland and worldwide (with the Global Forum on Migration and Development), active involvement of the migrant population and civil society in the reconstruction of BiH. This new outlook has generated a need to assess the potential of the BiH diasporas and their interest in participating in the socio-economic development of their country of origin.

In conjunction with a study carried out in BiH, the present publication has sought to present a portrait of the migrant population from BiH, while also exploring their integration in Switzerland and relationship with their country of origin. It appears that the willingness to invest in the development of BiH has lost some of its momentum, even though the culture of the country of origin and particularly the music is bringing together more and more people, of all ages and backgrounds. The fragile nature of the ethno-political scenario in BiH, the institutional paralysis caused by so many different institutional levels of the state, together with socio-economic insecurity, corruption and the predominance of nationalist political parties have fuelled a somewhat fatalistic attitude within the immigrant communities, who see their future in Switzerland. Moreover, with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, BiH has difficulty in convincing its citizens of its potential as a new state. The complex history and identity of BiH has a huge impact on immigrants’ attitude to their country of origin, particularly with regard to investment but also the possibility of returning one day. In the present context, which stems from the consequences of the Dayton Agreement, some BiH nationals find it hard to envisage a national collective conscience working towards the prosperity of a stable and multicultural state, whether in social or economic terms. First-generation migrants continue to send part of their income back to their family still in the country or to participate in projects for the reconstruction of the family home or their village of origin. However, such acts of solidarity tend to remain within the family or even at a regional level, and are rarely national. Nonetheless, with such local support given across the country, the financial aid sent by migrants to BiH contributes directly or indirectly to the development of the entire country.
The first generation of BiH migrants is thus clearly involved in supporting their country of origin. However, it remains to be seen what sort of relationship the children or grandchildren of these migrants, i.e. the second and third generations, will develop with their country of origin. Of course, many of these children are growing up with a Swiss passport and thus no longer appear in the statistics published on BiH citizens. But this new citizenship does not have to mean a loss of interest in their roots. Based on their parents’ nostalgia of a happy childhood in BiH and subsequent construction of a Swiss identity, the second or even third generation may revive an interest in transnationalism and possibly use their Swiss know-how for the benefit of development in BiH. In other words, the contribution made by the children and grandchildren of BiH migrants could also be non-financial, i.e. in the form of a transfer or sharing of know-how and experience acquired in Switzerland, or by using their network of professional contacts for the benefit of BiH. Such initiatives would require the involvement of institutions in both, the country of origin and the host country, so as to create the necessary structures and the framework conditions. As far as Switzerland is concerned, the country has a long presence in BiH and a tradition of hiring migrants, which has allowed it to define migration and development issues. Such projects may also result in investments and real economic cooperation between the two countries in the medium or long term.

Finally, it should be noted that the immigrant populations from BiH also have their own specific characteristics that set them apart from the other migrant populations from the Balkans, whether Kosovars, Serbians or Macedonians. Among these specific features are their heterogeneous associative nature, their grueling migratory journey, a fragile national identity, and the difficulties they face in coming together under a joint association. Nonetheless, BiH nationals also have certain points in common with the other migrant populations from the Balkans, in terms of socio-cultural and professional integration in the host country (education, employment, language, health, religion, residence permits) as well as maintaining links with their culture and country of origin (remittances, reconstruction, prospects for return, etc.). Finally, we should mention that, despite the trauma of the war and a difficult migration context, the migrants from BiH have retained their traditional spirit of openness and tolerance.
For specific information about the Bosnian and Herzegovinian population in Switzerland, a list of useful addresses is included below. As the landscape of associations is in permanent mutation, it is possible that some of the information is no longer valid by the time readers consult it. The list is based on information available at the time of writing and approved by those responsible. It does not claim to be exhaustive and contains two principal categories: on the one hand national associations and organisations, on the other hand associations and clubs organised on the basis of ethnicity, religion and language.

### National Associations

- **Bosanski klub Jedinstvo**
  Walzenhausenstrasse 9
  9430 St. Margrethen
- **Bosansko-hercegovacki kulturni centar**
  Lausanne
  http://bhkc-lausanne.ch
- **Club Kultur Shock**
  c/o Mario Perić
  Lerchenweg 33
  3012 Berne
  http://www.kulturshock.ch/
- **Kjlućka Diaspora**
  Postfach 103
  4852 Rothrist
  http://kljuckadijaspora.ch/
- **KUD Bosanski Ljiljani**
  Emmenweidstrasse 4
  6020 Emmenbrücke
- **Matica Bosne i Hercegovine**
  Bleicherweg 64a
  8002 Zurich
  http://matica-bih.org/
- **Mak Dizdar**
  Basel
  http://www.bosanskaskola.ch
- **Meša Selimović**
  Primarschule Felsenburgmatte
  8808 Pfäffikon SZ

### Bosnian and Herzegovinian Associations

- **Associazione culturale bosniaca Bosona**
  Via Cantonale
  6805 Mezzovico
- **Club Behar Sissach**
  4450 Sissach

### Appendix I:

**List of Associations and Cultural Clubs**
Religious, Ethnic and Language Associations

We have identified the following religious (black circle) and ethnic associations (white circle). In some places, there are multiple associations. Where there are both religious institutions and ethnic clubs, this is indicated by a diagonal division (black and white). Shown are institutions and clubs with a known link to BiH – there are many other Croat and Serbian associations which may serve individuals from BiH.

Bosniak Associations

Association des survivants de la Drina-Srebrenica ASDS
p.a. Permanence Srebrenica
Rue des Savoises 15
1205 Geneva

Bosnisce Verein Bosnjak Biel
Florastrasse 30 a
2502 Biel

Bošnjačka islamska zajednica St. Gallen
Geisenwaldstrasse 16
9015 St. Gallen

Bosniaki Verein, Sandzak Bosnien
Gewerbezone Aeschi
6410 Goldau

Bosniakisches Kultur Zentrum Sandzak
Hofstrasse 98
8620 Wetzwikon

Bosnischer Kultur Verein
Seegartenstrasse 4
8716 Schmerikon

Bosnicher Verein
Klublokal Bukvar Ahmet
Unterer Gansbach 2
9050 Appenzell

Bosnische Frauenverein
WaySearch
J.-J.-Ryffel-Strasse 6
5430 Wettingen

Džemat islamske zajednice Bošnjaka
Schlieren
Grabenstrasse 7
8952 Schlieren

Džemat islamske zajednice Lucern
Emmenweidstrasse 4
6020 Emmenbrücke
http://www.dzematluzern.ch/

Džemat «SABUR»
Steigerhubelstr. 94
3008 Berne

Džemat Kosovskih Bosnjaka Wallisellen
Industriestrasse 28
Postfach
8304 Wallisellen

GAM – Džemat SG
Werkstrasse 5a
9000 St. Gallen

Islamiska Zajednica u Kantonu Zugu
Sumpfstrasse 1
6300 Zug
http://dzematzug.ch/

Islamske zajednice Bošnjaka (IZBA)
kantona Aargau (IZBA)
Aarauerstrasse 57
5036 Oberentfelden

Islamische Gemeinschaft Bischofszell
Oberdorf 13
9220 Bischofszell

Islamiska zajednica Bošnjaka u Švajcarsko
Postfach 924
4800 Zofingen

Islamiska zajednica Heiden
Hinterergeten 110
9427 Wolfhalden

Islamicka asocijacija Yverdon
Rue Uttines 36
1400 Yverdon-les-Bains

Islamskaja zajednica Zug
Sumpfstrasse 1
6300 Zug

Islamsko bosanski kulturni centar dzemat Chur
Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft und Bosnischer Kulturverein
Kasernenstrasse 77
Postfach 284
7007 Chur

Islamiska zajednica Bazel
Kleinmüntingerstrasse 55
4057 Basel

Kulturni Centar Bošnjaka
Crêt Débely 13
2053 Cernier
http://www.dzematne.ch/

Kulturno udruženje Bošnjaka Ženeva
Rue Jean Simonet 14-16
1219 Châtelaine

Osmancic Izet
Trümmlenweg 1
8630 Rüti

Sljivar Sabahudin
Sternstrasse 5
9470 Buchs

SVK BiH Kula
Fannringstrasse 4
6403 Küsnacht am Rigi

Croat Associations

Note: Croatian language courses are available in 94 locations in Switzerland, financed by the Croatian government. These locations are not listed here, although they may be attended by Bosnian and Herzegovinan citizens. Compare: http://www.mvep.hr/hr/hmiu/iseljenistvo/svicarska/
Serb Associations

Hrvatska katolička misija
Zähringerstrasse 40
3012 Berne

Hrvatska katolička misija Zurich
Schlossgasse 32
Postfach 9057
8036 Zurich

Hrvatska katolička misija Basel
Kleinrhenstrasse 53
4058 Basel

Hrvatska katolička misija St. Gallen
Paradiesstrasse 38
9000 St. Gallen

Hrvatska katolička misija Luzern
Matthoffring 2/4
6005 Lucerne

Hrvatska katolička misija Grubunder/Gonzen
Gartaweg 15
Postfach 95
7203 Trimmis

Hrvatska katolička misija Frauenfeld
Zürcherstrasse 179
8500 Frauenfeld

Hrvatska katolička misija Aarau
Laurenzenvorstadt 71
5000 Aarau

Hrvatska katolička misija Lausanne-Wallis
Rue de la Borde 25
1018 Lausanne

Hrvatska misija Zug
Mühlengasse 35b
6340 Baar

Hrvatska katolička misija Ticino
Al Mai 18
6528 Camorino

Hrvatska katolička misija Solothurn
Unterer Winkel 7
4500 Solothurn

Hrvatski klub Plehan
Postfach 731
8957 Spreitenbach

Udruženje Hercegovaca
Altstetterstrasse 130
8040 Zurich

Hrvatska katolička misija Solothurn
Unterer Winkel 7
4500 Solothurn

Hrvatski klub Plehan
Postfach 731
8957 Spreitenbach

Srpski kulturni centar Sveti Sava
Tiefenackerstrasse 49
9450 Altstätten

Humanitarno udruženje Sveti Sava
Via del Moro 9
6500 Bellinzona

Regionalna zajednica srpskih klubova
Gallusstrasse 44
9500 Wil

Orthodox Church Lugano
Chiesa San Roco
Piazza San Roco
6900 Lugano

Orthodox Church Bellinzona
Chiesa Madonna della neve
Via Sasso Corbaro
6500 Bellinzona

Srpski kulturni savez u Švajcarskoj
Postfach 1960
8021 Zurich

Srpski Demokratski Klub
Postfach 181
9542 Münchwilen

Srpska Pravoslavna Crkvena Opstina U Lugano
Via Ciossaccio
6594 Contone

Club de Football «Slavija»
http://www.fcslavia.ch/

Srpski Klub «Treba»,
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6900 Lugano

Orthodox Church Bellinzona
Chiesa Madonna della neve
Via Sasso Corbaro
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Orthodox Church Lugano
Chiesa San Roco
Piazza San Roco
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Serbsisch-Orthodoxe Kirchgemeinde in Zürich
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http://www.pravoslavancrkva.ch
http://www.pravoslavlje.ch

Serbsisch-Orthodoxe Kirchgemeinde in Basle
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Serbsisch-Orthodoxe Kirchgemeinde Bern
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http://www.spcbern.ch

Serbsisch-Orthodoxe Kirchgemeinde in St. Gallen
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Serbsisch-Orthodoxe Kirchgemeinde in Luzern
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spc.portal.ch

Serbsisch-Orthodoxe Kirchgemeinde in Zürich
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Serbsisch-Orthodoxe Kirchgemeinde Bern
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Association des parents d’élèves Ecole serbe en Suisse romande
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Hram Sv.Trojice U Zürich
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http://www.pravoslavnacrkva.ch
http://www.pravoslavlje.ch
Appendix II:
Extended Bibliography
Empire: the functioning of a plural society.


Department of Migration Swiss Red Cross, ed. (2005). In the aftermath of war and torture: coping with long-term traumatization, suffering, and loss. Zürich: Seismo.


Fallun, Corinne and Elisabeth Jahn (2010). La diaspora bosniaque à la rescousse, TF1.


Appendix III:
List of Interviewees

Taner Alicehić, funder Re Investment solutions, Zug & Sarajevo
Osman Besić, head of department of health, Swiss Red Cross, Berne
Mirsada B., refugee from BiH (from Srebrenica), Fribourg
Violeta Brakuš, Serb parents’ association, Lausanne
Bernard Courvoisier, Association Envol, former dean, Vaud
Edin Dacic, Daccomet AG, Zurich
Emina Erdić, psychiatrist, Lausanne
Elma Hadzikadunić, project leader, «Age et Migration», EPER, Lausanne
Elvis Jakupović, Bosnian language school, Lucerne
Tarik Kapić, NGO Terra Nostra, patent expert, Solothurn
Hamdija Kocić, Association « Matica BiH », Zürich
Haris Lokvanić, refugee from BiH, returned to Sarajevo, SDC, Sarajevo
Dajana Mahinić, psychiatrist, Lausanne
Jean-Claude Metraux, psychiatrist and founder of „Nous autres”, Lausanne
Omer Micijevic, former president of „Matica”, Zurich
Mirsad Mujadžić, president of Swiss Dzemaats, Lucerne
Slavisa Obrenović, association «Majevičani», Yverdon-les-Bains
Jasmina Opardiya, project coordinator RRPPWB, University of Fribourg
Vlata Pavlinović, Croatian Catholic church, Lausanne
Mario Perić, „Kultur Shock”, Berne
Ivica Petrušić, Second@s-Plus, Aarau
Sabina Rondić, rector, Université de Lausanne
Bogoljub Popović, Orthodox priest, Lausanne
Pavle S., immigrant from BiH, Vevey
Rustem Simitović, Honorary Consula of BiH, Zurich
Nenad Stojanović, Universities of Zurich and Lausanne