Strategy for Integrated Border Management 2027

November 2019

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List of abbreviations

ACM    | Association of Cantonal Migration Offices
AFIS   | Automated Fingerprint Identification System
ALO    | Airline Liaison Officer
API    | Advance Passenger Information (electronic system that sends passenger data to the relevant border management agencies immediately after airline check-in)
ASF-SLTD | Automatic Search Interface for Stolen and Lost Travel Documents used by INTER-POL
BBI    | Bundesblatt (Official Federal Gazette)
BE     | Canton of Bern
BMVI   | Border Management and Visa Instrument
BSL    | Basel-Mulhouse Airport
CCJPD  | Conference of Cantonal Justice and Police Directors
CCPCS  | Conference of Cantonal Police Commanders of Switzerland
CD     | Consular Directorate of the FDFA
CIRAM  | Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model
COM    | Commission (of the EU)
CS-VIS | Centralised European visa system
DaziT  | Modernisation and digitalisation programme of the FCA
DDPS   | Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport
DEA    | Directorate for European Affairs of the FDFA
EES    | Entry/Exit system
EU     | European Union
eu-USA | European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
ETIAS | European Travel Information and Authorization System
EU     | European Union
EURODAC | European database for fingerprints of asylum seekers and illegal border crossers
FCA    | Federal Customs Administration of the FDF
FDFA   | Federal Department of Finance
FDIP   | Federal Department of Justice and Police
fedpol | Federal Office of Police in the FDJP
FIS    | Federal Intelligence Service in the DDPS
fn.    | Footnote
FOCA   | Federal Office of Civil Aviation
Frontex| European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
FTE    | Full-time equivalent
GE     | Canton of Geneva
GVA    | Geneva Airport
HPI    | Harmonisation of Swiss police information technology
IBM    | Harmonisation of Swiss police information technology
IBMF   | Integrated Border Management Fund
ILO    | Immigration Liaison Officer
INTERPOL | International Criminal Police Organization
ISF    | Internal Security Fund
IT     | Information and telecommunications technology
MRTD   | Machine-readable travel documents
PA     | Police attaché
PNR    | Passenger Name Record
POLSTA | Police-prosecution service strategy group
RAM    | Réseau d’Analyse Migratoire (Migration Analysis Network)
RIPOL  | Recherches informatisées de police (Swiss Confederation’s automated police tracing system)
SBG    | Swiss Border Guard within the FCA
SEM    | State Secretariat for Migration in the FDJP
SIS    | Schengen Information System
SPOC   | Single Point of Contact
SR     | Systematische Rechtssammlung (Classified Compilation of Federal Legislation)
Reg    | Regulation
VIS    | European Visa Information System
ZEMIS  | Central Migration Information System
ZH     | Canton of Zurich
ZRH    | Zurich Airport
1. Introduction

1.1 Integrated Border Management

The aim of Integrated Border Management (IBM) is to manage the Schengen external borders effectively, efficiently and in an orderly manner, in order to make these borders more secure by conducting better controls, while at the same time keeping borders as open as possible for legal travellers. The term ‘Integrated Border Management’ covers all the operations that serve to control the crossing of external borders, address potential threats at the external borders and contribute to combating serious and cross-border crime. Integrated Border Management may be regarded as an essential complement to the principle of free movement of persons within the Schengen area, a common area for freedom, security and the rule of law.

Planning and implementing the Integrated Border Management strategy is the responsibility of the competent authorities in the Schengen States and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in its respective area of responsibility.

The purpose of this document is to achieve the Vision set out in Chapter 2.
• to develop and consolidate the concept of Integrated Border Management in the context of current national trends and challenges;
• to build a bridge connecting with the European Integrated Border Management strategy (comprising the Commission’s political strategy and Frontex’s technical and operational strategy) and with national strategies on associated and related policy areas;
• to set out the strategic objectives for the period to 2027.

1.2 Developments since the 2012 IBM Strategy

Between 2010 and 2012, following the recommendations in the initial Schengen Evaluation of Switzerland, the State Secretariat for Migration (the SEM) and partner authorities at federal and cantonal levels devised the first national strategy on Integrated Border Management (referred to below as the ‘2012 IBM Strategy’). Based on this initial strategy, several working groups comprising federal and cantonal representatives drew up an action plan consisting of 68 measures to achieve the objectives laid down in the 2012 IBM Strategy (referred to below as ‘2014 IBM Action Plan’). In 2017, the first strategy cycle was concluded as planned. At this point, two thirds of all the measures in the action plan had already been implemented. Most of the other measures were in the course of being implemented.

On conclusion of the first strategy cycle, the SEM took the opportunity to commission an external evaluation of the strategy development process and the implementation and impact of the action plan. The evaluation report concludes that the close involvement of the relevant partners in devising the strategy and planning its implementation made a significant contribution to strengthening cooperation between authorities involved in IBM. Overall, the process of drawing up the strategy and the action plan was assessed as effective. The report identified potential for optimisation in two areas: firstly, it pointed out that developments in context and differing implementation requirements for strategy development and implementation planning were only superficially considered. This indicated that Integrated Border Management had not been organised flexibly. Secondly, it found that the issue of resources and implementation structures had largely been ignored. This had led to incoherence between objectives, measures and resources.

With regard to the implementation and effectiveness of the strategy, the evaluation stresses the relevance of the general goals and the measures analysed. However, it also points out that the slim implementation structure and the requirement of resource-neutral implementation have led to a situation where complex and resource-intensive measures cannot be implemented or can only be implemented in part. It takes the view that although the 2012 IBM Strategy has supported a trans-regional view, encouraged a common understanding of border management and improved cooperation within Switzerland, the monitoring accompanying implementation has not been used to strategically manage and further develop IBM.

In view of this, the evaluation report concluded with the following recommendations:

1. The IBM strategy should be updated.
2. The new IBM strategy must set clear priorities.
3. The coherence of the objectives, responsibilities, measures and resources must be taken into account at an early stage and continually kept in mind.
4. The new IBM strategy must be devised in cooperation with the relevant partner authorities.
5. Appropriate structures and resources for the flexible and dynamic implementation of the new IBM strategy should be made available.

The final report on the implementation of the 2014–2017 Action Plan approved by the Federal Council and the CCJPD also reaches a mainly positive conclusion. It points out that Integrated Border Management in the preceding years had been adopted by the professional groups concerned as a joint brand, as it were, and that it is now important for the follow-up strategy to build on existing strengths. This involves in particular the earliest possible inclusion of the cantonal and federal authorities concerned, as well as the approval of the follow-up strategy by the competent federal and cantonal authorities. With a view to the strategy’s implementation phase, there is also a need to examine whether and how the follow-up strategy could be more solidly embedded in the political landscape and to what extent this embedding can be used to control implementation.

In view of this and with reference to Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 on the European Border and Coast Guard, which requires the Schengen States to develop a national strategy for Integrated Border Management based on a specified basic framework, the Federal Council in a decision dated 30 November 2018 issued the mandate to the SEM to devise a follow-up strategy in cooperation with the stakeholders (see Chapter 1.3).
1.3 Strategy development process

Like the previous strategy, the current strategy was devised in close cooperation with the relevant federal and cantonal actors under the overall responsibility of the SEM. Offices of the FDJP (fedpol), of the FDF (FCA), of the FDJA (CD and DEA) and of the DDPS (FiS) participated in the development process along with the CCJPD, the CCPCS, the ACM and the cantonal police forces from ZH, GE and BE. These diverse participants were primarily brought together via the Border Steering Group1), ad hoc working groups, and the committee of the Conference of Cantonal Justice and Police Directors (CCJPD). Table 1 below provides a rough outline of the schedule for the development process for the new strategy on Integrated Border Management (referred to below as the 2027 IBM Strategy).

A comprehensive core document formed the basis for the current strategy. This contains detailed information on each of the components of the strategy (see Chapter 3.2) and numerous cross references to the starting position, the strategic approach to date and the operational structure, including any relevant recommendations from the Schengen evaluations or vulnerability assessments. This information formed the basis for the analysis and the strategic goals for each component that have been set out in this strategy paper along with introductory chapters 1–4 and the horizontal themes (Chapter 5).

1.4 Strategic links and duration

Given its need to be integrative, an IBM strategy cannot be conceived, developed or implemented in isolation. It is dependent on other strategies at national and international level. At a European level it has close ties with the EU Commission’s strategy for integrated border management1) and on the technical and operational strategy of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency2), the vision and values of which are reflected in the vision for the national strategy. The strategic goals of the technical and operational strategy of Frontex4) are adopted in the strategic goals devised below in Chapter 6.1 to 6.11.

An overview of the relevant strategic links is provided in Annex 1 (p. 48). Where required, reference is made in the footnotes to relevant links.

In line with the strategy of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the term of the European Fund for Integrated Border Management, the 2027 IBM Strategy is organised to run until 2027. This decision is based on the one hand on the experience with the 2012 IBM Strategy, which showed that five to seven years for a strategic plan for border management is appropriate. On the other, it makes sense, for financial reasons, to coordinate the duration of the strategy with the term of the fund that will largely finance the implementation of the strategy. Lastly, given the subject of the strategy, there is a need to align with Frontex’s technical and operational strategy, which also runs until 2027. Alignment with national strategy cycles (such as the Federal Council’s current legislature programme5), which was only available up to 2019 at the time the strategy was devised, or the current strategy for combating terrorism6), which has no fixed duration) was considered but rejected, as the duration of the new 2027 IBM Strategy could only be reconciled with these cycles with difficulty if at all.

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1) The Border Steering Group is a strategic consultative and coordination body. It aims to improve the close cooperation between the decision-makers in the Zurich and Geneva cantonal police forces, the FCA, fedpol and SEM in relation to border control. The Border Steering Group normally meets once a year in its expanded form (together with the CD, CCJPD, CCPCS, FIS, ACM and CCPD) to discuss IBM.


4) Strategic Goal 1: Reduced vulnerability of the external borders based on comprehensive situation-related awareness; Strategic Goal 2: Secure and properly functioning EU external borders; Strategic Goal 3: Maintaining the capabilities of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency.


2. The Vision

The Vision of the 2027 IBM Strategy continues the approach set out in the 2012 IBM Strategy (where it was termed ‘the general goals’): combating illegal migration and cross-border crime remain key components of the Vision. The aim of making entry and exit for bona-fide travellers as easy as possible is also part of the new strategy. On the other hand, the Vision deliberately does away with the scales symbol used in the 2012 IBM model. This suggested that a balance in qualitative and quantitative terms must somehow be struck between measures to combat illegal migration and cross-border crime on the one hand and measures to facilitate legal entry on the other. What is important, however, is not striking a balance but the need to organise measures to combat illegal migration and cross-border crime to ensure that their impact on legal travel does not exceed an unavoidable level of inconvenience, and that this impact is limited and further reduced wherever possible. This requirement is found again in the new strategy.

In addition to the previous general goals, the Vision now expressly mentions as an additional objective safeguarding the security of Switzerland and that of the Schengen area in particular, as well as security in an international context.17

Proof of effective, efficient and orderly border management that makes the Schengen external borders more secure through better controls, while at the same time keeping them as open as possible for legal travellers is quality, legality, effectiveness and efficiency. Switzerland must aspire to running a border management system characterised by streamlined, expeditious, quality-assured and efficient processes carried out by professional staff that complies with national and European law and respects human rights. Where they bring efficiency and quality and are required for economic reasons, Switzerland will rely on modern, technology-based solutions.

Switzerland understands border management as an overall system that is run jointly by numerous actors. Foremost among these actors are the federal authorities (where several departments carry out border management tasks) and the cantons, but also the Schengen group comprising the Schengen States and the relevant EU agencies, in particular Frontex. A functioning border management system thus requires close cooperation and coordination between all these actors both in a domestic and in a European context.

The 2027 IBM Strategy Switzerland is therefore pursuing the following Vision:

Switzerland operates a professional, legally compliant and efficient border management system:

• which contributes to the security of Switzerland and of the Schengen area in particular and increases security in an international context;
• which allows the smooth entry and exit of legal travellers and thus preserves Switzerland’s appeal as a location;
• which ensures success in combating illegal migration and cross-border crime;
• which cooperates closely with the relevant Swiss and foreign actors;
• and which uses suitable state-of-the-art technologies to do so.

3. Model

The key elements of the IBM model comprise the Four-Filter Model (see Chapter 3.1), already familiar from the first strategy cycle, the eleven strategy components mentioned in Article 4 of Regulation 2016/1624 (see Chapter 3.2) and three horizontal themes (see Chapter 3.3).

3.1 Four-Filter Model

The Four-Filter Model commonly used in the European border management context played a crucial role as a regulating principle in the 2012 IBM Strategy and since then has also become part of the Switzerland’s security policy strategy.20 With Regulation 2016/1624 it is not only the best practice, but has also been made law.21 The model is based on the assumption that the process of combating illegal migration efficiently and successfully should not focus on the Schengen external borders, but should already begin in third countries,19 and that it must also include measures within the Schengen area.

In comparison with the 2012 IBM Strategy, minor adjustments have been made to the model: these relate to the second filter, which in the 2012 IBM Strategy covered cooperation measures with neighbouring countries, i.e. in the Swiss context with other Schengen States and thus cooperation in the Schengen area. By contrast, the second filter is now understood in the European context as an umbrella term for measures in neighbouring third countries that are primarily significant for Schengen States with external land borders. As a country surrounded by Schengen States, Switzerland has no neighbouring third countries – unless states with direct flight connections to Switzerland are defined as such. In view of the volatility of the air traffic network, there is no reason to draw a distinction between third countries with and those without a direct connection with Switzerland as a basis for strategic planning. As a result, all measures relating to third countries are assigned to the first filter. This means that from now on the second filter no longer involves any measures. The measures carried out previously in the second filter in cooperation with other Schengen States are now carried out under the present strategy as part of the fourth filter (measures within the Schengen area).

In contrast, no changes have been made to the other three filters: the first filter covers measures in countries of origin or transit, the third filter constitutes the actual border control at the external borders, while the fourth filter covers measures within the Schengen area (those taken within Switzerland and cooperation with other Schengen States).

17 Persons who travel with the intention of complying with the applicable migration laws and who in particular do not intend to enter any country illegally or to remain illegally in the Schengen area after a legal period of residence. The final version of the Vision, instead of using the term ‘bona-fide traveller’, which is established in this professional field, uses the term ‘legal traveller’, which is easier to understand in general parlance, even if both terms mean the same.
19 The term ‘third countries’ in the Schengen context means all those states that are neither EU members nor Schengen-associated States.
22 See Introductory Sentence 2 of Regulation 2016/1624.

3.2 Components of the strategy

The Four-Filter Model described above serves as a classification system with regard to the phase of a migration process or the place where a measure takes effect, rather than as a content-related pattern for a strategy. This function is assumed by the eleven components named in Article 4 of Regulation 2016/1624, namely:

1. Border control
2. Search and rescue operations at sea
3. Risk analysis
4. Cooperation between Schengen Member States supported by Frontex
5. Internal and international cooperation between Schengen Member States
6. Activities in third countries
7. Controls within the Schengen area (incl. border controls within the Schengen area)
8. Return
9. Use of state-of-the-art technologies
10. Quality control mechanisms
11. Solidarity mechanisms

The present strategy was also developed and formulated based on these eleven components (see Chapter 6).

3.3 Horizontal themes

Three horizontal themes are superimposed on all these components. In contrast to the components, these topics do not have their own legal basis but arise from purely practical considerations and form a special part of the Frontex technical and operational IBM strategy:

1. Respect for fundamental rights
2. Education and training
3. Research and innovation

These horizontal themes are considered in Chapter 5.

In contrast to the model used in the first strategy cycle, the 2027 IBM model does away with separate strategic guidelines. These have proved to be redundant, as they are already part of the Vision, are completely covered by one of the eleven components of the strategy or by a horizontal theme, or only relate to requirements for the strategy development process, instead of making their own strategic statements.

3.4 Graphical presentation of the 2027 IBM model

The elements described in Chapter 2 and in 3.2 to 3.3 result in the following IBM model:

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**Vision**

- H1 – Fundamental Rights
- H2 – Education & Training
- H3 – Research & Innovation

**4-Filter Model**

- **F1** – Measures in third countries (general)
- **F2** – Measures in neighbouring third countries
- **F3** – Measures at the external border
- **F4.1** – Measures within the Schengen area (in Schengen group)
- **F4.2** – Measures within the Schengen area (in Switzerland)
- **F5** – Measures related to two or more filters (overlapping)

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Switzerland operates a professional, legally compliant and efficient border management system,

- which contributes to the security of Switzerland and the Schengen Area in particular and increases security in an international context;
- which allows the smooth entry and exit of legal travellers and thus preserves Switzerland’s appeal as a location;
- which ensures success in combating illegal migration and crossborder crime;
- which cooperates closely with the relevant Swiss and foreign actors; and
- which uses suitable state-of-the-art technologies to do so.

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Figure 1: 2027 IBM model
4. Trends

The Integrated Border Management strategy aims to set strategic goals for the components and considerations based on the Vision that have already been mentioned and in a further step to describe the way in which these goals should be achieved starting from the status quo. It should be noted that the strategy not only seeks to provide answers to current challenges, but also and above all to future challenges expected within the 2027 strategy horizon.

In view of this, in the following sub-chapters trends will be identified that will influence future border management and an attempt will be made to assess their impact on border management.

4.1 Mobility and migration

4.1.1 Increasing mobility

In recent years, the volume of passengers travelling to and from third countries outside the Schengen area has grown steadily (see 2). During the first strategy cycle from 2012 to 2017 alone, it increased at Swiss national airports by around 20% (Zurich +15%, Geneva +20% and Basel +51%).

Advancing economic and social globalisation and networking, combined with growing prosperity in many emerging countries23, will make intercontinental travel affordable for ever broader sections of the population. Driven by constant cut-throat competition in the aviation industry and the resulting fall in prices, this will lead to steady growth in the volume of passengers.

4.1.2 Constantly high migratory pressure

Numerous unresolved armed conflicts, climate and environment-related migratory movements, fragile states and the gulf between Europe and other parts of the world in terms of prosperity, security and prospects are crucial pull and push factors and lead to continued high migratory pressure towards Europe24.

Agreements with third countries such as Turkey and Libya often simply lead to changes in migration routes25. In addition, any slowdown in the migratory movement towards Europe achieved through these agreements is largely dependent on the political interests of the third countries involved. As a result, these agreements are highly susceptible to disruption, and may start to humble or completely fall apart at any time, offering no guarantee of a constant, long-term limitation of irregular migration towards the Schengen area.

Even if current irregular migratory movements are generally far below the record levels seen at the end of 2015, this trend cannot hide the fact that migratory pressure towards Europe is still high and, in view of the factors mentioned above, is set to remain high. As a result, would-be migrants will continue to seek ways and means of getting into the Schengen area or to Switzerland and, if necessary, of evading the border management system. In many cases, they will continue to use the services of traffickers, with the result that the phenomenon of people smuggling is set to remain constant as a matter of high importance.

\[\text{\textbullet \: Travellers going from or to airports outside the Schengen area (third countries) who are subject to a mandatory border control on entry and exit.}\]

\[\text{\textbullet \: Travellers within the Schengen area (between Switzerland and other Schengen States and in the opposite direction).}\]

\[\text{\textbullet \: Travellers going from or to airports outside the Schengen area (third countries) who are subject to a mandatory border control on entry and exit.}\]

\[\text{\textbullet \: Travellers going from or to airports outside the Schengen area (third countries) who are subject to a mandatory border control on entry and exit.}\]
4.1.3 General consistency in the national hotspots for illegal migration
In the coming years, migratory pressure is set to remain highest in the Mediterranean region, because effective protection of external borders at sea, especially when compared with air borders, is the most difficult to achieve, for legal and practical reasons.

In many cases, the European Mediterranean coastal states will not actually be the ultimate goal for the migrants. Even though the preferred destinations may change depending on the ethnicity/nationality of the migrants or the attractiveness of the policy on asylum, foreign nationals and returns in the destination states over the coming years, it must be assumed that many migrants, after arriving in Europe, will attempt to move further north.

As a result, the numbers of persons detained within Switzerland and in particular at Swiss internal Schengen borders in recent years have always been considerably higher than the numbers detained at the Swiss external Schengen borders (see 3).

In view of the factors mentioned, the high secondary migratory pressure at Swiss internal borders is set to continue and will also exceed the pressure the Swiss external air borders – not least because the air borders can be protected effectively through legal, technical and operational measures.

The pressure on the internal air borders, primarily appreciable so far from the direction of Greece, is also set to remain high. It remains to be seen whether with the observed movement away from the central to the western Mediterranean route will result in similar phenomena being observed from Spain as well.

4.2 Increased threat situation: border control as a threat management instrument
The uncertain situation, in particular in the Maghreb and in the Middle East, has also had a negative influence in recent years on the security situation in Switzerland. Switzerland is part of the western world regarded by jihadi as hostile to Islam and thus from their point of view is a legitimate target for terrorist attacks. In addition, Switzerland is increasingly becoming the target for illegal intelligence activities carried out by third countries. A fundamental change in these trends is unlikely.

In view of this, averting dangers and guaranteeing internal security has become a far more important aspect of border control in recent years. As no fundamental or continuous easing of tensions in the general security situation is likely at present, border control will continue to play a vital role in threat management and in guaranteeing internal security.

4.3 Constant reform of the Schengen acquis
The constantly high migratory pressure on the Schengen external borders, which can only be eased temporarily and on a fragile basis by agreements with third countries, and the continually tense security situation within the Schengen area following a range of terrorist attacks places the Schengen system under high political pressure. As a consequence, a number of Schengen States have re-introduced controls at their internal borders and have already extended these controls on several occasions – and thus at the very least called into question, if not entirely undermining the basic concept of a common territory for freedom, security and the rule of law without border controls within the Schengen area.

In response, in recent years and with a regularity never seen before, the EU has devised and introduced new projects and legislation in order to take account of the differing and in some cases opposing interests and concerns of its member states, and in order to secure a return to the regular Schengen system without border controls within the Schengen area. However, so far these reforms have not enjoyed the desired success, and indeed an increasing hardening of political positions and fronts on certain issues can be detected. It can therefore be assumed that to some extent counter-pressure on the Schengen system and with it the regularity of reforms will remain high to very high.

4.4 Increasing complexity and overlapping of tasks
In recent years, the border control process has become steadily more complex and the organisational and technical interfaces that must be respected and controlled have constantly increased. As a result, the technical and professional requirements – in particular for border control and the authorities responsible – have already increased markedly and will continue to do so. The need to keep pace with these developments means that the Zurich Cantonal Police and the FCA (SBG), the two largest border control authorities, are already facing major technical, financial and human resources challenges. In the foreseeable future, demands are set to increase further. For the other border control authorities, which are in any case reliant to a large extent on the groundwork and cooperation of the Zurich Cantonal Police or the FCA (SBG), this is all the more so the case.

At the same time, crossovers between migration management and control on the one hand and safeguarding internal security and public order on the other will become increasingly fluid. As a consequence, the areas of responsibility of the authorities responsible for these tasks (in particular those of the SEM, fedpol, the FCA and FIS at federal level, and those of the cantonal police forces) will overlap with increasing regularity.

The increasing complexity and the expanding overlap of areas of responsibility demand greater cooperation between authorities at federal and cantonal levels and the need to find suitable new forms of cooperation.

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**Table 3: Numbers of persons detained internally v numbers refused entry (Switzerland)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numbers detained at internal borders</td>
<td>11,117</td>
<td>29,934</td>
<td>48,162</td>
<td>26,090</td>
<td>15,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbers refused entry at external borders</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>1216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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28 Whereas at air and land borders, persons that do not meet the entry requirements, either directly or after an asylum procedure at the airport or directly on the land border, can mostly be returned again to the third country, in the case of persons picked up in international waters, this is considerably more difficult. On the increasing pressure on the Schengen external border, see also Federal Council Security Policy Report of 24.08.2016, p. 19 f.
30 Worth mentioning are, for example, new technical systems (EES, ETIAS, see Chapter 4.5.1 on both) or other primarily operational and technical initiatives (Interoperability Initiative), a proposal for amending the Schengen Borders Code with regard to the requirements and modalities for re-introducing border controls within the Schengen area and the proposal for the further reinforcement of frontiers.
31 See also the remarks in Chap. 4.5.2.
4.5 Processes and technology
4.5.1 Progressive digitalisation, process automation and outsourcing
In the absence of targeted countermeasures, the rising numbers of passengers and the threat management that the border control authorities have to carry out inevitably lead to longer waiting times at border checkpoints. In order to keep delays to a minimum, there is pressure to introduce further digitalisation and automation in border control processes.

Here the registration and comparison of digitalised biometric features plays a crucial role. Thanks to the increasing reliability of biometrics-based identification technologies, this trend should continue. With the aim of achieving even greater reliability, a trend away from identification procedures based solely on facial images towards those based on fingerprints can be observed. This trend is set to continue and in future will also cover categories of persons who currently can only be identified by means of facial image – persons who are increasingly the target for attempts at identity theft made by imposters.

As part of the increasing digitalisation of the information stored on a travel document, the comprehensive verification of the authenticity and integrity of this information is also gaining in importance. The authenticity and integrity of the digital data stored on travel documents can be clearly ascertained or confirmed by using internationally standardised digital certificates and their public keys.

Procurement, examination and recognition as well as secure provision to the control authorities thus play a fundamental role in the successful verification of digital data stored on travel documents.

In addition, the digital processing of biometric features also permits the widespread automation of border control processes, i.e. the actual identification process and the questioning of travellers when they are crossing borders. Here systems could even be used in the medium to long term that do not merely question travellers and record their answers, but which are also able to assess the credibility of the information, something that can currently only be done by a border control official. Automation therefore promises more effective and more efficient border controls.

Although the actual increase in efficiency offered by these automated systems cannot yet be conclusively assessed (alongside certain economies in control staff), these systems also generate considerable financial and staffing costs in relation to technical development and operation, it must be assumed that the trend towards automation will continue in view of the high pressure to increase efficiency.

The European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), which will be introduced in a few years, will be the first system in which travellers will have to interact directly with an automated system, independently and without the assistance of a consular or border control official or the support of an external service provider as a condition sine qua non before starting their journey. The introduction of ETIAS is based on the underlying assumption that prospective travellers normally have access to the internet. In relation to actual border controls, so-called self-service kiosks are already in use (if not yet in Switzerland) where travellers can themselves carry out procedures that were previously carried out by border control officials. In view of the high pressure to increase efficiency in border controls, the trend towards self-service systems is set to continue. In the long term, it is likely that this trend will also lead to systems that no longer rely on stationary hardware operated by government officials, but which increasingly use the travellers’ own smart devices. This is all the more the case because blockchain-based technologies could make it possible in the rather more distant future to dematerialise the proof of identity currently based on a physical travel document and allow people to carry their own digital proof of identity – for example on a smartphone.

4.5.2 Increasing levels of networking (interoperability)
With the introduction of the entry-exit system (EES), border control will no longer involve simply checking existing data, but will also generate new data. ETIAS provides new information – complementary to the data currently stored on travellers who require a visa – on third-country nationals travelling in the Schengen area. At present Advance-Passenger Information (API) data is collected on certain routes, and since 2018 Passenger Name Record (PNR) data has been gathered on all flights to and from EU States. Switzerland has yet to decide on whether it should also systematically gather and analyse PNR data. In addition, there are numerous other European and national databases that already play a significant role in border controls and in specific enquiries by the prosecution or migration authorities; these include the Schengen Information System (SIS), Switzerland’s automated police tracking system (RIPOL), the European fingerprint database for asylum seekers and illegal border crosses (EURODAC), the European Visa Information System (VIS), the Central Migration Information System (ZEMIS) and the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS).

These various databases currently function for the most part as isolated information sources with different rules on access – although they may contain data on exactly the same persons that only provide a proper basis for a decision on entry or any other official matter if they are subjected to a comprehensive assessment. In view of the increasingly fluid crossovers between migration management and control on the one hand and safeguarding internal security and public order on the other, greater interoperability among the systems is beginning to be ever more important. The Commission’s response has been the Interoperability Initiative, which by around 2024 should provide for an automatic exchange between certain systems, together with the development of a shared biometric database, a shared identity database and a European search portal. The need to make the various systems and databases as interoperable as possible has also become clear at national level.

4.5.3 Rising cost of data management
The use of new technologies has extended the border control authorities’ original range of tasks, as in addition to their conventional tasks, such as comparing data and drawing and documenting conclusions, the authorities must increasingly record and multitask data as well. The recording of previously unregistered data (for example on the entry and exit of third-country citizens for short-term stays) and the comparison of data contained in different data files that are still isolated increase the probability that contradictions and inconsistencies will come to light that have to be investigated and corrected. Normally this work can only be done manually, it is often extremely time-consuming and demanding (in relation to border controls) new requirement profiles and corresponding resources that can entirely negate the increases in efficiency achieved through interoperability.

In addition to the challenges involved in recording and processing personal data, a further issue that arises is the use of extensive data collections for non-person-specific, analytical purposes. The evaluation of the precise statistics that will be available in future on the entry and exit of certain citizens, the comparison of these figures with the numbers refused entry or with findings on overstayers and other comparisons sought to provide interesting results. If Switzerland were also to record PNR data at some time (see fn. 35) and thus, for example, obtain information on travel routes as well, all this information could be
used to generate evidence-based risk profiles. The challenge will lie in evaluating large volumes of data systematically, in a shift from the current practice of comparing databases, if appropriate with the aid of algorithms and self-learning systems, according to specific criteria or according to anomalies/abnormalities.

4.5.4 Growing complexity risks

Although technological progress makes a vital contribution to increased efficiency and security in border control, it also entails certain risks due to the drastically rising complexity of the technologies used:

Border control is already widely supported by technical systems. Increasingly it involves checking purely technical criteria (for example the existence of a visa with fingerprints that correspond to those of the traveller, or checking the authenticity of the data chip in an electronic travel document). The resultant focus on technical issues is likely to increase in view of the foreseeable developments. This means that control staff will need a growing level of technical and normative understanding in order to be able to assess the information presented by the control systems, compare it critically with a profile that will still be based on personal impression, interpret it correctly and recognise discrepancies reliably.

The high degree of computerisation also makes border control and many other border management activities largely dependent on the availability and integrity of the technology. Even rare and brief system failures inevitably lead to temporary omissions in the system. When the systems become available again, it will still be difficult or even impossible to eliminate the resulting blind spots. In addition, as the importance of technology for border control and law enforcement systems grows, its attraction as a potential target for cyber-attacks will also increase. As a consequence, measures to maintain or increase availability and to protect systems against attack are set to become even more important.

Lastly, high complexity and technical and operational interdependence increase the need to have specialists who can devise, develop and operate the numerous systems already in existence and the new systems that will come along. The specialist knowledge required, in particular in relation to business analysis, project management, system architecture and programming, often goes well beyond the employee profiles in the organisations traditionally responsible for the systems; as a result, this expertise already has to be bought in from outside or specifically built up in-house, and in future this will probably be even more the case. Furthermore, with increasing computerisation, the costs of planning, development and above all of operating the systems are likely to rise considerably (see also Chapter 4.6).

4.6 Scarcity of resources

Future developments, such as growing numbers of passengers, additional control systems (EES, ETIAS, systems for interoperability), a greater need for security or an increased level of threat and the expertise that has to be developed as a result, when taken together inevitably mean that border management will need considerably more resources in the future. In particular the conception, development, and operational and technical running and maintenance of IT systems will require more staff and financial resources.

Along with the demands related to actual border control, the overall demands made of Schengen-conform border management will increase, which will often result in an additional need for resources. This is perfectly illustrated by the recommendations of the last Schengen Evaluation in relation to basic and continuing training (see Chapter 5.2), risk analysis (see Chapter 6.3) and quality assurance (see Chapter 6.10): when taken together, it would be virtually impossible to implement these recommendations using only the existing resources, particularly the human resources.

In addition to the pressure on human and financial resources among the authorities involved in border management, the pressure on other resources is steadily increasing: the large border crossings at the airports of arrival will soon reach the limit of their spatial and logistical capacities. This due firstly to the rising volumes of passengers and secondly to the use of new border control infrastructure (e.g. self-service systems\(^{37}\) for better management of the rising volume of passengers). The development of infrastructure relevant to border control is largely dependent on the available space, which, depending on the location, cannot necessarily be expanded as and when required.

\(^{37}\) See also Chap. 6.1.
5. Horizontal themes

As already mentioned in Chapter 3.3, the three horizontal themes discussed below have an overarching importance for all components of the strategy (Chapter 6) – even if they are not decisive to the same extent in every case. In the following remarks, only the overarching considerations are discussed. The practical relevance of the horizontal themes, however, (as far as it is decisive) will be examined under the individual elements, where any strategic goals required will also be formulated.

5.1 Respect for fundamental rights

Fundamental rights originate from various international and national legal documents, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights98, the European Convention on Human Rights99 and the Swiss Federal Constitution100. They are universally valid and a benchmark for any official action, and thus also for integrated border management.

Back in the 2012 IBM Strategy, the conformity of border management with the law and human rights was pinpointed as one of the four general goals. As a strategic guideline, the 2012 IBM Strategy stipulated that border management should respect human rights and offer persons seeking protection from persecution access to suitable procedures. These principles are also found in the current Vision for Integrated Border Management (see Chapter 2). Switzerland is thus following the European border management strategy, according to which fundamental rights, including the principle of non-refoulement, must be upheld to the fullest extent in order to strengthen mutual trust in relation to all border management and repatriation measures. In particular, respect must be given to the rights of persons in need of protection and to the rights of minors.

As a horizontal theme, respect for fundamental rights is by its nature a red line running through all the elements of border management. The following remarks provide a few examples that illustrate how respect for fundamental rights influences the individual components.

Swiss border controls are carried out in full compliance with Articles 3 and 6 of the Schengen Borders Code, while preserving fundamental rights and freedoms. In addition, border control officials follow the recommendations of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, which are also expressly mentioned in the directives issued on border control procedures. Cantonal police officers are also subject to the provisions of the cantonal legislation on policing matters. This legislation expressly requires respect for constitutional rights, human dignity and the principle of proportionality. Violations of these provisions may lead to disciplinary measures or even to prosecution. In the SBG, which as part of the FCA carries out control duties on external and internal borders based on customs law and on delegation agreements with the cantons, any misconduct relating to respect for fundamental rights may also result in disciplinary or criminal penalties.

As part of training, the issue of fundamental rights is given high priority. Fundamental rights constitute a separate training block for various border control authorities, with eight to eighteen lessons. In addition to this, border control officials are taught subjects such as ethics, asylum law and data protection. Every border control officer is comprehensively trained before beginning duties so that they can carry out their work with the required knowledge and awareness.

In relation to internal security and combating terrorism, respect for fundamental rights should not be regarded as conflicting, but as complementary policy objective101. This EU statement of policy is also reflected at national level. According to the Federal Council’s security policy report, respect for human rights is among Switzerland’s wider security policy interests102. This policy is also specified in the strategy for combating terrorism, which states that measures to combat terrorism are based on international law, and in particular on human rights103.

Respect for fundamental rights forms the basis for trust-building state action. The present strategy should contribute to ensuring that fundamental rights are accorded the required importance in all aspects of border management.

5.2 Education and training

Sound education and training adapted to the function, tasks, skills and competences of the staff is an essential requirement for professional, legally compliant, efficient and high-quality104 border management. This is essential if border management is to make an effective contribution to security, combat illegal cross-border migration successfully, leave bona-fide-travellers largely inconvenienced, encourage cooperation with other actors and make suitable use of state-of-the-art technologies. Accordingly, properly structured education and training based on uniform standards is vital to achieving the Vision for the 2027 border management strategy.

Border management issues are a concern for various federal and cantonal authorities in the Swiss state structure. These actors are each responsible for training their own staff so that they are able to carry out the tasks assigned to them in accordance with cantonal, national or international law (in particular the Schengen Acquis). This means that there is no standardised training syllabus in many fields. Education and training courses differ considerably from authority to authority, which inevitably leads to differences in standards of work and levels of quality.

The necessity for uniform training standards was already recognised in the 2012 IBM Strategy in relation to the border control component105. In the 2014 IBM Action Plan, the actors involved were only able to agree on one measure106, which although implemented was not and still is not suitable for fully achieving the desired objective of standardised training. The issue of training in relation to the activities of foreign representatives was also a subject considered in the 2012 IBM Strategy107. However, target attainment in relation to this also fell short of expectations, as the measures related to achieving this sub-goal were all made dependent on a list of “hot-spots” (i.e. foreign representations under particular migratory pressure), which was not realised in the form originally planned.

In view of this, the current strategy must also prioritise education and training if it is to satisfy the demands of its Vision.

98 Communication 2015/185/COM from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The European Agenda on Security, of 28.04.2015, p. 3.
100 2014/185/COM from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The European Agenda on Security, of 28.04.2015, p. 3.
101 See Objective 3.1.2-1: ‘Border control staff training follows the same standards and is completed with a set of exams with harmonised content.’
102 See Objective 3.1.2-2: ‘E-learning tool for basic and continuing training in the field of border control’. 103 See Objective 1.1-1-3: ‘Training module “Illegal migration and people smuggling at their location.”’
5.3 Research and innovation

In order to implement border control in accordance with national law and the provisions of the Schengen Acquis, the Swiss authorities rely on innovative solutions. Research is a key element, in particular for the use of state-of-the-art technologies in the border control process (see Chapter 6.9).

At European level, under Article 37 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 on the European Border and Coast Guard, Frontex is required to actively pursue research and innovation activities in relation to integrated European border management. Frontex passes on the results (in accordance with Article 50 of Regulation 2016/1624) to the European Parliament, the member states and the Commission. In addition, Frontex supports the member states and the Commission in identifying suitable research topics and in devising and conducting EU framework programmes for research and innovation, and implements the parts of these framework programmes that are relevant to border security.

At national level, the authorities concerned are themselves responsible for keeping abreast of the latest research and for encouraging the quest for innovative solutions. At the same time, however, it makes sense to exploit as many synergies as possible, both at European and at national level. This need is already being taken into account to a certain extent, in that for example the FCA (SBG) and the cantonal police forces are the E-Government Strategy Switzerland, the 2018–2022 National Strategy to protect Switzerland against cyber risks and the programme on the harmonisation of Swiss police information technology (HPi) (see also Chapter 6.9).

Switzerland is already pursuing several strategies in relation to research and innovation, which prioritise matters such as digitalisation, process automation, use of state-of-the-art technologies and the exchange of information, and which are therefore also of crucial importance for border management.

In October 2011, the Federal Council signed the Tallinn Declaration on eGovernment49, which aims to provide a joint basis for making progress with the digitalisation of the Federal Administration not only at a national, but also at an international level. The declaration covers intercantonal and international cooperation, as well as the exchange of knowledge and the exploitation of expertise with the aim of benefiting from already existing solutions and jointly tackling cross-border tasks and processes.

Further national strategies relevant to border management are the E-Government Strategy Switzerland, Digital Switzerland, the 2018–2022 National Strategy to protect Switzerland against cyber risks and the programme on the harmonisation of Swiss police information technology (HPi) (see also Chapter 6.9).

In addition, the federal authorities have run and are running a variety of border-management-specific research projects. Worth noting here are the mid-term evaluation carried out by ISF Borders Switzerland (2017)53, the study on the economic effects of Switzerland’s association with Schengen55 and the external evaluation of the 2012 IBM Strategy56.

Also relevant to the border management process is the DaIT transformation programme57, which aims to bring the FCA into the digital era by 2026, and which will find a solution to the current silo-type organisation structure with its clear separation between the movement of persons and that of goods and the related inflexible deployment of staff resources. The programme consists of seven projects, all aiming to achieve strategic goals. They include projects to renew the border control software and to improve risk analysis. Particularly relevant for border management is the ‘Operations and planning’ project, which aims to improve the functioning of applications that control the deployment of operational staff (e.g. an operations management system) and to provide the central, joint and standardised documentation of control activities and results.

Overall, ever more rapid progress is being made with the various border management relevant developments, in particular in relation to technology. Accordingly, research and innovation are basic requirements for the successful implementation of all aspects that make up the Vision. At the same time, the human and financial resources that are available for conducting research in the field of border control are limited. As a result of Switzerland’s geopolitical situation, where airports are its only external borders, it would be presumptuous for Switzerland to expect to be among the Schengen States’ most innovative pioneers. Instead, it is important to benefit as much as possible from the innovations and findings made by other member states.

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47 E.g.: ‘Best Practice Operational Guidelines for Automated Border Control (ABC) Systems’ or ‘Best Practice Technical Guidelines for Automated Border Control (ABC) Systems’.


51 https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/51396.pdf

52 https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/51406.pdf

53 https://intranet.bfm.admin.ch/intrabfm-publ/content/berichte/forschungsfonds/bericht/rechval-ifo-grenzland.pdf

54 http://www.dazit.admin.ch


57 http://www.zaart.admin.ch
The components of the strategy mentioned in Chapter 3.2 provide a framework for the content of this strategy. In the following remarks, a brief summary of each of the eleven components is provided that analyses the current structure and sets out the strategic goals.

6. Components

6.1 Border control

At present, Switzerland has what is essentially a technically well-equipped system of controls on the Schengen external borders that are carried out by professional staff and that meet the current requirements. Selective improvement measures, as regular Schengen evaluations\(^{32}\) have shown, have been and are being quickly implemented and do not adversely affect this general assessment.

However, this does not hide the fact that in coming years demands will continue to grow considerably as a result of legal and technical developments and a steady increase in passenger numbers.

In operational terms, a paradigm change is imminent, in which the standard procedure for border controls will no longer simply involve the comparison of data, but also the recording, storing, mutation and deletion of data (for more details on this, see Chapter 6.9). At the first control line, this will generally make the control process more time consuming, complex and costly. Recording all the entry and exit data relating to third-country citizens will also lead to cases in which existing data have to be corrected or missing data added. As a result, processes will change at the second control line as well, and the workload will increase markedly. Given that staffing levels at the major airports are currently only barely adequate or even too low\(^{33}\), the workload for staff is thus likely to increase even further and the recruitment of additional staff will be essential. Furthermore, it can only be assumed that the potential increase in efficiency due to process automation and the interoperability of systems will not be enough to compensate for the increased need for resources to deal with the rising numbers, costs and complexity of controls.

The technical requirements that the control staff will have to meet will also continue to increase and even greater professionalism will be necessary. For staff who are responsible not only for border control but also for other policing or customs-related duties, this may well become increasingly difficult or even no longer possible. The Schengen external borders must be controlled everywhere according to the same principles. Teaching these principles properly in comprehensive education and training courses requires a high level of expertise that is currently only available to a sufficient extent in two of the present eight border control authorities. In view of this, the merger of the current training courses to provide a national Swiss border control training programme must become a priority strategic goal.

In technical terms, the changes described will necessitate a conversion of the existing border control applications from simple comparison systems to comparison and recording systems that must also interact with an ever-increasing number of other systems. As two different border control applications are still in operation, these adaptations must be carried out twice in every case and both systems must be separately connected to the required peripheral systems. In addition, there are the challenges that could result from the possible splitting-up of the border control process; in future this may be carried out (depending on the scenario, in some or in all cases) by means of self-service systems (for example kiosks). This will further increase the complexity of the control process\(^{34}\).

For smaller airfields without any permanent control infrastructure, these changes mean that either fixed control desks with the required hardware will have to be installed, or that infrastructure will be developed or purchased that provides the functionalities necessary to carry out mobile border crossing controls.

Increasing computerisation also brings the risk that human perception and profiling based on observation will take a back seat. Special attention must be paid to avoiding this in the education and training of the control staff in the future.

Due to the close mutual dependence between border control and airport infrastructure (such as the provision of waiting rooms and a sufficient number of border control counters and offices or the physical separation of passengers travelling within Schengen and those travelling to and from third countries), the changes described will also have an effect on the infrastructure of airports with an external border, but in particular that of international airports. These airports will have to provide new infrastructure, such as larger waiting rooms and possibly additional control desks and/or sites for e-gates and self-service systems, if need be. Although in most cases it ought to be in the interest of airport operators to adapt their infrastructure suitably in good time, currently there is still no legal requirement for an airport operator to provide the infrastructure needed to ensure an orderly border control process.

6.2 Search and rescue operations at sea

As a landlocked country with no sea borders, Switzerland does not maintain a maritime search and rescue service. Accordingly, the strategic component mentioned in Article 4 let. b of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 on the European Border and Coast Guard is of no practical relevance to the Swiss strategy.

Due to Switzerland’s lack of maritime training and operational experience, participation in joint Frontex operations is not a priority in the Swiss border management strategy.

\(^{32}\) Most recently that of February 2018. The detailed evaluation reports and resulting recommendations are classified and thus not accessible to the public.

\(^{33}\) The 2018 Schengen Evaluation of external borders and the baseline assessments by Frontex from 2017 and 2018 regard the staffing levels in ZRH and GVA, at least in relation to certain functions, as insufficient, and recommend additional selective recruitment.

\(^{34}\) See also the remarks and goals formulated in Chapter 6.9.
6.3 Risk analysis

For as long as there is a prosperity gap between Switzerland and Europe and many parts of the rest of the world (in particular Africa), people from these regions will attempt to travel to Europe, legally or illegally. In view of this and of constant population growth in many African states, the management and control of migration, and the efficient and successful combating of illegal migration will become increasingly important. It is therefore essential that the risk analysis at national and at European level continues to be developed and made more efficient. In addition, a comprehensive understanding of the risk and threat situation is essential to combating cross-border crime successfully. This is the only way in which challenges that change rapidly and which often arise suddenly can be recognised and overcome, and the only way in which targeted migration controls that affect bona-fide travellers as little as possible can succeed.

In Switzerland, various authorities at national and cantonal level have considerable knowledge of illegal migration matters (e.g. SEM, FCA, Fedpol, CD, Zurich airport police, cantonal migration offices, etc.). This knowledge and its results have yet to be properly linked up in a central location, so that the preparation of a comprehensive national situation report or national risk analysis is not currently possible. The information available on illegal migration is not available to all levels of all the authorities concerned. This is an issue in particular for staff in the police, border control, migration offices, customs posts and consulates, who are in direct contact with potentially illegal immigrants or residents. Often they are unaware that analytical products are already available, in some cases even freely accessible, and that analytical results have yet to be properly disseminated. This is an issue that is even more pronounced concerning migrants to Switzerland from the south and east, from Turkey and the Balkans, where the radiation of the conflict is often not recognized.

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The creation of a national risk analysis unit in accordance with current European standards (at present CIRAM 2.0) requires additional resources. None of the current analysis units have the required capacities to take overall responsibility for the national analysis. This includes the SEM unit, which has been assigned overall responsibility. In addition, in many places there is a lack of resources available to be able to supply methodologically correct contributions to an analysis of this type on a regular basis. A national analysis will not however replace the specific analyses made by the participant authorities. It will expand their basis and establish their general context. A national risk analysis can only be conducted if additional resources are made available. It is not possible to estimate what is required, as it depends on how extensive a national risk analysis is planned to be.

Switzerland’s federal structure makes it difficult to set up a national risk analysis. The responsibility for border control was originally that of the cantons, but several cantons have assigned responsibility for border control at the airports on their territory to the FCA. The cantons in certain cases have different strategies for dealing with frontier protection and combating illegal migration. Ensuring standardised working methods in the cantons and training the cantonal analysts, where appropriate, according to the current European standards are also challenges that are unlikely to be met without additional resources. In addition, the federal authorities do not have the power to issue orders to the cantonal authorities in all areas of responsibility. This makes it difficult to introduce a national risk analysis and to implement measures in response to the results of such an analysis.

A national risk analysis is also a requirement for achieving the CCIPD’s plan to improve strategic coordination between police forces and prosecution services (POLSTA).

As part of the present strategy, it will be necessary to examine whether a national risk analysis requires to be implemented through ordinances or by an act of parliament.

In view of this, the following strategic objectives must be pursued in relation to risk analysis:

- The national and cantonal authorities which are decisive to the risk analysis relating to the external border work according to the current European standards. They contribute with their resources and their knowledge to the creation of the national risk analysis.
- The analysts receive the required education and training in the application of the current European standards.
- A formalised national risk analysis structure has been created that includes all the decisive actors and which has defined tasks and responsibilities. The Confederation and cantons provide all the required additional resources at their respective levels.

6.4 Frontex-supported cooperation between Schengen Member States

Because of its geographical situation, Switzerland has a keen interest in ensuring that the external border protection system works well. Participating in Frontex operations is an important instrument in its strategy of pre-entry measures and in guaranteeing Switzerland’s internal security, just as in the other Schengen States. Through exchanges between border protection experts, familiarity with other countries’ organisational structures is encouraged and at the same time a faster flow of information is guaranteed. Active participation in Frontex operations is therefore expedient both from a directly tactical and operational standpoint and with a view to encouraging solidarity. In the future Frontex will play an even more crucial role in external border protection. The negotiations just concluded on a new Frontex regulation seek to further empower the agency in operational terms. It can therefore be assumed that all Schengen States will have to increase the numbers of human resources participating in Frontex operations. Switzerland will also continue to make its contribution to external border protection. Border protection experts will receive high quality training according to the requirements. To improve coordination in the project and training sectors, the process of providing information will be standardised with fixed tasks and responsibilities. In addition, the partner authorities involved will be kept up-to-date via expert bodies at Frontex.

With a view to achieving the Frontex goal of promoting cooperation with authorities in the field of customs control, the SBG officers, because of their existing responsibilities as part of the FCA, can already make a highly competent and professional contribution. In particular, the ongoing organisational development of the FCA takes this need into account.

These considerations result in the following strategic goals / focus areas:

- The availability of border protection experts to reinforce external border protection in Frontex operations is guaranteed in terms of numbers and quality, while still taking account of Switzerland’s national requirements.
- Operational readiness in terms of a ‘Rapid Pool’ to support other Schengen States in the event of unusual and disproportionate migratory pressure or some other unusual and disproportionate challenge is also guaranteed.
- Resources are available to conduct an assessment of weak points and any shortcomings identified on Switzerland’s external borders will be consistently eliminated.
6.5 Cooperation within and between Schengen Member States

Thanks to the goals set out in the 2012 IBM Strategy and related measures in terms of the 2014 IBM Action Plan, cooperation at a national and international level in many areas has been improved18. Because of the close involvement of the participating authorities in drawing up both documents, the development processes in themselves led to better exchanges and closer cooperation among the participants. The 2012 IBM Strategy and the 2014 IBM Action Plan can therefore be regarded as the starting point for a new culture of cooperation on border matters19.

However, this positive trend cannot disguise the fact that in future even closer cooperation between the federal and cantonal authorities is needed, in order, based on the given allocation of tasks, to cope successfully with the increasing complexity of border management and the overlap of responsibilities in certain areas. Nowadays closer cooperation is commonly associated with increased expenditure on resources – whether in the form of new bodies and working groups or an increased frequency of meetings and need for consolidation, etc. In order to cushion the impact of this correlation, it will be essential to establish new and less resource intensive forms of cooperation. Here above all, more widespread use of state-of-the-art technologies must be considered (e.g. more frequent use of video conferences or common file storage systems for the efficient and simultaneous processing of documents during the consolidation phase, etc.). Where the cost of coordination exceeds a certain level, the circumstances (in particular the organisational situation) that led to this expenditure must be investigated.

At an international level, the situation as regards committees and working groups has changed considerably. In particular the progressive computerisation of border management has occasionally led to an almost inflationary development of new committees. For example, in connection with the Smart Borders project, on the European side alone (EU Commission and eu-LISA) there are around five committees or working groups, which each hold one to two-day meetings at various intervals. This results in around 96 days of meetings each year. In addition, there are three sub-working groups, which meet for at least 24 days. Overall this therefore results in around 120 days of meetings, which corresponds to half an FTE, so to speak. And this calculation does not include the travelling time and the time required for preparations and follow-up.

In view of the current resource situation, it is not normally possible to cover the cost of all these bodies. This makes it important to consider carefully whether it is in Switzerland’s interests and within its capacities to participate, and to use available resources sensibly – which ultimately means that a decision is regularly taken not to participate.

A further special challenge, above all in everyday, operational and non-institutionalised national cooperation, is presented by the regional and linguistic peculiarities that have an impact on cooperation. Experience has shown, for example, that information is commonly exchanged within a body’s own geographical or linguistic region only, although other partners could also benefit from having the information concerned. It is vital to overcome these barriers and thereby achieve networking at operational level across the board.

Some of the recommendations made in the 2018 Schengen Evaluation in relation to national cooperation demand an improvement in institutionalised and formalised cooperation structures. For example, it is required that cooperation be developed in general, through permanent and systematic cooperation structures. This demand can be accepted to a certain degree. To achieve sustainable and permanent cooperation, it is essential that certain basic elements of cooperation are mandatory and are therefore set out in writing, e.g. in the form of bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements or protocols. This is the only way, for example, in which arrangements originally made spontaneously and at personal level can be given a certain sustainability and offer all those involved the required legal and planning certainty. For example, it would be a good idea in relation to education and training (see Chapters 5.2 and 6.1) if the border control authorities entered into a written agreement on standardising training. In relation to cooperation between border control and customs authorities, the Schengen Evaluation recommends an intensification and formalisation of cooperation (expressly with regard to Zurich Airport). Where this is not yet the case, efforts must be made to intensify (e.g. through regular meetings, exchanges of information, etc.) and formalise cooperation. Consideration must also be given to whether the SEM as the supervisory authority for border control should be notified of agreements of this type.

It should however also be stressed that an institutionalised and formalised form of cooperation is neither desirable nor expedient in all areas and at all levels. Within Switzerland, cooperation, not least because of the small size of the country, is traditionally based on well-established personal channels, networks and contacts that work very efficiently both at operational and strategic levels without any formal structure. At an operational level in particular, it is occasionally important for information to be passed on quickly and easily. This successful and pragmatic form of cooperation also explains the persistent scepticism that certain actors show towards the formalisation of cooperation across the board.

Lastly, efforts must be made to extend the mandate of the Border Steering Group. This is also in line with a recommendation from the Schengen Evaluation, which called for a broadening of the Border Steering Group’s mandate so as to improve national coordination and control mechanisms in view of the decentralised allocation of tasks. Currently the Border Steering Group is concentrating on border control matters. Because border control increasingly overlaps with and depends on other areas of border management, it is appropriate that the Border Steering Group as the central, strategic body should expand its sphere of activity to include all aspects of border management (i.e. all its components), thus consolidating the integrated approach. Accordingly, its circle of participants should be expanded. In addition, consideration should be given as to whether and if so to what extent the Border Steering Group, currently conceived primarily as an advisory and discussion body, should be assigned more powers so that it is able to more actively shape the border management landscape.

These considerations result in the following strategic goals / focus areas:

• All the authorities involved in border management will intensify national and international cooperation at all levels in suitable ways. In order to make cooperation more sustainable and robust, it will become increasingly institutionalised.

• The growing need for cooperation nationally and internationally will be cushioned through suitable, resource efficient forms of cooperation.

• The mandate for composition of, and participants in the Border Steering Group will be expanded so that the Group can become more effective in all aspects of border management.

• Participation in international committees will depend on Switzerland’s interests, with priorities being defined in advance and resources being used in a targeted manner.

6.6 Activities in third countries

The activities in and with countries of origin and transit (third countries) primarily comprise the visa procedure, foreign detachments and international migration cooperation.

**Visa procedure**

The visa procedure is largely based on Schengen’s legal requirements and, through its upstream border and security checks, makes an important contribution to preventing irregular migration and cross-border crime.

Switzerland takes part in the discussions on the implementation and development of related legal principles at EU level and supports the aim of more closely linking visa policy with concerns over combating irregular migration. The available Schengen legal state should also be used strategically at national level so that costs and convenience in the visa procedure are kept as low as possible for people who travel regularly.

Potential conflicts of objectives between the visa procedure and other strategic interests (such as simplifying legal travel as part of tourism policy60) or host state policy61) should be reduced. Accordingly, Switzerland is supporting efforts to steer visa policy in a direction where flexibility is encouraged while at the same time security is reinforced, and, if necessary, efforts are also made to align this with cooperation with third countries on returns. For example, Switzerland has already made a request for the conclusion of a visa exemption agreement for diplomats and/or holders of official service passports systematically dependent on a reciprocal request for the conclusion of an agreement with regard to returns.

In view of occasionally inflexible visa procedures, increasing mobility among applicants may in future lead to a certain inconsistency. The technical potential in relation to digitalisation is well advanced. Sooner or later, it is expected that progress will be made with digitalisation in relation to visas as well, whether in the cooperation between the authorities or in the contacts with the visa applicant. Related discussions have already been held at EU level, and a study is in preparation. These developments must eventually also be expected at national level, in order that the visa procedure meets the demands of a digitalised world and of interoperability.

In view of the foregoing remarks, the following strategic goals will have to be pursued in relation to visa policy:

- Switzerland is committed at European level to having legal principles on visas that make legal travel simpler and which provide an efficient instrument for combating irregular migration and risks to national security.
- Switzerland is anticipating a trend towards digitalisation in relation to visas and is using the available resources to create the required regulatory and technical environment in the medium to long term that will enable the operational implementation of digital visa procedures.

**Foreign detachments**

The aim of the pre-entry strategy is to take measures in countries of origin and transit to prevent illegal migration towards Switzerland and towards the other Schengen states. These measures include the deployment of airline liaison officers (ALOs), police attachés (PAs/fedpol and FCA/62) and immigration liaison officers (ILOs). Increasing globalisation and mobility and related improvements in transport links require the focused and needs-based deployment of personnel beyond national borders. This is the only way to guarantee a faster and more direct exchange of information and close cooperation with the relevant partner authorities.

- Liaison officers (ALOs, PA/Attachés FCA and ILs) will be used as is appropriate in the circumstances to ensure close cooperation with the authorities in third countries and with the international liaison network.

International immigration policy

When it comes to cooperating with third countries, the many years of interdepartmental cooperation within the framework of international migration cooperation (IMC) is a real strong point. In political dialogues, the issue of migration is raised systematically. Also related to this is the strategic connection between development policy and migration, which is set out in the policy documents on development cooperation for the 2017–2020 period.

Cooperation with third countries on migration management not only requires mutual trust but also a legal framework and functioning structures in the third countries themselves. Through dialogue, agreements, partnerships and projects, Switzerland is seeking in particular to reinforce the systems that protect displaced persons and refugees in the countries of initial admission in order to counter the trends and incentives relating to irregular migration.

Even though Switzerland with its partnership-based approach enjoys a high degree of trust in third countries, the stability and thus the desired expansion of protection and migration systems in third countries remains a challenge. Crises and conflicts, scarce resources and state instability will continue to lead to new migration situations and thus represent the greatest risk to cooperation with third countries. Alongside bilateral dialogues and bilateral cooperation, multilateral processes and platforms offer opportunities to achieve the goals of Switzerland’s foreign policy on migration. At the same time, Switzerland, due to its geographical situation and partial affiliation to the European migration structure, is also dependant on developments at EU level. It benefits from the EU’s foreign policy clout, but is also affected in specific cases both by conflicts between the EU and third countries and by conflicts within the EU. In relations with third countries, a balance must be struck between autonomous, flexible and credible partnerships on the one hand and the goal of a coherent European immigration policy on the other.

These considerations result in the following goal for migration policy:

- Switzerland will deliberately pursue migration dialogues with significant countries of origin and transit and aim to formalise cooperation by entering into agreements or partnerships.

6.7 Controls within the Schengen area (including border controls within the Schengen area)

With regard to controls within the Schengen area, Switzerland already has a range of instruments available for combating illegal migration and cross-border crime. First and foremost are police cooperation agreements with neighbouring countries. These provide a vital foundation for developing international police cooperation and the exchange of information. On their basis, joint operations can be carried out and support services provided in the event of major incidents or accidents. Switzerland is ready to update these cooperation agreements where required, and to expand their scope in cooperation with its neighbouring countries.

The agreements between the FCA and the cantons are also valuable instruments for guaranteeing security in the Schengen area and within Switzerland. Based on these agreements, the FCA (SBG) is taking on additional policing tasks and carrying these out both in customs offices and at customs posts and as part of its mobile controls in the defined area of operations, i.e. at the border. This allows synergies to be exploited. In addition, the FCA (SBG), based on the Customs Act, can carry out policing measures around the country, without violating cantonal sovereignty in policing matters. This system of customs checks is therefore a proven measure for combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime as well. However, given the allocation of responsibilities, there is also a certain potential for conflict, as the cantonal police forces and the FCA/SBG for example have different rules on intervention and there is a lack of uniform standards for operational priorities. For example, different operational resources are available at federal and cantonal level, and the level of human and financial resources also differ. This may have a
negative impact on combating illegal or transit migra-
tion. Although the agreements between the cantons
and the FDF are an important step towards combating
illegal migration more comprehensively and effectively,
they cannot eliminate the disparities mentioned in
every case.

Good and close cooperation between the authorities
responsible for controls both within the Schengen
area and within Switzerland is an essential element in
guaranteeing and maintaining security in the Schengen
area. Cooperation is enhanced by the increased use
of state-of-the-art technologies that enable illegal
migration and cross-border crime to be fought suc-
cessfully. In order to achieve productive cooperation
and maintain it in the long term, it makes sense if all
control authorities have an operational doctrine for
border management that is as similar as possible and
have the same or similar resources to carry out con-
trols, which they use according to standardised criteria.

Lastly, controls within Switzerland are also affected
by technical advances in border management. Mobile
controls in Switzerland are currently based on ana-
logue systems, but will have to be digitalised in order
to secure access to the relevant databases, in particu-
lar EES and VIS. Following the introduction of EES, for
example, there will be no need to stamp travel
documents, and border control officers will require
access to the EES database in order to identify over-
stay in stays. Then again, with the eViea, visa stickers in travel
documents will no longer be necessary, which means
that information in relation to visas will have to be
obtained electronically. In order to be able to carry out
efficient and informative mobile controls in Switzer-
land in the future, the control authorities will have to
upgrade their equipment and in particular will have
to rely on biometrics-based interrogators (see Chap-
ter 6.9).

These considerations result in the following strategic
goals:

- Switzerland is continuing to expand national coop-
eration between the authorities responsible for bor-
der controls within the country and cross-border
cooperation with neighbouring countries.
- Switzerland will continue to make use of the cus-
toms system to increase security in border areas.

6.8 Return

The federal policy on return primarily encourages
migrants to leave of their own volition, but also
involves the enforcement of judicial removal orders, in
some cases by using coercive enforcement measures.

Generally, cooperation with the countries of origin
on return works well. With some countries, agreements
and migration partnerships make a vital contribution.
There are, however, also numerous countries of origin
with which operational cooperation works smoothly,
even in the absence of any agreement on return.

With certain countries of origin, cooperation on return
has proven difficult. These are primarily the states on
the list of priority countries for returns, but certain
states with relatively few return cases also fall into
this category. In most cases where there are difficulties
with cooperation with the countries of origin, other Euro-
pean states face the same situation. For example,
Eritrea does not accept forced returns as a matter
of principle. And Algeria does not permit any other
European states to return persons on special flights.

The Federal Council has repeatedly stressed that it
regards better cooperation with these countries as a
priority and will take the measures required to achieve
this. In addition to making the best possible use of
the available national instruments for return, the efforts
of the European Commission to improve voluntary
and forced return measures also offers an option. As
part of its planned expansion of the European Border
and Coast Guard Agency in terms of personnel and
funding, the European Commission is also planning
to expand Frontex’s mandate with regard to returns.
In a new move, Frontex should also support member
states in reaching removal decisions, obtaining travel
documents and developing national return manage-
ment systems. In addition, the Agency also aims to
strengthen cooperation with third countries. The EU
discussions on amendments to Regulation 2016/1624/
EU on Frontex have already been concluded. In addi-
tion, Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive) has
been revised in order to make removal procedures
more efficient. Switzerland is following the discussions
and offering its opinion on specific amendment pro-
posals within the framework of various committees.

As a Schengen-associated state, Switzerland faces
quite specific challenges as a result of some of these
proposals. For example, Switzerland, due to its delay in
adapting the legislation, lacks the practical experience
required to be able to participate in the discussion
on new legal instruments on the basis of evidence it
has gathered, or Switzerland, as an associated state,
is unable to benefit from return agreements between
the EU and third countries.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that at a European
level, Switzerland is among the most efficient coun-
tries when it comes to the enforcement of removal
orders. This applies both to removals to the country
of origin and to Dublin transfers. For example, in 2017
Switzerland executed on average 57% of removals to
countries of origin, while in the European Union the
average was around 37%. It is worth remembering
that the effective number of exits is considerably
higher, as the numbers of persons who leave without
any checks is not recorded. Switzerland’s efforts with
regard to returns are also reflected in the declining
number of pending cases of enforcement of removal
orders. From 2013 to the end of 2017, the number of
pending enforcement cases fell from 7,293 to 4,115.
This represents a decline of 44%.

Return assistance is now an indispensable instrument
of Swiss asylum policy. Currently, around 90 persons
return to their country of origin every month with
the benefit of individual return assistance. Voluntary
return is the advantageous alternative to forced
return; it also remains the only option if the latter is
not feasible. Return assistance and the conduct of
country programmes often lead to more widespread
acceptance of return measures among the authorities
in the countries of origin; they are also a positive ele-
ment in the dialogue on migration. At a political level
return assistance and voluntary returns also increase
acceptance among interest groups and the general
public.

The Interdepartmental Structure for International
Cooperation on Migration (ICM Structure) – and thus
also interdepartmental cooperation with regard to
returns – was subjected to an external evaluation in
2016. The results showed that the existing structures
are appropriate and, by European comparison, mod-
ern and sophisticated. In particular, partner states
regard the regular exchange as part of the dialogues
and the range of topics as very important. At the
same time the analysis showed that the existing
national structure had shortcomings at a strategic
level. As a result, the ICM Structure has been modified
on certain points. The FDJP and the FDFA have signed
a supplementary agreement to this end which rein-
forces the proven structures and implements the rec-
ommendations of the external evaluation. At present
there is no further need for action on this front.

Based on the results of the Schengen Evaluation with
regard to returns, there is a particular need to adapt
or harmonise procedures in relation to the ordering
of removals. The existing discrepancies in the practices
of the various authorities and in the practices of indi-
cidual cantons must be reduced to a minimum. In

sache-curia-vida/geschatv14fla?flaid=20180809.
65 See also the report of the Control Committee of the National Council of 26 June 2018 on administrative detention in the field of asyl-
mu and the report the Parliamentary Control of the Administration for the attention of the Control Committee of the National Council of 1
November 2017 on administrative detention in the field of asylum.
66 According to Eurostat.
The term 'single search interface' indicates a standard search mask that can be used to query different information systems at the same time.

Measures will be examined that reduce or eliminate shortcomings in cooperation on returns with other states in the Schengen area. A further weakness is the somewhat inconsistent quality requirements in relation to biometrics also pose a challenge in technical terms. For example, the EU currently applies the standard of 500ppi for the resolution of fingerprints, whereas the national AFIS system requires 1000ppi. As a result, fingerprints in asylum cases are recorded at 1000ppi and stored in AFIS. For Eurodac and Asyl CS-VIS, they are downscaled to 500ppi. On the one hand, the higher resolution of 1000ppi in AFIS is of crucial importance to feed into law enforcement. On the other, this high-quality requirement leads to difficulties for police and border control authorities, as mobile equipment is only available for 500ppi. The situation will become even more problematic in future when the new Eurodac Regulation introduces the requirement to record all illegally resident third-country citizens in Eurodac.

At the same time, the new technical developments can be regarded as an obvious opportunity to organise the border control process more efficiently and to take account of the security aspect in particular; in that identity checks will become more reliable and exchanges between border control systems faster and more comprehensive. In view of the growing numbers of passengers, automation and thus the use of state-of-the-art technologies will also make a vital contribution to maintaining functioning controls at external borders.

The integration of various systems also means that border-control-relevant information can be used and analysed more efficiently and processes can be simplified. For example, the combination of border crossing data from Greek NIS and EeXs, the RA data from airports, the result of the APAPIR comparison and the data from the risk analysis could help to simplify certain processes. This is mainly because the border control authorities will know in advance whom they will encounter on the first control line and whether this person, for example, has scored a hit in a police search system even though this person is not the person actually sought by the police at all. In addition, by combining different systems, it will be possible to provide a more comprehensive view of the individual in question.

6.9 Use of state-of-the-art technologies

On the whole, Switzerland is well positioned when it comes to using state-of-the-art technologies. The Schengen-relevant systems and applications currently required are functional, and preparations for planned renewals at a technical level are progressing well.

The Swiss border control authorities already work with a single search interface68 that is integrated into the border control software, and some applications relevant to border control are already interoperable (ORBIS – ZEMS, ORBIS – AFIS, SIS – RIPOL, RIPOL – ASP-SLTD). Clear progress has also been made with the common definition of requirements and the procurement of border control systems. Here the HPi coordination programme is worth a special mention, and more use may be made of this in the future.

At the same time, however, there is still potential for improvement in relation to the joint procurement of new technological applications and in the exchange of know-how between participant authorities at federal and cantonal level and, where applicable, with other states in the Schengen area. A further weakness is that authorities with control duties within Switzerland lack infrastructure for reading and interpreting e-documents and databases such as VIS, SIS or (in future) EES.

The main risk in the use of state-of-the-art technologies lies in the constantly increasing complexity of the border control process. In the coming years, various new Schengen developments such as EES, ETIAS and interoperability will be integrated into the Swiss IT landscape. In addition, national systems, where required and possible, will increasingly have to be made more interoperable. In view of the complexity and the increasing interdependence of the various systems involved in the border control process, smaller police forces already rely on support from the Zurich Cantonal Police and the FCA (SBG). This dependency will probably intensify. The increasing focus on technological matters is also changing the responsibilities of border control authorities. With future systems such as EES, data will no longer simply have to be compared, but increasingly will have to be re-recorded and mutated, which will increase the workload on the first control line considerably. The re-recording of data and the reconciliation of different data files will also lead to contradictions coming to light that will then have to be investigated on the second control line, with the result that the workload will increase there as well. These tasks will require human resources with new requirement profiles. In the related education and training, special attention will have to be paid to ensuring that increasing computerisation does not supplant profiling based on human observation. The use of self-service systems and kiosks on the other hand will lead to the border control process being split up; although the upstream collection of the data will relieve the workload to a certain extent, it will also further increase the complexity of the control processes. In addition, qualified specialists will increasingly have to be employed for the conception, development, introduction and operation of the numerous systems and applications. This will also lead to costs for education and training and for hiring external specialists. As a consequence, the use of state-of-the-art technologies will only lead to resource savings in certain cases, not the majority, and in some cases will bring additional costs in the field of border control, as it will be essential to employ more staff.

A further key risk relates to the increasing dependence of the border control process on the availability and integrity of the technological systems. Even brief system failures may lead to gaps in the system that cannot be closed afterwards or can only be closed at considerable expense. A similar risk is also present at a European level, because if one of the central systems of eu-LISA were to fail, the exchange between the various national systems of the Schengen member states could no longer be guaranteed. Data from travellers already registered would have to be registered again, which would lead to a phenomenal increase in waiting times at airports, and also to significant loopholes in security.

The problem of increasing dependence on technical systems and applications lies not only in the possibility of a system failure, but also in increased vulnerability to cyber-attacks. The growing importance of the technology for border control and law enforcement will make it a potential target for cybercrime. As a consequence, measures to protect the systems against attack are set to become even more important.

The somewhat inconsistent quality requirements in relation to biometrics also pose a challenge in technical terms. For example, the EU currently applies the standard of 500ppi for the resolution of fingerprints, whereas the national AFIS system requires 1000ppi. As a result, fingerprints in asylum cases are recorded at 1000ppi and stored in AFIS. For Eurodac and Asyl CS-VIS, they are downscaled to 500ppi. On the one hand, the higher resolution of 1000ppi in AFIS is of crucial importance to feed into law enforcement. On the other, this high-quality requirement leads to difficulties for police and border control authorities, as mobile equipment is only available for 500ppi. The situation will become even more problematic in future when the new Eurodac Regulation introduces the requirement to record all illegally resident third-country citizens in Eurodac.

At the same time, the new technical developments can be regarded as an obvious opportunity to organise the border control process more efficiently and to take account of the security aspect in particular; in that identity checks will become more reliable and exchanges between border control systems faster and more comprehensive. In view of the growing numbers of passengers, automation and thus the use of state-of-the-art technologies will also make a vital contribution to maintaining functioning controls at external borders.

The integration of various systems also means that border-control-relevant information can be used and analysed more efficiently and processes can be simplified. For example, the combination of border crossing data from Greek NIS and EeXs, the RA data from airports, the result of the APAPIR comparison and the data from the risk analysis could help to simplify certain processes. This is mainly because the border control authorities will know in advance whom they will encounter on the first control line and whether this person, for example, has scored a hit in a police search system even though this person is not the person actually sought by the police at all. In addition, by combining different systems, it will be possible to provide a more comprehensive view of the individual in question.

68 The term 'single search interface' indicates a standard search mask that can be used to query different information systems at the same time.
which of these options is of any interest to Switzerland—Transit-Pax profile. Here the aim will again be to decide to make statistical statements, for example on the situation.

The use of state-of-the-art technologies is a key element of the Vision. On the one hand, it contributes to increased security, while on the other, it also takes account of the need to make the process of entering and leaving countries as smooth as possible for bona-fide-travellers. In addition, interoperability makes a vital contribution to combating illegal migration and cross-border crime, in that cooperation between national authorities, and above all between the national authorities, and above all between the authorities in the various Schengen member states, will be improved. However, it must be remembered that Switzerland faces a major challenge in implementing the mandatory systems, with the result that few resources will remain for further technological innovations. As a result, there can be no demand to be on the front line in the development and use of state-of-the-art technologies. Instead the aim must be on the front line in the development and use of innovations. As a result, there can be no demand to have the technical equipment (e.g. mobile interrogator devices) and trained personnel to be able to make practical use of the control options legally available to them.

The control-related infrastructure is optimally protected against any form of cyber-attack or manipulation, and contingency plans have been made for dealing with system failures.

When procuring control-related infrastructure, potential synergies with Schengen States will be consistently identified and exploited.

Switzerland will ensure that its national systems are linked as required with the EU central systems.

These considerations result in the following strategic goals:

- Control staff will work with standardised systems/applications for border control and for identity checks on foreign nationals within Switzerland.
- Border control, police and migration authorities will have the technical equipment (e.g. mobile interrogator devices) and trained personnel to be able to make practical use of the control options legally available to them.
- The control-related infrastructure is optimally protected against any form of cyber-attack or manipulation, and contingency plans have been made for dealing with system failures.
- When procuring control-related infrastructure, potential synergies with Schengen States will be consistently identified and exploited.
- Switzerland will ensure that its national systems are linked as required with the EU central systems.

6.10 Quality control mechanisms

Suitable (standardised) quality control mechanisms help to guarantee security in the Schengen area and to combat illegal immigration and people smuggling.

Switzerland reviews its compliance with national and international regulations on external borders through national audits and internal revisions and has its own experts on Schengen Evaluations. The annual vulnerability assessments carried out by Frontex make a further important contribution to protecting the external borders. With these instruments, Switzerland basically has a clear and appropriate quality assurance mechanism that can continually review the effective implementation of Integrated Border Management and react quickly to challenges. However, the audits do not cover every aspect of Integrated Border Management.

A good and standardised quality control system also requires sufficient (human and financial) resources. The human resources include both using specialists in Switzerland and participating in evaluations in other Schengen States. Switzerland recognises the need for and the benefits of this participation and, insofar as it can, it regularly sends experts to the evaluations. Although Switzerland has already participated in the European training programmes, there is no systematic planning coordinated between the SEM and border control authorities on training and on the use of evaluation specialists on external borders. This compromises knowledge transfer, has a negative impact on quality, and prevents Switzerland from benefiting from the experience it would gain from the evaluation of other states for the purpose of improving its own quality.

Although the quality of the Swiss border management system can basically be regarded as good – as has been confirmed by previous Schengen evaluations and vulnerability analyses – there is in view of the current rather rudimentary quality control mechanisms a certain risk that the identification and rectification of quality-related defects will be delayed and heavily dependent on external evaluations and analyses. In addition, Switzerland is currently unable to provide all the data required for the vulnerability analysis (see also Chapter 6.4 and the strategic goal formulated there).

According to the Vision, the 2027 BMW Strategy should respect both human rights and European and national law and at the same time contribute to the security of the Schengen area and of Switzerland. In order to meet these requirements, suitable quality control mechanisms are needed that make regular review and, if necessary, rectification, possible.

In view of this, the foregoing considerations result in the following strategic goals:

- Switzerland will review its ability in terms of personnel and financing to increase its participation in the planning and conduct of evaluations of other Schengen States.
- Switzerland has an adequate quality assurance system that covers additional components of integrated border management.
- Switzerland has qualified and experienced evaluation specialists in all sub-sectors who participate regularly in the evaluation of other member states.
- Switzerland will review its ability in terms of personnel and financing to increase its participation in the planning and conduct of evaluations of other Schengen States.
6.11 Solidarity mechanisms

In order to promote internal security in the Schengen area, a fund is being set up for the European Union’s 2021–2027 multi-annual financial framework from which member and associated states will receive appropriate financial support. This Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF) is intended to promote integrated European border management at the external borders and the further development of the common visa policy.

The IBMF comprises two instruments: an instrument for financial aid in relation to border management and visas (IBMF-BMVI) and an instrument for financial aid in relation to customs control equipment. The IBMF-BMVI aims to help guarantee uniform high-quality controls at the external borders and to facilitate legal cross-border travel. In order to receive grants, Switzerland must prove that projects have been carried out that conform to the fund’s strategic orientation and objectives.

One strength of the IBMF-BMVI lies in the possibility of promoting strategic projects in relation to internal security and Swiss border management (e.g. border control infrastructure at Zurich Airport or the focus areas of the IBM strategy). A further positive point is the continuous networking between relevant actors within the Federal Administration and between the Confederation and the cantons. In addition, the management system is very well established and accepted. There is an awareness of partnership-type cooperation and steady improvement. The staff responsible have the required qualifications and experience.

However, a balance must always be struck between what is contributed to a funded project (e.g. in the form of the administrative workload) and its effect. A further weakness is the requirement that projects have to be funded in advance. In some circumstances, this reduces the incentive for a project organiser to apply for funding: the funds must be organised first and only flow in later. Familiarity with the instrument should also be increased and efforts should be made to raise awareness among those concerned. With the increased funding of the BMVI in comparison with its predecessor instrument, the question also arises of whether the resources previously put in place at the responsible authority are sufficient.

The main risk of the instrument is that the funding allocated to Switzerland will not be sufficiently used up. In addition, member and associated states must ensure that grants are used appropriately, and prevent or resolve any irregularities in the use of funds. Opportunities for the advantageous use of this instrument arise in particular in relation to Schengen-relevant IT systems (e.g. EES) and related hardware components (e.g. e-gates). The EU is heavily promoting their ongoing (further) development due to their importance in facilitating legal and combating illegal border crossings. The instrument could also be used in relation to visa policy, if effectiveness and efficiency in the issuing of visas can be increased by a link to EU systems and irregular migration can be reduced by posting liaison staff to third countries.

The objectives of the IBMF-BMVI offer the possibility of promoting larger IT projects relating to border management and to the focus areas of the IBM strategy. In both cases, the instrument can support the successful implementation of projects at national level and thus the ongoing developments towards effective and integrated European border management at the external borders. Effective and efficient management will mitigate the aforementioned main risk of insufficient take up of funding. The continuous checking and adaptation of the management system can also optimise the use of resources both by the responsible authority and by the project organisers.

As the requirement that projects must be funded in advance reduces the incentive for certain project organisers to request funding, alternatives should be tried out and, if appropriate, implemented. However, because its legal basis has already been decided, the BMVI has no room for manoeuvre here. Different approaches are therefore only conceivable for the post 2027 multi-annual financial framework and only to the extent that they are compatible with European Commission requirements.

These considerations result in the following strategic goals:

- The BMVI will support the realisation of the goals set out in the IBM Strategy.
- The national management system for the BMVI is efficient, effective and streamlined. It causes project participants a minimum of administrative work.
- Consideration is being given to an alternative to the mandatory advance funding of projects implementing integrated border management measures from 2027.

69 For example, immigration liaison officers (ILOs) or airline liaison officers (ALOs).
7. Implementation

7.1 Action plan

The impact and the success of the strategy depend on the structures and means by which it is transformed into specific measures and the way in which these measures are implemented. The implementation plan can be based on the experiences gained from the 2012 IBM Strategy9 and the 2014 IBM Action Plan10. At the same time, the findings and recommendations from the evaluation of the previous strategy and of the Action Plan on Integrated Border Management11 must be taken into account.

Among the evaluation recommendations is the clear setting of priorities. Any action plan should focus on measures that require fundamental coordination and cooperation between the participant authorities and in which no progress could be made without the IBM cooperation between the participant authorities and in which no progress could be made without the IBM strategy. Accordingly, it is planned to subdivide the measures into key measures and standard measures, whereby the key measures meet the above-mentioned prioritisation criteria. The Border Steering Group has a crucial role with regard to these measures. It should act as the ordering authority and in this role is also responsible for controlling the project and with it the measures. The project management will be assigned to the lead authorities. In relation to the standard measures, the lead authority is responsible for the project control and management. In particular, the initiation of a measure is the responsibility of the individual authorities. They notify the SEM, in its role as the authority responsible for managing the Action Plan, of measures that contribute to achieving the goals laid down in the strategy, and are themselves responsible for their implementation. The task of identifying key measures is that of the expanded Border Steering Group, which also decides on the standard measures to be included in the Action Plan.

Thus, in relation to key measures, the Border Steering Group plays a substantially more important role, whereas in the case of standard measures, it is primarily the lead authorities that bear responsibility. In addition, the Action Plan should be dynamic, so that it can react whenever appropriate to changes in the environment and in influential factors. This means that the Action Plan should be regularly updated, i.e. new measures can be adopted at any time with the consent of the expanded Steering Group, and ongoing measures can be adapted to changed conditions and needs. As a result, the Action Plan will not be available as a definitive approved document, but solely as a continuously updated online version. This is the only way in which the desired dynamic and flexible structure of the Action Plan can be achieved. For the same reason, there will be no requirement for any political validation from the Federal Council or the CCJD. In relation to the Action Plan, the expanded Border Steering Group acts as the supreme oversight and approval body.

Accordingly, with regard to Action Plan, the following goal may be set.

- The Action Plan is sufficiently flexibly structured in view of the dynamics of the environment and the influential factors and focuses on measures that have a certain scope in terms of their need for coordination and their impact.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role11</th>
<th>Responsibility for standard measures</th>
<th>Responsibility for key measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project control: Overall control of the project and ensuring that the project goals are achieved</td>
<td>Lead authority</td>
<td>Expanded Steering Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project management: Devise project strategy, manage project and staff, conclude project</td>
<td>Lead authority</td>
<td>Lead authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct of the project: Establish project results and conduct quality assurance measures</td>
<td>Lead authority MB Behörden</td>
<td>Lead authority MB Behörden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Roles according to type of measure (simplified)

7.2 Strategic control

As explained in Chapter 7.1, the Border Steering Group12 (in particular in its expanded form) once again plays a crucial role in the realisation of the 2027 IBM Strategy and in the implementation of the Action Plan. In addition to its current control function at the level of the Action Plan, in the future it will also be responsible for control of the key measures of the Action Plan.

In view of these tasks, the Border Steering Group’s current mandate, which is essentially based on a voluntary commitment from the authorities involved and, significantly, has no statutory basis, appears to be insufficiently robust, which was also a finding of the Schengen Evaluation in 2018.

In addition to the goal already set in Chapter 6.5, which primarily aims at a thematic expansion of the Border Steering Group’s mandate, the mandate also needs to be reinforced in its formal and legal basis. This is all the more the case because the continuous development of an IBM strategy and its ongoing implementation in terms of an action plan constitutes a long-term task that is required by law, with the result that the bodies entrusted with this task must have a minimum legal basis. This reinforcement of the mandate is also in line with the recommendations of the 2018 Schengen Evaluation relating to implementation governance13.

This justifies adding the following strategic goal relating to control to the strategic goals defined on the basis of the analysis of the individual components:

- The establishment, tasks and powers of the Steering Group must be regulated by law.

11 Designation of roles, tasks, and requirements in accordance with Hermes Standard (See http://www.hermes.admin.ch/respublikation/index.html?element=kategorie_rolle.html). In accordance with Hermes, each role is carried out by a pre-determined person. In the current matrix, for the sake of simplicity, only the organisation that the responsible person has to provide is indicated
12 See Fn. 11.
13 The Council Decision addressed to Switzerland following the 2018 Schengen Evaluation contains the following two recommendations in relation to governance: ‘Develop a national administrative capacity to establish, implement and monitor the implementation of the integrated border management strategy’ and ‘Strengthen the national coordination and steering mechanism for border management by updating and expanding the mandate of the Border Steering Group to cover the whole integrated border management concept.’
7.3 Funding

The funding of measures to implement the IBM strategy has been and still is a matter for the federal and cantonal authorities responsible. This also means that the Border Steering Group, even after a statutory basis is given to its mandate as planned, will have no financial powers of its own – not even in relation to key measures. As a result, its ability to control such projects effectively through the strategic allocation of resources will also be severely limited in the future. Nor can the Border Steering Group offer any incentives to individual authorities to encourage them to implement standard measures.

A possible source of funding is the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF) mentioned in Chapter 6.11. However far from all IBM-relevant measures can be (re-)financed using resources from the IBMF, which means that ways and means will have to be sought outside the relevant IBMF measures in order to create the incentives required for implementing the IBM strategy. To this end a mandate should be obtained from the Federal Council to conduct a detailed examination of an incentive system.

This gives rise to the following strategic goal with regard to funding IBM implementation:

- Consideration is being given to creating incentives for implementing the IBM Action Plan.

7.4 Communication

In recent years, IBM has become a widely used and familiar brand in the professional circles concerned. This brand character and the image it conveys must be further consolidated.

To succeed with this, specific measures are required. In particular, the plan is to create a new IBM logo and produce an instructional and promotional film on Integrated Border Management.

Irrespective of the measures actually taken in the course of implementation, these considerations result in the following strategic goal:

- Specific measures will be taken to further consolidate and publicise the concept and content of Integrated Border Management among the federal and cantonal administrations involved and at a political level.

8. Strategic goals

The overview of the goals set for each of the components is therefore as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Strategic goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Border control</td>
<td>Illegal border crossings will be consistently prevented at all Swiss external borders. Recognisable threats to security will be identified and dealt with successfully, where appropriate in the course of border controls. Undesirable effects on legal travel will be limited to a minimum. The border control authorities have specialised and specifically trained professional control staff at their disposal in sufficient numbers and with a sufficient level of sustainability. The border control authorities have an adequate technical and physical infrastructure at their disposal that is adapted to the volume of passengers and which enables efficient border controls to be carried out in accordance with the legal requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk analysis</td>
<td>The national and cantonal authorities which are decisive to the risk analysis relating to the external border work according to the current European standards. They contribute with their resources and their knowledge to the creation of the national risk analysis. The analysts receive the required education and training in the application of the current European standards. A formalised national risk analysis structure has been created that includes all the decisive actors and which has defined tasks and responsibilities. The Confederation and cantons provide all the required additional resources at their respective levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation between Schengen Member States supported by Frontex</td>
<td>The availability of border protection experts to reinforce external border protection in Frontex operations is guaranteed in terms of numbers and quality, while still taking account of Switzerland’s national requirements. Operational readiness in terms of a ‘Rapid Pool’ to support other Schengen States in the event of unusual and disproportionate migratory pressure or some other unusual and disproportionate challenge is also guaranteed. Resources are available to conduct an assessment of weak points and any shortcomings identified on Switzerland’s external borders will be consistently eliminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National and International cooperation between Schengen Member States</td>
<td>All the authorities involved in border management will intensify national and international cooperation at all levels in suitable ways. In order to make cooperation more sustainable and robust, it will become increasingly institutionalised. The growing need for cooperation nationally and internationally will be cushioned through suitable, resource efficient forms of cooperation. The mandate for, composition of, and participants in the Border Steering Group will be expanded so that the Group can become more effective in all aspects of border management. Participation in international committees will depend on Switzerland’s interests, with priorities being defined in advance and resources being used in a targeted manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component</td>
<td>Strategic goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities in third countries</strong></td>
<td>Switzerland is committed at European level to having legal principles on visas that make legal travel simpler and which provide an efficient instrument for combating irregular migration and risks to national security. Switzerland is anticipating a trend towards digitalisation in relation to visas and is using the available resources to create the required regulatory and technical environment in the medium to long term that will enable the operational implementation of digital visa procedures. Liaison officers (ALOs, PA/Attaches FCA and ILOs) will be used as is appropriate in the circumstances to ensure close cooperation with the authorities in third countries and with the international liaison network. Switzerland will deliberately pursue migration dialogues with significant countries of origin and transit and aim to formalise cooperation by entering into agreements or partnerships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls within the Schengen area (incl. border controls within the Schengen area)</strong></td>
<td>Switzerland is continuing to expand national cooperation between the authorities responsible for border controls within the country and cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries. Switzerland will continue to make use of the customs system to increase security in border areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Return</strong></td>
<td>The content of removal orders will meet minimum requirements that apply throughout Switzerland. Measures will be examined that reduce or eliminate shortcomings in cooperation on returns with countries of origin that result from Switzerland's status as a Schengen-associated state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Use of state-of-the-art technologies</strong></td>
<td>Control staff will work with standardised systems/applications for border control and for identity checks on foreign nationals within Switzerland. Border control, police and migration authorities will have the technical equipment (e.g., mobile interrogator devices) and trained personnel to be able to make practical use of the control options legally available to them. The control-related infrastructure is optimally protected against any form of cyber-attack or manipulation, and contingency plans have been made for dealing with system failures. When procuring control-related infrastructure, potential synergies with Schengen States will be consistently identified and exploited. Switzerland will ensure that its national systems are linked as required with the EU central systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quality control mechanisms</strong></td>
<td>Switzerland has an adequate quality assurance system that covers additional components of integrated border management. Switzerland has qualified and experienced evaluation specialists in all sub-sectors who participate regularly in the evaluation of other member states. Switzerland will review its ability in terms of personnel and financing to increase its participation in the planning and conduct of evaluations of other Schengen States.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Overview of the strategic goals
9. Annexes

9.1 Annex 1: Strategic links

Relevant national reference documents:

- Dispatch on the measures for strengthening Switzerland’s role as a host state dated 19.11.2014
- Report on international migration cooperation from February 2017
- Swiss Strategy for Combating Terrorism of 18.09.2015
- FCA strategic principles from February 2017
- Federal tourism policy dated 15.11.2017
- Harmonisation of Swiss police information technology (HPi)
- Swiss E-Government Strategy
- Digital Switzerland
- National strategy to protect Switzerland against cyber risks 2018–2022
- Tallinn Declaration
- Mid-term evaluation of ISF Borders Switzerland (2017)
- Study on the economic impact of Switzerland’s association with Schengen
- External evaluation of the 2012 IBM Strategy
- FCA’s DaziT Transformation Programme

Relevant European reference documents:

- Commission Communication of 13.05.2015 on the European agenda on migration
- Commission Communication of 06.04.2016 – Stronger and smarter information systems for borders and security
- Commission Recommendation of 12.05.2017 on proportionate police checks and police cooperation in the Schengen area
- Commission Recommendation of 03.10.2017 on the implementation of the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code on temporary re-introduction of border control at internal borders in the Schengen area
- Commission Communication of 14.03.2018 – on the implementation the European agenda on migration, including Annex 6

9.2 Annex 2: Lists

9.2.1 List of figures

Figure 1: 2027 IBM model

9.2.2 List of tables

Table 1: Overview of the strategy development process
Table 2: Volume of passengers (in thousands) at Swiss national airports from 2010 to 2018
Source: FOCA aviation statistics
Table 3: Numbers of persons detained internally
Table 4: Roles according to type of measure (simplified)
Table 5: Overview of the strategic goals

v numbers refused entry (Switzerland)

Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1104 on the implementation of the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code on temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders in the Schengen area dated 03.10.2017.